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Abstract 
 
The emergence of a Hong Kong identity was neither sudden nor preordained; instead, 
it was a gradual historical process, one that was decades in the making and the climax 
of which witnessed some of the most consequential political mobilisations in the history 
of modern China. This dissertation charts transformations in Hong Kong from 1949 to 
1997 concerning how men and women there interpreted their relationships with Great 
Britain, the People Republic of China (PRC), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
the ruling Chinese political organisation the partisans of which were always eager to 
recruit new supporters in the city. This project analyses how Chinese in Hong Kong 
evolved from sojourners in the city during the immediate postwar era, to members of 
a settled population who viewed the colony as their permanent home, and finally to 
engaged citizens who were willing and able to participate in protests or popular 
campaigns to defend what they perceived to be the interests of their Hong Kong. This 
dissertation examines how acts of oppression and injustices that occurred within the 
context of everyday life served as building blocks for political protests. Differing 
opinions regarding whether Hong Kong Chinese should be loyal to the regime in 
control of mainland China similarly led to political confrontations between pro-PRC 
partisans and local activists who were unconvinced that their Chineseness was 
dependent upon loyalty to Beijing. Replying upon interviews with witness to and 
participants of momentous events in the city’s past and utilising archival sources, this 
PhD thesis illustrates how the rise of a sense of belonging among Chinese in Hong 
Kong was inextricably tied with the development of the city’s ‘culture of protest’, as 
controversies that arose out of tensions between the local population and Beijing only 
highlighted that the soon-to-be-former British colony was and would likely continue to 
be a unique entity within the PRC even  after 1997. 
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Introduction 
Overview  
At midnight of June 30th, 1997, as British rule came to a peaceful end and the Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong officially became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) under the sovereignty of the PRC, China redeemed the humiliating defeat it had 
suffered in the First Opium War. If the cession of Hong Kong to the British Empire in the 
aftermath of the First Opium War was the commencement of the so-called ‘century of 
humiliation’, a period that witnessed China’s geopolitical decline during the final decades of 
Qing rule, then the city’s retrocession to Chinese sovereignty could be seen as yet another 
monumental step in the PRC’s relentless march toward the status of a leading world power. 
Even as Chinese global ascendency continued, however, certain segments of the Hong Kong 
population remained wary of the PRC, and the willingness of some local residents to participate 
in popular movements that were critical of the Hong Kong government could be seen as 
indicative of rising resentment against the policy choices adopted by the city’s political leaders. 
More than twenty years after the conclusion of British colonial rule, Hong Kong is still a vibrant 
society containing members who expect their voices to be listened to and respected by those in 
positions of power.  
Even during British rule, Hong Kong was seen by its residents as a unique Chinese 
society. This study chronicles the development of a Hong Kong identity from 1949 to 1997 
and explore the question of how inhabitants of the colony came to see themselves as a distinct 
group of Chinese. The central argument of this dissertation is that the emergence of a local 
identity among men and women of Hong Kong motivated them to challenge the legitimacy of 
political operatives who were perceived to be undermining the stability of the city.1 
                                                          
1 While this dissertation will focus on Hong Kong’s Chinese majority, Hong Kong, being a Chinese global city 
and a former British colony that served as Britain’s Far East trade and financial hub, has always been a 
multicultural society containing men and women of different races and faiths. Accordingly, there had been the 
publication of monographs in recent years that concentrated on Hong Kong’s cosmopolitanism. Emma Jinhua 
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There is a need to chronicle how expression of Hong Kong identity came to be 
associated with efforts by local men and women to resist political partisans who were seen as 
determined to undermine Hong Kong’s stability and how the territory came to be perceived as 
unique precisely because so many of its residents were able to defend their collective interests. 
Hong Kong was transformed from being the launching point of Chinese nationalistic agitations 
against British imperialism in the 1920s to a site of popular protests and mass mobilisations to 
defend the interests of the city in the 1980s and 1990s. My dissertation is the first to examine 
how the realisation that Hong Kong represented a distinct society motivated political activists 
to engage in mass political mobilisations to safeguard the city’s distinctiveness. 
Historiographical Review  
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the most prominent chroniclers of Hong Kong’s past, such 
as G. B. Endacott, Norman Miners, and Elizabeth Sinn, focused on the examination of Hong 
Kong’s political structure and cooperation between the Chinese elites and colonial officials in 
the governance of the colony.2 Works produced by Hong Kong specialists who were active 
from the 1960s to the 1980s therefore did not reveal much about the daily life of average men 
and women who did not reach the pinnacle of wealth and power. Nevertheless, G. B. Endacott 
was regarded as the ‘foremost historian of Hong Kong until the 1970s’, and Norman Miners’ 
                                                          
Teng’s monograph focused on the experiences of Eurasians in Hong Kong and examined how their lives and 
careers was shaped by global migration trends. Emma Jinhua Teng, Eurasian: Mixed Identities in the United 
States, China, and Hong Kong, 1842–1943 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). Paul O’Connor’s 
insightful work highlighted the vibrancy of the Muslim community in Hong Kong. Paul O'Connor, Islam in Hong 
Kong: Muslims and Everyday Life in China's World City (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012). John 
Nguyet Emi and Lisa Yuk-ming Leung produced an outstanding volume on the lives and daily challenges of 
South Asian minorities in Hong Kong. John Nguyet Emi and Lisa Yuk-ming Leung, Understanding South Asian 
Minorities in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014). 
2 G. B. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 1964); Norman Miners, The Government and Politics and Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1975); Elizabeth Sinn, Power and charity: A Chinese merchant elite in colonial Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003). Commenting on G.B. Endacott’s Government and People 
in Hong Kong, Hugh D. R. Baker argued that the work’s title was misleading, for Chinese inhabitants of the 
colony were almost entirely absent in the author’s analysis of constitutional development in Hong Kong. Hugh 
D. R. Baker, ‘Review of G. B. Endacott: Government and people in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: a Constitutional 
History', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 29. 1 (February 2006), 204-205 (pp. 204-205). 
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monographs are available in most university libraries as textbooks for undergraduate students.3 
Sinn’s monograph is still seen as a classic, as it shed light on how although 19th century Chinese 
merchants were not represented at the highest organ of state power, they still were relied upon 
by the British as vital partners in the governance of Hong Kong, especially since they wielded 
great influence in the colony due to their presence in charitable organisations that delivered 
social services to local residents. This reliance on local Chinese institutions to provide social 
services, especially in the domain of medical care, was still evident after the unveiling of Hong 
Kong Baptist Hospital in 1963, thus demonstrating the enduring effectiveness of the local elites 
as well as the organisations they led.4    
When it became evident that Hong Kong would once again become part of China in 
1997, the impending end to British rule created an imperative to rediscover a historical 
narrative whereby Chinese who resided in Hong Kong were not merely servants of the colonial 
state but were instead key participants in the Chinese resistance efforts against imperialism in 
the 20th century. Accordingly, in the 1990s, Ming K. Chan produced works that highlighted the 
role played by non-elite Chinese in various anti-colonial movements against British 
establishments in South China and rulers of colony in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.5 
Based on his dissertation on South Chinese labour movement from the late 19th century to the 
1920s, a group that was responsible for political actions that ‘came very close to liquidating 
British interests in South China’, Chan’s chapter in a collection of academic essays focusing 
on Hong Kong Chinese’s refusal to meekly submit to colonial authority was especially relevant 
at a time when there were widespread criticisms against Sino-British negotiations leading to 
                                                          
3 Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), p. 12. 
4 Michael Kam 甘穎軒, Quan ren yi zhi ban shi ji : Xianggang jin xin hui yi yuan sh i 全人醫治半世紀: 香港
浸信會醫院史 (History of Baptist Hospital since 1963)( Xianggang : San lian shu dian (Xianggang) you xian 
gong si, 2015), p. 30, p 84.  
5 Ming K. Chan, ‘Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict: Mass Mobilization and the Crisis of Legitimacy’, in 
Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992, ed. by Ming K. Chan (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 1994), pp. 27-59. 
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1997 that largely ignored the wishes of men and women residing in the colony.6 Chan’s works 
reveal that Chinese in Hong Kong possessed the capacity for mass mobilisation against 
unpopular government policies. Chan further emphasised that the colony had historically been 
governed by British rulers and their Chinese collaborators who were often unwilling and unable 
to improve the lives of lower class Chinese. 7  British governance, not surprisingly, was 
frequently dependent upon suppression of those who challenged colonial rule.  
The works of Chan therefore demonstrated the willingness of the Chinese workers in 
Hong Kong to combat their colonial masters and the important roles they played in successive 
local challenges to British rule. Indeed, the ‘bizarre status’ of Hong Kong as a Crown Colony 
that was tolerated by its population in the age of decolonisation emerged only after the colonial 
state successfully overcame political threats presented by pro-PRC partisans in the 1960s.8 The 
social-political peace that was prevalent in the 1970s, one that led scholars such as Peter Harris 
and Siu-kai Lau to view Hong Kong as essentially made up of apolitical Chinese, was a 
historical abbreviation, one that came about after the supporters of the CCP in Hong Kong, 
arguably the most powerful political group in the colony, was forced into retreat after its 
members had been defeated by the British in the 1967 riots.9 The cliché, that Hong Kong was 
fundamentally an apolitical colony, one that was governed by the ‘Jockey Club, Jardine and 
Matheson, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Governor – in that order’, was never an 
                                                          
6 Ming K. Chan, ‘Labor and Empire: The Chinese Labor Movement in the Canton Delta, 1895-1927’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Stanford University, 1975), p. 67. For a concise overview of Sino-British negotiations from the 
1980s to the 1990s, see Steve Tsang, Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), chapters 15-16.  
7  Ming K. Chan, ‘Hong Kong: Colonial Legacy, Transformation, and Challenge’, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 547, The Future of Hong Kong (Sep., 1996), 11-23 (p. 14-15); Ming  
K. Chan, ‘The Legacy of the British Administration of Hong Kong: A View From Hong Kong’, The China Quarterly, 
Issue. 151, (Sep 1997), 567-582 (p. 568); Ming K. Chan, ‘Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the 
Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-1990’, in The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese Sovereignty – An 
Interdisciplinary Reader, eds. by Ming K. Chan and Gerard A. Postiglione (Armonk: East Gate Book, 1996), pp. 8-
41 (p. 15).  
8 Peter Harris, Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1978), p. 132.  
9 Harris, Hong Kong, p. 57; Siu-kai Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press, 1984); 
Ming K. Chan, ‘Hong Kong Workers toward 1997: Unionisation, Labour Activism and Political Participation 
under the China Factor’, Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 47, Number 1, 2001, 61-84 (pp.63-
64).  
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accurate representation of the city’s complexity.10 Harris and Lau assumed that a unique and 
transitory period to be the norm in the history of British Hong Kong, a perception not shared 
even by colonial policymakers, as instead of assuming the political passivity of local residents 
to be permanent, they were actively enacting policies to secure the goodwill of the local 
population. The legitimacy of the colonial state was enhanced by its willingness to deviate from 
its lassize-faire economic outlooks, a development that was largely the by-product of how 
successive riots in 1966 and 1967 exposed the frustration felt by the average residents 
concerning the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor and the need of the colonial 
state to invest heavily in various social programs.11   
In spite of the overall contributions he made to Hong Kong studies and the fact that he 
was able to establish a truly novel historiographical framework by analysing successive 
challenges to British colonialism presented by the Chinese working class in Hong Kong and 
other parts of the Pearl River Delta, there were elements of the colonial past that were left 
unexplored by Chan. Chan either saw Chinese in Hong Kong as potential foot soldiers for 
popular mobilisation or a population that was largely left out of the machinery of government. 
There is a need to investigate how residents of Hong Kong could transform themselves, 
sometimes within a relatively short time span, from being members of a politically apathetic 
population, to partisans that played prominent roles in some of the most significant anti-
colonial movements in South China. While Chan did an excellent job in describing the often 
miserable working conditions of Chinese labourers in Hong Kong, he did not convey whether 
it was the accumulation of humiliating experiences while living and working in a colonial 
context, sudden eruptions of anti-colonial and nationalistic sentiments, or a combination of 
                                                          
10 Richard Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place - Borrowed Time (London: Andre Deutsch, 1968), p. 17. 
11 Carroll, Concise History, p.  150.  
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both that sparked acts of political mobilisations participated by Hong Kong’s Chinese working 
class.12 In other words, the voices of Chinese workers were missing from Chan’s works.  
Of course, this absence of Chinese workers’ voice should not be seen as a failing of 
Chan. In other British colonies, officials often obsessively chronicled the rituals and customs 
of their subjects for the purpose of formulating policies that would further consolidate imperial 
power.13 The determination to control all aspects of colonial life and the obsessive attention to 
detail that was common in other colonies manifested themselves in interactions between the 
colonisers and the colonised in British Hong Kong. As it was ably demonstrated by Christopher 
Munn, early colonial Hong Kong contained a substantial ‘apparatus of control and regulation’, 
and ‘[the] extraordinary powers accumulated’ by the colonial state ‘were repeatedly reworked, 
frequently supplemented, and only occasionally relinquished’.14 A powerful law and order 
apparatus was necessary to suppress ‘the periodic riots, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and 
disturbances that became a feature of life in Hong Kong in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries’.15 It was this obsession to maintain control and the resultant need to 
generate the paperwork and records necessary for the colonial machinery’s continued functions 
that gave Munn the archival sources he needed for his groundbreaking work. These records 
contained vital information on how the colonial government ruled its subjects, not how 
colonialism was viewed by Chinese in the colony. After all, how Chinese in the colony viewed 
British rule was less important than the enactment of laws and regulations to preserve colonial 
public order and the maintenance of statistics and other requisite information that would keep 
British policymakers most informed on how the Chinese population could be kept under control. 
                                                          
12 Chan, ‘Labor and Empire’, Chapter IV.  
13 For an in-depth examination on colonial officials’ compulsion to record and control the lives of their 
subjects, see Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Form of Knowledge: The British in India (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996).  
14 Christopher Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841-1880 (Surrey: Curzon 
Press, 2001), p. 376 
15 Munn, Anglo-China, p. 376. 
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The recordkeeping methods of the colonial government thereby prevented Chan from 
chronicling how oppressions that occurred in the context of daily life motivated Chinese 
workers in Hong Kong to engage in acts of political mobilisations against the British.  
While Hong Kong’s colonial past demonstrates that its Chinese residents possessed 
historical experiences that were radically different from those of their compatriots in China, 
the tendency of scholars to highlight the colony as a bastion of anti-imperialism and Chinese 
nationalism reinforced the impression that Hong Kong was simply an extension of China. 
Utilising the historiographical framework that interpreted Hong Kong as a constituent part of 
China, Stephanie Po-yin Chung’s book argued that as ‘the Chinese in Hong Kong identified 
themselves politically’ with China, or more precisely, Guangdong, and ‘not with British Hong 
Kong’. As such, political struggles in South China represented ‘the…arena that attracted their 
attention and participation’.16 The politics of Cantonese merchants depicted in Stephanie Po-
yin Chung’s monograph possessed a regional orientation, as they had financial interests all over 
Guangdong, meaning that if they wanted to create a political environment favourable to their 
businesses, they had to support the creation of a regional government or facilitate the emerge 
of a coalition of regional leaders that would be supportive of businessmen and men of finance.  
Before and after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, historians such as Steve Tsang, 
David Faure, and Pui-tak Lee emphasised that the colonial past of the city and its Chinese 
population deserved closer scrutiny by historians. 17  Analysing the social, economic, and 
political histories of Hong Kong through the compilation of primary sources and the providence 
of commentaries on important documents, these scholars asserted strongly that only a thorough 
understanding of the city’s historical heritage would allow its inhabitants and rulers to decide 
                                                          
16  Stephanie Po-yin Chung, Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900-
25 (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 16.  
17 Steve Tsang, ed., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Politics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
1995); David Faure, ed., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1997); David Faure and Pui-tak Lee, eds., A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Economy (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2004). 
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which aspects of colonial legacy should be discerned or preserved.18 Operating within the same 
intellectual trend that Hong Kong possessed a distinctive history that deserved scholarly 
attention, Wai Kwan Chan (henceforth W. K. Chan) produced a monograph that, while 
acknowledging the importance of Chinese nationalism, highlighted the specific socioeconomic 
conditions within the colony that led to strikes and boycotts by the Chinese working class 
against their colonisers in the 1920s.19 Reviewer Michael Tsin stated that W. K. Chan’s work 
deserved ‘a wide and serious reading’ due to the author’s contribution to a growing literature 
that portrayed Hong Kong as more than 'a mere appendage of Sino-British history' and ‘a 
discrete entity’ in its own right.20 While one of the focal points of his analysis, Hong Kong’s 
Seaman Union, did not leave behind a large amount of archival documents due to its depository 
being destroyed by a fire, through his skilful utilisation of available materials from British 
companies such as Swire Group, Chinese merchants, and local officials, W. K. Chan was 
nonetheless able to produce a work that could be seen as a counterbalance to monographs that 
underemphasised Hong Kong’s historical status as a distinct Chinese society.21 According to 
W. K. Chan, abysmal working conditions and exploitations by British merchants as well as 
their Chinese allies led to the emergence of a class consciousness among Chinese workers in 
Hong Kong. It is important to note that although a determination to undermine British 
imperialism in South China was a motivating force, the need to improve their living standards 
was the primary impetus behind the political activism of the colony’s workers in the early 
1920s. Despite the fact that the Chinese working class in Hong Kong often played significant 
roles in nationwide anti-imperialist movements, there remains a need to investigate the 
                                                          
18 Steve Tsang and David Faure, preface to A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Economy, eds. by David Faure 
and Pui-tak Lee (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), vii-viii (vii).   
19 Wai Kwan Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies of Class Formation in Early Hong Kong 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
20 Michael Tsin, ‘China and Inner Asia: Review of The Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies of Class 
Formation in Early Hong Kong. By Chan Wai Kwan’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 51. 4 (November 1992), 881-
882 (pp. 881-882). 
21 Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society, pp. 1-2. 
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contrasting perspectives on colonialism between residents of the colony and their compatriots 
in China. Even with the British serving as the common enemy, the goal of Chinese workers in 
Hong Kong was often to force colonial officials to become more responsive to their needs, not 
to eradicate colonialism or to make foreign establishments completely subservient to the 
interests of the Chinese political parties determined to obtain control over all of China. 
Complementing Ming K. Chan’s PhD dissertation and revealing how the cooperative 
relationship formed between Chinese workers in Hong Kong and those who were employed in 
other cities in Guangdong enabled the Chinese working class in the region to emerge as a 
powerful political force, W. K. Chan’s work demonstrates that in addition to Chinese 
nationalism, a determination to create a better society in Hong Kong for men and women who 
had to seek employment there was another motivating factor for political mobilisations.  
Hong Kong studies in the post-1997 period was dominated by works that concentrated 
on the policies implemented by the colonial government as well as their allies to maintain 
British authority and counteract political threats presented by Chinese political actors. As 
demonstrated by John Carroll, although many Chinese workers in Hong Kong participated in 
political campaigns orchestrated by Chinese political parties to weaken British colonialism as 
the result of intense dissatisfaction with the local administration, colonial policymakers 
emerged victorious in the Canton–Hong Kong Strike-Boycott of 1925-1926 because they were 
strongly backed by their local Chinese allies who were convinced that the CCP and the 
Kuomintang (KMT) was waging ‘an ideological and economic war’ that threatened the 
survival of a prosperous Chinese territory.22 Made up mostly of elite merchants, ‘loyal Chinese’ 
                                                          
22  John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese elites and British Colonial in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2007), p. 132. The first KMT-CCP United Front was formed in 1923 for the purpose of eliminating 
warlordism and imperialism in China. This first KMT-CCP United Front constituted the ruling coalition of Canton 
during the Canton-Hong Kong Strike of 1925-1926. The Canton regime provided financial as well as political 
support to the strikers and members of their families. While the Strike-Boycott was ignited by the killing of 
Chinese protestors at the hands of British law enforcement agents in Shanghai and Shameen, those who 
participated in the campaign to cripple British Hong Kong were also strongly motivated by local concerns. During 
the height of the Strike-Boycott, Hong Kong strikers presented the local administration with a series of demands, 
10 
 
such as Chow Shouson and their colleagues did everything within their power to ensure that 
Hong Kong did not become paralysed when a large number of its workforce departed for 
Canton in support of the Strike-Boycott, and some of them even performed tasks that were 
normally below their social status such as waste disposal and street patrol.23 While he did not 
utilise previously undiscovered archival materials, Carroll did build on the historiographical 
trend established by Sinn by stating that elite Chinese merchants in Hong Kong collaborated 
with the British not only because of material self-interests, but also due to their commitment to 
a city the preservation of which would ensure its emergence as a distinct Chinese society 
superior to the various regimes vying to control China. While Chinese workers in Hong Kong 
remained highly mobile, especially as the lack of border control between the colony and other 
cities in the Pearl River Delta further facilitated the ease of travel between British and Chinese 
jurisdictions, businessmen like Chow had by the 1920s identified Hong Kong as their 
permanent home.24 A recurring theme in all of Carroll’s monographs was that while they 
wanted to played a meaningful role in China’s development as a modern nation-state, if the 
Chinese government and Hong Kong were engaged in political conflicts, prominent Hong 
Kong Chinese merchants in the 1920s would choose to defend British Hong Kong, a key point 
that was overlooked by Chung as her analysis ended just before the Strike-Boycott.25 What 
Chung ignored was that while Hong Kong Chinese businessmen did indeed possess business 
interests all over Guangdong, their wealth and social status were dependent upon the 
preservation of Hong Kong’s colonial status. As stated by Zheng Wan Tai and Siu-Lun Wong, 
business successes and social-political prominence of the leading Chinese in Hong Kong was 
based on their ability to serve as intermediaries between the local population, the Chinese 
                                                          
the most prominent of which included direct elections to the Legislative Council, the introduction of eight-hour 
workday, and the end of legal discrimination against Chinese in the colony. Chan, ‘Hong Kong in Sino-British 
Conflict’, p. 45, p. 48.  
23 Carroll, Edge of Empires, p. 139, p. 152, p. 186.   
24 Carroll, Edge of Empires, p. 86;  Chan, ‘Labor and Empire’, p. 98. 
25 Carroll, Concise History, pp. 75-76, p. 105; Carroll, Edge of Empires, p. 139, p. 152.   
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(Guangdong) government, and the British colonialists, a skillset that would become 
unnecessary had the colony fell to the KMT-CCP coalition in the 1920s.26  
Due to availability of recently declassified documents in the British National Archive 
and the willingness of key participants to discuss the roles they played in past political events, 
2009 and 2010 witnessed the publication of monographs that focused on the 1967 riots, during 
which CCP officials stationed in Hong Kong and their local supporters essentially waged a 
low-intensity war against the colonial administration.27 In 1967, public support for colonial 
rule once again ensured the survival of British Hong Kong.28 As argued by Gary Ka-wai 
Cheung, Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, the defeat suffered by CCP cadets not only further 
marginalised their supporters in the colony, but also led to public appreciation of the colony’s 
status as a distinct Chinese territory and renewed support for the colonial state as the most 
credible defender of Hong Kong Chinese’s welfare.29 While including a brief comparative 
study between the 1925-1926 Strike-Boycott and the 1967 riots and a scope of analysis 
spanning from Hong Kong’s place within the British imperial system to the colony’s domestic 
politics, the collection of essays edited by Robert Bickers and Ray Yep provided excellent 
snapshots of important historical moments in the city’s past without explaining in detail how 
these historical moments came to be.30 Although Cheung strongly asserted that riots led to the 
emergence of a Hong Kong identity, readers were not given an analysis of how this rise of a 
local consciousness impacted Hong Kong going forward, as Cheung’s work represented a study 
                                                          
26 Zheng Hongtai 鄭 宏 泰 and Wong Siu-Lun 黃紹 倫, Zheng Wan Tai and Siu-Lun Wong 政商兩和 : 何東 (Politics 
and Business: Robert Hotung)( Xianggang : San lian shu dian (Xianggang) you xian gong si, c2013), p. 169.  
27 Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, (eds.), May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967 (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2009); Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong's Watershed: The 1967 Riots (Hong Kong: 
University Press, 2009.  
28 Cheung, Hong Kong's Watershed, p. 133.  
29 Cheung, Hong Kong's Watershed, p. 5, p. 132;  Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, ‘Studying the 1967 Riots: An 
Overdue Project’, in May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967, eds. by Robert Bickers and Ray Yep 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), pp. 1-19 (p. 12). 
30 John Carroll, 'A Historical Perspective: The 1967 Riots and the Strike-Boycott of 1925-26', in May Days in 
Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967, eds. by Robert Bickers and Ray Yep (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2009), pp. 69-87; Bickers and Yep, ‘Studying the 1967 Riots’, p. 16.  
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of events in 1967 only. Instead of being a definitive study, Bickers and Yep themselves 
admitted that their volume should be seen as the point of commencement for students interested 
in investigating postwar Hong Kong and the 1967 riots.31 There is a need for a historical 
analysis that would take into consideration Hong Kong’s postwar history in its entirety to 
explain how the Hong Kong population’s identity formation process culminated in the majority 
of its members supporting the colonial government in 1967 and the ways in which the rise of a 
sense of belonging impacted social-political development in the city as the colonial era was 
coming to an end.  
Renewal academic interest in the 1967 riots did not lead to the 1960s monopolising 
scholarly attention at the expanse of later periods of colonial rule. The mid-to late 2000 
continued to witness the publication of high-quality books focusing on Hong Kong. Leo 
Goodstadt’s tetralogy on the colonial government’s socioeconomic policies from the postwar 
era to the end of the colonial period deserves careful reading for the author’s crisp writing style 
and insightful commentaries on how collaboration between elite Hong Kong Chinese 
merchants and colonial officials continued right to the end of British rule.32 In stark contrast to 
this careful examination of colonial policymaking process, there was a noticeable absence of 
scholarly works that concentrated on mass mobilisation efforts from the 1970s to the 1980s. 
Indeed, it is surprising that scholars did not build on the works published by scholars such as 
Ming K. Chan and Gerard A. Postiglione that detailed how fear created by the impending  
resumption of Chinese sovereignty led to mass protests before 1997. 33  Suzanne Pepper’s 
monograph on the history of pro-reform movements was an outstanding contribution to Hong 
                                                          
31 Bickers and Yep, ‘Studying the 1967 Riots’, p. 16.  
32 Leo F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005); Leo F. Goodstadt, Profits, 
Politics And Panics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007); Leo F. Goodstadt, Reluctant 
Regulators (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011); Leo F. Goodstadt, Poverty In The Midst Of 
Affluence (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014).  
33 Ming K. Chan and Gerard A. Postiglione, (eds.), The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese Sovereignty 
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).  
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Kong studies, and it merits praise as a historical monograph that charted the evolution of how 
local efforts to implement constitutional changes went from being led and participated mostly 
by middle class professionals to popular campaigns involving significant segments of the 
population.34 
Hong Kong studies received further academic attention after the 2014 Umbrella 
Movement, as the political chaos of that year once again demonstrate the capacity of the local 
population for popular mobilisations. Both Richard C. Bush and Lynn T. White wrote well-
received volumes on the prospect for constitutional reforms in Hong Kong after the events of 
2014.35  In many ways, White and Bush were operating in the historiographical tradition 
established by prominent practitioners of Hong Kong studies like Ming K. Chan, in that Hong 
Kong was analysed as a unique Chinese city, one that could become a facilitator for positive 
changes within China. White explicitly stated that Hong Kong could be seen as a case study to 
determine whether constitutional changes within the PRC were possible, while Bush 
emphasised how Beijing interacted with the city could give analysts clues on how the CCP 
leadership would deal with other peripheric Chinese territories such as Taiwan.36 At the same 
time, there had been a rising tendency among scholars based in Hong Kong to treat the city and 
developments within it as almost the singular focus of analyses.37 It was almost as if distrust 
towards the CCP, a sentiment that was gaining in prominence, was influencing a rising 
generation of Hong Kong scholars a large segment of which was increasingly unwilling to 
                                                          
34 Suzanne Pepper, Keeping Democracy At Bay (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). 
35 Lynn T. White III, Democratization in Hong Kong – and China? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016); 
Richard C. Bush, Hong Kong in the Shadow of China (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016). 
36 Bush, Hong Kong, chapter 11; White, Democratization in Hong Kong, chapter 8. 
37 Monographs produced by Chen Yun and Cheng Chung-tai are examples of Hong Kong-centric scholarship. 
Chen Yun 陳雲, Xianggang cheng bang lun : yi guo liang zhi, cheng bang zi zhi, shi Xianggang sheng si you 
guan zhi shi 香港城邦論 : 一國兩制, 城邦自治, 是香港生死攸關之事 (Hong Kong as a City-state: One 
Country, Two systems, City-state Self-rule, a Key Issue in the Survival of Hong Kong) (Xianggang : Tian chuang 
chu ban she you xian gong si, 2011). Cheng Chung-tai 鄭松泰, Civic Nationalism and State Formation 由本土民
權到建邦立國 (Xianggang : Re xue shi bao you xian gong si, 2016 Chu ban). 
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examine evolutions within Hong Kong alongside the momentous changes that were occurring 
within the borders of the PRC.  
Significance of this Project:  
While accepting that the unique historical circumstances surrounding Hong Kong since 
the establishment of the Crown Colony in 1842 has made it a unique Chinese territory and 
arguably the most globalised and cosmopolitan city in all of China by 2018, this dissertation 
studies the history of Hong Kong from 1949 to 1997 through an emphasis on ‘the China factor’ 
– an acknowledgement that the city’s relations with China and political parties that sought to 
control the mainland was, and is, an inescapable part of the Hong Kong story.38 Indeed, as it 
was pointed out by Helen Siu, Hong Kong was part of  the southern Chinese (Lingnan) cultural 
sphere of influence and activists in the city had historically been determined to play meaningful 
roles in Chinese national politics.39 In explaining  how and why large segments of the Hong 
Kong population went from being merely apprehensive about the PRC in the immediate 
postwar era, to unwilling to follow the commands of CCP partisans in 1967, and to openly 
calling for the enactment of political reforms within the city as well as the PRC in 1989,  my 
project addresses to what degree mass rallies for constitutional changes in the sunset period of 
colonial rule were motivated by the imperative to safeguard the city’s welfare  and a 
determination  to transform Hong Kong into a more liberal political entity, one that could serve 
as an example for the PRC to emulate.  
                                                          
38 According to Saskia Sassen, ‘Since its inception, Hong Kong has been a key intersection of different worlds, 
forever a strategic exchange node for firms from China to the rest of the world and from the rest of the world 
to China…Hong Kong could only lose this historic role if all investor interest in China would cease, or if Shanghai 
could replicate the combination of resources represented by Hong Kong. Both of these conditions are unlikely 
in the near future’. Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), p. 174.  
39 Helen Siu, ‘Remade in Hong Kong: Weaving Into the Chinese Cultural Tapestry’, in Unity and Diversity: Local 
Cultures and Identities in China, eds. by Tao Tai Liu and David Faure (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
1996) pp. 177-197 (p. 177, p. 180). 
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This project asserts that the objective of prominent Hong Kong activists, such as Martin 
Lee, was not simply to implement constitutional changes in city, but also to ensure that a liberal 
political system would serve as a guarantor of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula that 
promised the post-1997 HKSAR a significant degree of autonomy. Through the organisation 
of mass popular movements that were able to attract the participation of record number of local 
residents, local activists cemented a political culture that oriented towards the preservation of 
Hong Kong’s peace and prosperity.  Mass protest that erupted in Hong Kong as 1997 was 
approaching led to the consolidation of a local identity in the city.  
Theoretical Underpinnings   
Instead of treating the emergence of a Hong Kong identity as a sudden event, my 
dissertation instead examines its development as a historical one, something that was decades 
in the making. My dissertation demonstrates that Hong Kong identity had a historical root, an 
evolutionary product that grew alongside changes that was occurring in the colony. My 
dissertation assumes that the Chinese residents of Hong Kong shared a baseline of togetherness 
that was created by a common language, ethnic background, and cultural heritage. Their 
commonality was then accentuated by not only the policies of the colonial state, but by 
escalating Beijing-Hong Kong tensions and the belief that the PRC was unwilling to acquiesce 
to constitutional reforms in the city that would have granted local residents a greater say in the 
affairs of the city. Life in Hong Kong create within local society an unwritten moral code, one 
that was seemingly disregarded by political partisans whose loyalty was centred around 
organisations outside of Hong Kong. As conflicts between those who viewed Hong Kong as 
the focus of their political activities and those who were determined to propagate loyalty 
towards organisations outside of the city intensified, the colony was increasingly being seen as 
a distinct entity, especially since controversies concerning the proper political allegiance of its 
inhabitants only accentuated the fact that it was distinct from other Chinese cities. When acts 
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of resistance that took place within the context of everyday life appeared to be unable to 
preserve the city’s way of life, a large segment of the Hong Kong population became convinced 
that mass mobilisation represented the only way for inhabitants of the city to defend their core 
values. This dissertation demonstrates how acts of resistance that took place in the context of 
everyday life gradually became massive mobilisations efforts that fundamentally challenged 
the existing political system.  
The arguments presented by Michael Billig, that various insignificant aspects of daily 
living constantly reminded residents that they resided in a geopolitical entity possessing a 
unique cultural heritage that set it apart from other nation-states, and that these reminders often 
became so embedded in the daily life of the members of the national community that they 
became unexceptionally, could be applied to British Hong Kong as well.40 Hong Kong, after 
all, was geographically a part of South China that was separated from the Chinese state due to 
the Qing Empire’s defeat in the Opium War. By the 1960s, however, the separation between 
Hong Kong and the PRC appeared to be a part of natural order in East Asian geopolitics 
because, by then, the city’s colonial status had been in existence for over a century and its 
legitimacy was constantly reinforced by the British administration’s ability to issue its own 
currency and enforce border restrictions, capacities that were associated with modern nation-
states. Each time a person who grew up in Hong Kong utilised the Hong Kong currency for his 
or her daily purchases, he or she was reminded of the fact that he or she was residing in a state 
that was separated from the PRC. The perpetuation of Hong Kong’s colonial status contributed 
to the emergence of a local identity, as the longer Chinese in Hong Kong resided in a polity 
separated from the PRC, the easier for them to perceive separation between them and other 
Chinese as something natural. In the eyes of many residents of Hong Kong, colonialism, instead 
                                                          
40 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 22-21. 
17 
 
of being viewed as something that was imposed upon them, represented a normal part of their 
daily existence.  
Of course, colonialism was often challenged, especially by pro-PRC partisans in Hong 
Kong, and the city was never safe from the volatility of Chinese politics. As noted by John 
Hutchinson, it was often intra-ethnic conflicts that were the most contentious, as rivals were 
convinced that they were the better representatives of their ethnic groups, and that their 
opponents were traitors that had to be crushed.41 In the case of Hong Kong, in addition to 
confrontations between the KMT and the CCP over which party was the legitimate 
representative of China, tensions in the 1960s erupted between those who viewed that being 
Chinese meant being loyal to the regime currently in power in China and those who were 
convinced that the capacity to preserve and appreciate Chinese cultural heritage represented 
the essence of being members of the Chinese civilisation in the 20th century. Even when Sino-
Hong Kong tensions were at their peak, Hong Kong Chinese did not abandon their cultural 
heritage, as it was immediately after the pro-PRC partisans waged an existential struggle 
against the colonial regime that the campaign to make Chinese an official language intensified 
and captured popular imagination. 42  In addition to being a conflict between Chinese 
nationalism and British colonialism, the 1967 riots could be classified as an attempt by pro-
PRC Chinese nationalists, who were keen to enforce national unity at the expanse of the 
emerging identity in the city, to impose their ideology on their compatriots in Hong Kong, a 
course of action that partisans of the CCP believed to be in the best interests of those residing 
in the colony.43 As stated by Hutchinson, it was possible for members of an ethnic group to 
become so alienated from their peers that political conflicts became inevitable.44 Conflicting 
interpretations among members of the same cultural group over their proper responsibilities to 
                                                          
41 John Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict (London: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 77-78.  
42 Wai-man Lam, Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 127.  
43 Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict, p. 44.  
44 Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict, p. 101. 
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each other and to the ethnic community of which they were a part represented a fundamental 
tension in postwar Hong Kong.45  
During the 1967 riots, it was Hong Kong resident’s ‘everyday resistance’ against 
political actors who were perceived to be acting in a manner that was harmful to the stability 
of the city that preserved its British status.46 Using the theoretical approach of James C. Scott, 
who stated that  ‘the aggregation of a host of petty, self-interested acts of insubordination or 
desertion’ could have profound impact on the outcomes of political campaigns to either 
consolidate or destabilise a ruling regime, my project highlights how Hong Kong Chinese’s 
collective refusal to acquiesce to the collapse of colonial rule  saved British Hong Kong when 
it faced an existential threat in 1967.47  
That there were Hong Kong residents who were unwilling to accept the collapse of the 
city’s colonial status reveals that by the 1960s, Hong Kong was becoming a distinct Chinese 
society, one that was developing a set of unwritten code of conduct the adherence to which by 
local inhabitant was necessary for their collective prosperity. This dissertation chronicles the 
ways in which Hong Kong’s moral regulations, which represented ‘a tacit collective convention, 
unwritten, but legible to all dwellers through the codes of language and of behaviour’, emerged 
during the postwar era.48 Arguing that the actions of partisans of Chinese political parties often 
seemed determined to violated Hong Kong’s ‘unwritten moral code’, the cardinal principle of 
which was the preservation of the city’s prosperity and the collective well-beings of its 
residents, this dissertation analyses how supporters of the CCP gradually became marginalised 
in local society, so much so that they even formed a subsociety, or to use a Bordieuan term, a 
                                                          
45 Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict, p. 77. 
46 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1985), p. 294. 
47 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 294. 
48 Michel De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life – Volume 2: Living and Cooking, trans by Timothy J. Tomasik 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 16.  
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‘habitus’, in Hong Kong, one containing its own values, distinctive culture, and ideology.49 In 
this way, there existed in post-1967 Hong Kong a pro-PRC habitus in which ‘symbolic capital’ 
was accumulated through acts of loyalty to the PRC.50  As ‘adherence to an institution is 
directly proportional to the severity and painfulness of the rites of initiation’, the fact that pro-
PRC partisans were consigned to the margins of Hong Kong society meant that they had no 
choice but to form a habitus if only for mutual support and defence against an often hostile 
mainstream society. 51  This project demonstrates that unity and cohesion were maintained 
within the pro-PRC camp through the establishment of a series of interconnecting personal, 
professional, and even familial ties that promoted loyalty to Beijing. Such a policy ensured that 
actions contrary to the wishes of the party-state would constitute a betrayal to one’s friends, 
family members, and colleagues. Borrowing Michel Foucault’s argument concerning how the 
utilisation of non-violent means could nevertheless crush the spirits of those who broke 
established societal rules, I will demonstrate that while no longer relying upon violence to 
preserve loyalty after the 1967 riots, the pro-PRC habitus defended itself against external 
enemies not through physical domination, but by the destruction of its opponent’s reputations 
in various public forums.52  
While there existed a very substantial number of PRC sympathisers in Hong Kong, 
distrust towards the CCP fully manifested itself in 1989, when protests after protests erupted 
in the city before and after leaders in Beijing were seen as using excessive force in the removal 
of student protestors assembled in Tiananmen Square. Participated by about one-sixth of the 
total population of Hong Kong at their absolute peak, the rallies and protests of 1989 became 
                                                          
49 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, Sociological Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), 14-25 
(p. 17, p. 19); Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (New York: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1977), p. 21. 
50 Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, p. 23.  
51 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Rites of Institution’, in Language & Symbolic Power, ed. by John B. Thompson, trans. By 
Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 117-127 (p. 123). 
52 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), p. 7, p. 15.  
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so inseparable from Hong Kong identity that they evolved into an annual tradition, one 
participated by all those in Hong Kong who were critical of the CCP year after year since 
1989.53 Given the fact the protests and rallies to commemorate the Tiananmen Square incident 
occupied the busiest areas of Hong Kong, a city in which land represented a highly valued 
commodity, it would be proper to examine popular mobilisations during the sunset period of 
colonial rule using the analytical lenses of Henri Lefebvre. As stated by Lefebvre, instead of  
constituting nothing, space actually represented ‘a framework of power’, as each form of 
sovereign authority, be it a city-state, an imperial state, or a nation-state, had its own ‘particular 
way of partitioning space’.54 If utilisation of space represented the demonstration of power by 
a sovereign authority, then occupy of space should be seen as challenge or repudiation by men 
and women who were unwilling to acquiesce to those who had power over them. Given the 
fact that protestors were shouting anti-CCP slogans at sites such as Victoria Park, it is difficult 
to escape the impression that this determination to occupy the most expansive area of Hong 
Kong represented a challenge to the outgoing and incoming sovereign powers, both of which 
were seen as unwilling and unable to defend the interests of Hong Kong. At a time when the 
CCP was determined to inherent the British administrative structure, one the power of which 
was highly concentrated in the hands of elite policymakers, protestors in Hong Kong were 
mobilising against a governing system that, in the words of Crawford Young, was often able 
to be ‘freed…from responsiveness to its subjects to a remarkable degrees’ due to it 
unaccountability.55 My dissertation demonstrates that in the process of engaging in popular 
                                                          
53 Alvin So, ‘The Tiananmen Incident, Patten’s Electoral Reforms, and the Roots of Contested Democracy in 
Hong Kong’, in The Challenge of Hong Kong’s Reintegration With China, ed. Ming K. Chan, (Hong Kong: Hong 
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54 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans by D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1991),  pp. 
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mobilisations against their current and future sovereign masters, the population of Hong Kong 
acquired an identity that was distinct from their compatriots in China, one that was, to use a 
term popularised by Craig Calhoun, ‘categorical’, as it was a sense of belonging that convinced 
Hong Kong Chinese that they had a direct relationship that was not mediated by other 
‘networks of concrete social relations’ with the polity on the behalf of which they were 
protesting. Hong Kong identity therefore was much more ‘salient’ than other forms of 
identifications, as there existed a conviction that the advancement of the city’s social, economic, 
and political interests would benefit the majority of its residents.56  
Theoretical Considerations   
1) Everyday Resistance as the Building Block for Popular Mobilisations 
- Everyday resistance represented a series of defensive campaigns waged by members of a 
population who were unwilling to risk opened confrontations against those in positions of 
power. According to Scott, while each act that violated societal norms would provoke acts 
of resistance that would undermine the violators’ standing in the community, even character 
assassination campaign, one of the principal ‘weapons of the weak’, could not force its 
targets to engage in new behaviours; rather, the best hope for the powerless was to force 
those in positions of power to cease acting in a manner that was harmful to their social 
inferiors. 57  This dissertation demonstrates, however, that everyday resistance often 
possessed accumulative effects, as  each minor act of defiance and successful deployment 
of weapons of the weak established precedents concerning which types of behaviour were 
socially acceptable. While each weapon of weak concentrated on specific violations of 
societal norms, successive everyday resistance established moral code that members of 
                                                          
56 Craig Calhoun, ‘Social Theory and the politics of Identity’, in Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. by 
Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 9-37 (p. 26). 
57 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, pp. 24-25. 
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society had to abide. Successful implementation of everyday resistance therefore provided 
the groundwork for popular mobilisations, as weapons of the weak not only led to the 
creation of moral code against which all members of society would be judged, the 
successful defence of their immediate interests by men and women without political power 
also allowed them to conserve strength so that when they were powerful enough to openly 
challenge those who harmed their welfare, they would have sufficient justifications for their 
defiance. If those in positions of power were acting in a manner contrary to societal 
interests, everyday resistance and weapons of the weak enabled those without formal power 
to safeguard their strength before attempting to impose their values on authority figures 
whose actions were deemed to be harmful to society.     
2)  Intrapopulation Conflicts as Engines for Societal Changes  
- Ultimately, Scott, De Certeau, and even Billig, with his concentration on the capacity of 
stable nation-states to reinforce a sense of unity through the creation of items bearing 
distinctive nationalist symbols and insignias, represented works that analysed well-
functioning societies possessing few existential stifles. All three of them examined societies 
that were already formed, not those that were coming into existence or were transforming. 
Sceptical about the durability of ‘revolutionary consciousness’ that demanded sweeping 
societal changes and the viability of revolutions that sought the destruction of existing 
social norms, transformations did not constitute one of Scott’s focuses. 58  To examine 
postwar Hong Kong, the analytical frameworks of Scott, De Certeau, and Billig had to be 
used alongside that of Hutchinson, whose work highlighted conflicts among those who 
lacked formal power. The modern history of Hong Kong not only reveals that crises that 
threatened to upend existing social norms and traditions did occur, but also that 
confrontations could erupt between the rulers and the ruled as well as between those who 
                                                          
58 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 332, p. 341 
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did not occupy formal positions of authority, especially within societies that were 
undergoing profound transformations. Confrontations between different groups within the 
same population could also significantly enlarge the social space available for political 
engagements, as those in formal positions of authority either were too preoccupied by other 
matters during periods of great societal changes to intervene in intrapopulation conflicts, 
or that the defeat of one group necessarily enlarge the ability of its vanquishers to play a 
larger role in public affairs. Either way, this type of intrapopulation conflicts usually 
sharpened the ability of common men and women to participate in public affairs, so that 
when the time came that they had to confront those in actual positions of authority, these 
veterans of past political conflicts would be ready for new engagements.       
3) Popular Mobilisations as Means to Cement a Local Identity  
- Large mobilisation efforts in Hong Kong, most noticeably the protests in the aftermath of 
the Tiananmen incident, failed to achieve their objectives of transforming the city’s 
constitutional structure. At the same time, while they failed in their stated goals, popular 
mobilisations, as reveal in the history of Hong Kong, often created changes. As stated by 
Eric Hobsbawn, acts of revolts by the common people, while often doomed to failure, could 
nevertheless live on in popular memory, thereby serving as foundations for future popular 
movements.59 Even Henri Lefebvre, when he asserted that the overcoming of inequalities 
could only be achieved first ‘by occupying space’ and then ‘by producing a space’, was 
advocating for a two-step process that would end with common people reclaiming their 
ability to carve out a spatial area separated from global capitalism, thereby demonstrating 
that the objective of popular mobilisations was never to succeed on the first attempt.60  For 
better or worse, the popular movements in 1989 arguably gave birth to Hong Kong’s 
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‘protest culture’ that had come to be a defining feature of the city’s political environment.61 
In this sense, political mobilisations were often future-oriented, as they could be seen as 
the first steps in the process of transforming existing social, economic, and political 
structures.  
- The assumption of this dissertation is that, similar to the emergence of working class 
solidarity in England from the 18th to the 19th century, during which a vibrant working class 
culture, a refusal to submit meekly to aristocratic rule, and a willingness to politically 
mobilise to challenge those in positions of authorities led to a ‘collective self-
consciousness’ of the English workers, the men and women of Hong Kong, through 
experiencing together British rule, participation in everyday resistance, and common 
engagement in monumental political mobilisations the primary purpose of which was to 
alter the existing political system that the CCP was determined to inherit from the departing 
British, gained a sense of belonging before the end of colonial rule.62 This dissertation 
therefore subscribes to Craig Calhoun’s argument that strong identity manifested itself in 
collective action, and its intensity was often reinforced when a group was mobilised for the 
achievement of a common purpose  or the defence of a moral code accepted by the majority 
as legitimate.63 In Hong Kong, ‘participants in collective action seek to build, legitimate, 
or express an identity’.64 The purpose of large-scale protests in Hong Kong was to ‘make a 
nonstandard identity acceptable and to make that identity livable in the context of the 
movement itself’.65 Even popular movements that failed to achieve their stated objectives 
could become means for a fractured population to achieve a sense of cohesion or unity. 
                                                          
61 Bob Beatty, Democracy, Asian Values, and Hong Kong: Evaluating Political Elite Beliefs (Praeger: Westport, 
2003), p. 90. 
62 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 913.  
63 Craig Calhoun, ‘The Problem of Identity in Collective Action,'' in Macro Micro Linkages in Sociology, ed. by 
Joan Huber (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage, 1991), pp. 51-76 (p. 53, pp. 64-67). 
64 Calhoun, ‘The Problem of Identity’, p. 51.  
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Violently contradictory memories of popular protests could help a population achieve 
unity, as the very fact that members of a polity fought over the significance of past events, 
or even engage in political mobilisations against one another over conflicting 
understandings of historical incidents, meant that they did indeed share a common history, 
their disagreement over its interpretation notwithstanding. The monumental political events 
that occurred in postwar Hong Kong changed the city, as popular mobilisations became an 
engine for the city’s identity formation process.  
The Emergence of a Local Identity in Hong Kong 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One charts how Hong Kong transformed from a territory made up primarily of 
sojourners to a city with a permanent population, even in the absence of concerted identity 
formation efforts by British policymakers and in spite of local Chinese residents’ political, 
economic, as well as cultural ties with mainland China. Policy changes such as the democratic 
reform package proposed by Governor Mark Young in 1946, one of the objectives of which 
was to create civic pride among residents of Hong Kong by giving them the right to vote and a 
direct stake in local affairs, was rejected by Governor Alexander Grantham and his political 
British colonialism  created a basic sense of 
distinctiveness and belonging
Everyday resistance was utilised to 
defend British Hong Kong during 
the 1967 riots
Living conditions in Hong Kong 
necessitated the creation of an 
unwritten moral code the 
purpose of which was to defend 
the collective welfare of those 
residing in the city
A pro-PRC habitus emerged after 
the 1967 riots that enforced unity 
through  interconnecting 
professional or familial ties
Conflicts between 
different factions in 
Hong Kong reaffirmed a 
local identity
Dramatic political events 
led to popular 
mobilisations that 
further consolidated a 
local identity 
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allies in 1952.66 Prominent Confucian scholars who found teaching posts in Hong Kong such 
as Ch'ien Mu similarly did not advocate for the emergence of a local identity. Motivated by the 
an anti-communism that viewed the PRC as an ideological enemy due to its leaders’ perceived 
disrespect of Chinese traditions, Ch'ien Mu and his colleagues at New Asia College espoused 
a nationalism that focused on appreciation of China as the site of origin for Chinese culture and 
admiration of past cultural achievements as a means to safeguard colonial residents’ ethnic 
identity.67 Hong Kong residents, like many of their compatriots who resided in jurisdictions 
outside of China during the immediate postwar period, overwhelmingly identified themselves 
as ethnically and culturally Chinese.68 As pointed out by Pui-Tak Lee, men and women who 
left their home provinces and came to the colony in order to escape political conflicts, even 
businessmen and financiers who were ideologically opposed to the communist regime, never 
entirely terminated their ties with China. They regularly conducted financial transactions with 
PRC officials and sent money as well as goods to assists their relatives in China.69 Nevertheless, 
as stated by Billig, modern geopolitical realities such as the closure of borders between states 
inevitably reinforced the belief among residents that, instead of being able to freely move 
between different jurisdictions, they had to pick a polity to be their definite home.70 As the 
colonial administration began to exercise border control by 1949 to limit the influx of Chinese 
refugees into the colony, by the 1960s, there were many local inhabitants who grew up in the 
colony and had not previously resided in any other jurisdictions.71 Hong Kong’s ability to 
                                                          
66 Steve Tsang’s work is the best historical account available on attempted constitutional reforms in Hong Kong 
from the 1940s to the 1950s.  Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at 
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69 Pui-Tak Lee, ‘Avoiding Isolation by the Revolution: K. P. Chine’s Dealings from Hong Kong with Shanghai and 
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provide its new arrivals with opportunities to start their lives anew due to the remarkable 
growth of the manufacturing sector, and the resultant capacity to absorb migrants into the local 
workforce meant that instead of overwhelming the city, successive waves of refugees were 
assimilated into Hong Kong society.72 Since the PRC was often embroiled in political chaos, 
those who arrived in Hong Kong as refugees were discouraged from returning to their native 
provinces. A sense of permanency, however, did not necessarily translate into loyalty towards 
the colonial government. Colonial rule was often ‘repressive and racist’, and corruption 
permeated almost all levels of government in the postwar period. Social services in Hong Kong 
were seen as inadequate in the 1960s, and in spite of Hong Kong’s incredible economic growth, 
‘considerable improvement in living conditions’ merely ‘inspired the desire for still further 
improvement’.73 As revealed by the 1966 riots, a disturbance that was provoked by the Star 
Ferry’s price increase, an undercurrent of anger and resentment existed among Hong Kong 
Chinese, and it was unclear whether a significant number of them would rally to the defence 
of the colonial state in the event of a major political crisis.74   
Chapter Two examines how British policymakers turned the tide against pro-PRC 
partisans during the 1967 riots and the far-reaching effects the disturbances had on Hong Kong 
society. In the absence of popular support given to the colonial administration, it was possible 
that London would not have granted Governor David Trench the permission to begin the 
crackdown on pro-PRC establishments that successfully neutralised the threats posed by the 
rioters. This chapter proposes that while men and women of the colony, especially those who 
                                                          
until 1956 that the colonial government began to repatriate Chinese refugees. Chi-Kwan Mark, ‘The “Problem 
of People”: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949-62’, Modern 
Asian Studies, Volume 41, Issue 6 November 2007, 1145-1181 (p. 1148).  
72 The rapid expansion of Hong Kong’s population transformed Hong Kong into one of the most densely 
populated territories on the planet. As stated by David Trench, Hong Kong Chinese lived ‘in a quite appallingly 
overcrowded city, in a fiercely competitive environment, where poverty and considerable wealth are seen side 
by side’. TNA: PRC: FC0 40/103: ‘Hong Kong: A Review of Principal Developments’, p. 1. 
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were not supportive of the CCP, did not stage counter-protests against pro-PRC partisans, their 
willingness to continue their daily life and act as if the riots were having no effects on them 
constituted a gesture of protest against those who were determined to undermine the stability 
of Hong Kong. The calmness with which the common people of Hong Kong conducted 
themselves during the 1967 riots should also be seen as a vote of confidence for the colonial 
administration. The 1967 riots had often been described as a ‘watershed’ event in the history 
of Hong Kong, one that led to the emergence of a local identity among inhabitants of the colony. 
Consequently, academic works relating to the struggles between British Hong Kong and its 
adversaries in 1967 mostly ignored how, after their defeat, partisans of the PRC became even 
more strident in their support for Beijing. The criminal records of pro-PRC partisans that were 
the by-products of their involvement in the 1967 riots often meant that they could only secure 
employment in organisations affiliated with Beijing. Imprisonment, perceived maltreatment at 
the hands of British officials, and isolation from mainstream Hong Kong society forced 
supporters of the PRC to band together against those who viewed participants of the 1967 riots 
as mere criminals. Pro-PRC partisans’ inability to re-enter mainstream society after the 1967 
riots reinforced solidarity within the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong. The 1967 riots 
strengthened the Chinese nationalism of pro-PRC partisans at a time when other inhabitants of 
the territory increasingly viewed the colony as a political entity distinct from the PRC. 
Chapter Three sheds light on the ways in which political mobilisations in Hong Kong 
during the 1970s impacted Hong Kong society and further contributed to the growth of a local 
identity. As locally born residents of Hong Kong gradually formed a majority in the city, a 
significant number of university students in the 1970s saw the colony as the only home they 
ever knew. As exemplified by the protests against corruption that led to the establishment of 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974, student activists were uncommonly 
interested in improving the lives of those who were socioeconomically disadvantaged. The pro-
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PRC elements within the Hong Kong student movement were able to rebuild the image of the 
CCP after the 1967 riots, especially as Beijing established itself as a responsible world power 
after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972, and perceived Japanese encroachment on 
the Diaoyutai Islands provoked massive protests. Many pro-PRC partisans, however, 
abandoned their political commitment to Beijing after the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, 
the faction that was previously portrayed as unfailingly loyal to Mao Zedong. Adherence to 
and appreciation for Chinese culture, sentiments that were exemplified by the campaign to 
make Chinese an official language, gradually took precedence over political allegiance to the 
PRC among Hong Kong residents who saw mainland China as their ancestral homeland. While 
economic relations between Hong Kong and the PRC would deepen after the launch of Chinese 
economic reforms in 1979, protest movements galvanised a local consciousness that motivated 
residents of the colony to see themselves as citizens with rights and responsibilities in their 
Hong Kong. This chapter demonstrates how injustices that occurred in the everyday life of the 
colony compelled student activists to wage campaigns to improve local living standards and 
how these efforts in turn encouraged the rise of a Hong Kong identity.  
The final chapter focuses on Sino-British interactions in the final years of colonial rule 
and the ways in which local political figures and average men and women reacted to 
momentous changes that were occurring in Beijing when it became clear that Hong Kong 
would become a part of the PRC in 1997. After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
in 1984, it became evident that local residents’ collective fate would be controlled by the CCP 
after 1997. The political disturbances that occurred within the PRC in the late 1980s convinced 
most of the colony’s political activists that only substantial constitutional reforms could 
safeguard the territory’s autonomy after 1997. The struggle for constitutional reforms from 
1989 onwards became an existential one for many involved, as it was believed that without a 
liberal governing structure, Hong Kong could not preserve its distinctiveness. A determination 
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to protect the city’s autonomy fuelled the commitment of pro-reform politicians to engage in 
political struggles to transform Hong Kong. By 1992, the imperative to defend Hong Kong’s 
interests and safeguard the welfare of its residents became the foundations of a local political 
culture that is still in existence in today’s Hong Kong.  
In addition to offering a recapitulation of this dissertation’s key arguments, the 
Conclusion provides a summary of political events that took place in Hong Kong from 1949 to 
1992. When Chris Patten assumed the post of governor in 1992, a Hong Kong identity had 
been firmly established. With the establishment of two political blocs, one that advocated for 
political reforms and the other asserted the need for closer alignment with Beijing, the city had 
by 1992 a vibrant political culture in which partisans on both sides felt compelled to appeal to 
the public that they were the better defenders of Hong Kong’s interests, a stance adopted even 
by the sympathisers of the PRC. Even after the establishment of a local political culture and 
the consolidation of an identity in 1992 as well as the termination of the British status of the 
city in 1997, Hong Kong studies, to this day, remains a highly vibrant subfield of China studies. 
The dissertation ends on a contemplation on the future of Hong Kong studies and the possible 
directions of the city more than twenty years after retrocession.   
Methodology  
My dissertation pays close attention to the political elites, leaders of protest movements, 
and local constitutional developments. This focus on high politics had already been put to 
effective use by Hong Kong specialists such as Steve Tsang in his classic study on the 
governance of Hong Kong, which highlighted that in a colony in which political power was 
concentrated in the hands of a selected few, a focus on the political elites was almost 
unavoidable.75 My dissertation focuses on materials produced in Hong Kong from 1949 to 
1992 that were recognised by contemporaries as highly important, thus deserving the attention 
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of future generations. It would therefore be imperative for my dissertation to analyse items 
such as important speeches by political leaders, editorials published by newspapers during 
important historical moments, and even the proceedings of popular protests to gain a better 
understanding of their social, economic and political contexts. My dissertation aims to not only 
study the objectives of political leaders, but also to analyse their motivations and constraints 
that were created by the society in which they inhabited.   
High politics is not the singular focus of my dissertation, as my stated goal is also to 
shed light on the daily existence of Hong Kong’s common people. The objective of 
reconstituting the daily life of Hong Kong Chinese would be accomplished through the 
consultation of government publications and declassified documents from archives in Hong 
Kong and London. Newspapers, periodicals, and memoirs published by Hong Kong activists 
with insights into daily living in the colony is invaluable as well. At the same time, while there 
are sufficient resources available for aspiring historians to compose a dissertation that solely 
focuses on documentary sources, it would be a missed opportunity if actual voices of those 
who resided in the colony were not heard. Indeed, as demonstrated by Bickers and Yep, Hong 
Kong Chinese are now increasingly willing to speak openly about their experiences during 
turbulent periods of the colony’s past.76 As such, oral interviews represent a vital component 
of my dissertation. I interviewed several men and women who were imprisoned by the British 
government due to their involvement in the 1967 riots. I also interviewed political activists to 
obtain their testimonies concerning political confrontations that took place in Hong Kong 
during the postwar era. 
As stated by Brubaker et al, overly structured interviews or questionnaires often 
produced results that aligned with the researchers’ perceptions, as the questions that were posed 
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were composed in such a way that would create responses that most suited the questioners’ 
needs.77 In this way, my conversations with my interviewees were free flowing, and my talks 
with my interviewee did not simply produce the results that I desired. With my fluency in 
Cantonese, I was able to acquire substantial data using the ‘informal interview’ technique, 
meaning that my interviewees were able to speak openly and freely without the constraint of a 
prepared questionnaire on the topics that I wished to discuss.  
Sources  
Documents located in the British National Archives contained detailed information 
regarding the action and policies of Chinese political parties in Hong Kong and plans by British 
officials to counter them. The CAB 129, CAB 134, CO 537, CO 1030, CO 1035, FO 371, FCO 
40 and T 317 series hold records detailing how officials in London interpreted political 
conflicts that engulfed Hong Kong, apprehensions they had regarding security threats that 
confronted the colony, and how public servants formulated policies that they perceived to be 
in the best interests of Hong Kong. Concerning archival research relating to the 1967 riots, I 
used recently declassified materials that are now part of the FCO 371/120922, FCO 
371/120923 and CAB 134/2945 files containing correspondences between Trench and his 
colleagues during the crisis and how policymakers in London interpreted events in Hong Kong. 
Government publications such as the Hong Kong Annual Reports grants me further 
understanding of British officials’ policy formulation process. Archival resources in Hoover 
Institution such reports compiled by American diplomats stationed in Hong Kong on important 
local events has been consulted as well.  
In addition to well-known political figures such as Jasper Tsang, the founding leader of 
the Hong Kong Democratic Party, Martin Lee, as well as his eventual successor, Albert Ho, I 
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33 
 
interviewed men and women who were imprisoned by the British during the 1967 riots. I also 
made use of the Newspapers and Periodicals Collections of the Special Collections of the 
University of Hong Kong Library in order to study the viewpoints expressed by local 
publications regarding important political events that took place in Hong Kong from 1949 to 
1992.  Publications like the student journal of the University of Hong Kong, the Undergrad 
(學苑) have helped me explore the ways in which members of the younger generation felt 
about their lives in the territory. 78  I also utilised the testimonies of Hong Kong Chinese 
detailing how they viewed the colony’s socioeconomic conditions and political environment 
during the postwar period that are now part of the Hong Kong Oral History Archives. 
University of Toronto’s Richard Charles Lee Canada-Hong Kong Library contains extensive 
primary materials relating to social, economic, and political conditions of postwar Hong Kong 
that were highly useful to me as well.  
Concluding Remarks  
Utilising archival sources from Britain, Canada, China, Hong Kong, and the United 
States, my aim is to present a history of political struggles that took place in postwar Hong 
Kong. My dissertation examines how the rise of a Hong Kong identity led to popular 
mobilisations the purpose of which was the preservation of the city’s status as a distinct Chinese 
city. PRC acquiescence to the colonial status of Hong Kong was absolutely vital to the colony’s 
survival.79 The fact that the colonial status of Hong Kong was beneficial to the PRC meant that 
CCP leaders were willing to tolerate the continuing presence of a polity containing a population 
that Beijing could not control. Indeed, even today, the distinct status of Hong Kong ensures the 
indispensability of its financial sector, one that continues to contribute to the 
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internationalisation of renminbi (RMB).80 The willingness of the CCP to exercise relative 
restraint when interacting with Hong Kong during various periods of the postwar era was 
instrumental to the emergence of a local identity, as the common people there were free to 
develop their distinctive social, economic, and political values. In addition to being a scholarly 
inquiry on the emergence of a society the inhabitants of which saw themselves as different 
from their fellow countrymen residing in China, this dissertation is an in-depth analysis of how 
the political activists in Hong Kong were able to organise some of the most important 
mobilisation efforts in modern Chinese history.  
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Chapter One – Postwar Hong Kong: Trials, Tribulations, and the Emergence of a Local 
Identity, 1949 to 1966 
 
Introduction 
 
The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong was created when Hong Kong Island was 
formally ceded to Great Britain through the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, following the defeat of 
the Qing Empire in the First Anglo-Chinese War. 1  The colony expanded to include the 
Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island after the ratification of the 1860 Convention of 
Peking.2 Another crucial development of Hong Kong occurred when the geographical area 
known as the New Territories was leased to Great Britain for a period of ninety-nine years, 
until 1997, under the terms of the 1898 Convention of Peking.3 The acquisition of the New 
Territories greatly expanded the size of the colony, as the new area was about ten times the size 
of the rest of Hong Kong.4 The total area of the colony by 1898 was roughly 391 square miles.5 
Bordering on the south-eastern coast of Guangdong and the eastern portion of the Pearl River 
estuary, Hong Kong’s geographic propinquity to the mainland, as well as the colony’s first-
rate harbour, made it an ideal entrepôt for products destined for South China.6 As the result of 
its proximity to China, Hong Kong assumed geopolitical importance that was disproportionate 
to the colony’s actual size. During the Cold War, the establishment of the PRC necessitated the 
gathering of reliable intelligence on the CCP regime, which was obtained by agents stationed 
in Hong Kong.7 Often referred to as the ‘Berlin of the East’ due to its status as a free port 
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situated just outside of communist China, the colony became a symbol of hope for those fearful 
of communism’s triumph in China and other parts of Asia.8  
Geoffrey Howe once compared Hong Kong to a Ming vase that was so precious and 
delicate that the CCP and British governments needed to handle it with extreme care.9 In spite 
of its seeming fragility, postwar Hong Kong survived successive crises, such as the 
establishment of the PRC, the Korean War, the resultant embargoes that nearly crippled the 
territory’s trade with the mainland, as well as political disturbances caused by partisans of 
Chinese political parties that threatened to overwhelm the colony.10 This chapter will examine 
what changed and what remained the same in the colony from 1949 to 1966 and will analyse 
why specific alterations to Hong Kong’s social, economic, and political structures occurred. 
Beginning with an inquiry into Britain’s postwar geopolitical position and the reasons behind 
London’s insistence on preserving the British status of Hong Kong, this chapter will then 
provide a detailed description of the colony’s constitutional structure. The absence of 
democratic reforms, in spite of Governor Mark Young’s attempts to change the existing 
constitutional structure, was perhaps the greatest failure of British rule in Hong Kong during 
the postwar period. This determination to depoliticise Hong Kong society also manifested itself 
in colonial educational policies. Curricula were designed in such a way to compel pupils to 
concentrate on their cultural heritage, and not on contemporary affairs. In spite of the colonial 
administration’s various deficiencies, the colony did emerge under British rule as a 
manufacturing powerhouse that was able to create employment opportunities for workers in 
Hong Kong, and resettlement and housing programs did provide affordable housing for 
Chinese who had chosen the city as their permanent home. Nevertheless, intense dissatisfaction 
against colonial rule began to manifest itself in the 1960s, and British officials, instead of ruling 
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over sojourners who had no stake in the long-term prosperity of the colony, were responsible 
for men and women who saw Hong Kong as the only home they ever knew. The absence of 
representative governance, an educational system that attempted to dissuade students from 
becoming politically conscious, and the emergence of popular discontent in the 1960s all 
demonstrate that while the local administration was able to endure during a period of 
geopolitical chaos, policymakers failed to construct a governing system capable of maintaining 
the legitimacy of British rule. 
Britain, Hong Kong, and Postwar Geopolitics 
Before diving into Hong Kong studies, it is important for scholars to examine the 
international context that surrounded the colony, especially as British policymakers were often 
hostages to geopolitical forces that were beyond their control. With the benefit of hindsight, it 
is easy to assert with confidence that the British Empire was doomed to disintegrate after 1945, 
as the imperial centre was drained of both manpower and financial resources after years of 
war.11 Indeed, how could London remain an imperial centre when food rationing in Britain 
ended only in 1954 and the sterling was devalued by 30% five years prior?12 Christopher Layne 
even commented on the 'predatory nature of U.S. economic strategy', observing that the 
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postwar financial system that was based on currency convertibility put London at the mercy of 
Washington.13 The decision to transform the sterling into a convertible currency was due to 
American insistence that convertibility be the key condition under which a much needed loan 
was extended to London in 1946 to alleviate Britain’s dollar shortage.14 The convertibility of 
the sterling meant that members of the sterling zone would be tempted to embark ‘on immense 
import programmes from all sources, unrestricted by the limitations of supplies available’ from 
the United Kingdom or countries that once fell under the umbrella of imperial preference, 
thereby dooming any prospect of a London-led trade bloc.15 Convertibility could also make 
Britain financially dependent on the United States. In fact, between July and August of 1947, 
Britain recorded a net drain of $868.9 million (the equivalent of $9,235.16 million in 2015).16 
The loan that was supposed to solve the dollar shortage problem could potentially make the 
problem permanent. The drain on dollar reserves was so severe that full convertibility was 
suspended until 1958.17 The suspension of convertibility notwithstanding, it became apparent 
that whenever London was confronted by an economic or financial crisis, it would need to 
appeal to Washington for assistance. Without overseas assets that could act as cushions when 
international crises led to selling of the sterling, London would always be dependent upon 
Washington for a bailout in the event of a disaster. Dependence on Washington was 
exemplified in 1956 when the run on the pound and American insistence that no bailout would 
be forthcoming in the absence of British withdrawal from Egypt ultimately forced London to 
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stage a humiliating withdrawal at the height of the Suez Crisis.18 Knowing that uncritical 
support towards Britain would undermine American world standing, Washington simply 
refused to assist London until the Eden government abandoned its attempt to invade a sovereign 
nation-state in order to reverse the Egyptian government’s decision to nationalise the Suez 
Canal.19  
Even taking into account the financial and political crises that confronted Britain, it is 
impossible to ignore the sheer determination of London to preserve its great power status. In 
the case of India, the British government wrongly assumed that promptly granting 
independence in 1947 would ‘would reap a rich reward in Indian gratitude, and that Congress 
would respond in a spirit of fraternity’. British policymakers thus operated on the erroneous 
assumption that an Anglo-Indian strategic partnership would materialise, thereby ensuring that 
Britain could provide guidance to Indian leaders who were seen as unschooled in international 
relations.20 While Britain’s postwar colonial policies may have appeared to be in disarray, with 
one colony granted independence, another remaining a British possession, and yet another 
transformed into constituent part of a new federation, these seemingly chaotic policies were 
designed to preserve London’s influence in different regions of the world.21 If British influence 
could endure even after decolonisation, as it was perceived to be the case in Southeast Asia 
after Indian independence, then withdrawal was an acceptable course of action. If a military 
stance had to be made in a particular region so that British authority could be preserved, then 
policymakers were willing to pursue this route. As noted by John Darwin, arguably the greatest 
living historian of the British Empire, ‘the onslaught on the Malayan Communist Party, Mau 
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Mau, EOKA or the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen scarcely resemble a staged retreat 
in the face of nationalism’.22 It was essential for Britain to continue to play an important role 
in world affairs, for what would be a better method to obtain political or economic favours 
from Washington than being a useful great power, especially one that could be counted on to 
help stop the advent of communism? To preserve London’s great power status, Britain had to 
be a stabilising geopolitical actor, one that, having learnt the hard lessons of Suez, refrained 
from needlessly antagonising Washington and potential allies and advanced the interests of the 
western world by acting as a check against communist aggression around the world.    
It would therefore be a mistake to simply view British postwar history in a linear 
manner, with London gradually became more and more dependent on the Americans and losing 
its great power status in the process. For most of the postwar period, Britain was the undisputed 
‘third world power’, one that was valued by Washington as an essential ally in maintaining 
global peace and stability.23 Colonial nationalism, something that was commonly attributed as 
another leading cause for the termination of the British Empire, was not necessarily fatal to 
maintenance of imperial possessions. In the Cold War world, having Britain as a protective ally 
even after obtainment of political independence could be essential for survival. While regional 
powers, such as India, could forsake ties with their former colonial master, for smaller countries, 
survival necessitated the continuation of cordial relations with London. Post-independence 
Malaysian politicians no doubt were grateful for British military intervention that helped their 
country withstood Indonesian aggression from 1963 to 1965. 24  Self-preservation in a 
dangerous region of the world was the primary motive that led independent Singapore to 
successfully lobby for the maintenance of the British base in the city-state after its expulsion 
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from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. While there were frequent discussions of closing the 
Singapore base, talk of withdrawing from Southeast Asia became unrealistic as both the United 
States and another important British ally, Australia, were vehemently opposed to any 
suggestion of Britain reducing its commitments before the region was deemed stable.25 The 
Singapore base, the primary raison d'etre of which was the preservation of regional stability, 
was only dismantled completely in 1976, eleven years after the independence of the city-state.26 
Singapore almost certainly got the better end of the deal, as London most likely would have 
closed the base, thereby depriving the Singaporean government of British military protection, 
had the Federation of Malaysia been a sufficiently strong political entity to protect itself from 
external threats. 27  Britain’s colonial and imperial legacies imposed privileges as well as 
burdens. On the one hand, being seen as a great power afforded it authority on the international 
scene that would otherwise be unavailable to a mere European nation-state. On the other hand, 
to remain a great power, Britain had to assume global obligations, and that meant accepting 
costly overseas military commitments. 
Of course, there were concrete financial incentives for London to preserve British 
authority in different parts of the world. When considering why Britain became involved in the 
Malayan Emergency, the conflict with local communist forces from 1948 to 1960 that 
motivated Whitehall policymakers to support the creation of the Federation of Malaysia by 
amalgamating Brunei, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore to prevent further 
destabilisation of the region, one should not discount that Malaya was a significant producer 
of rubber and tin. These resources, according to one writer, represented ‘by far the most 
                                                          
25  David Easter, ‘British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movement in Indonesia during the 
"Confrontation", 1963-1966’, in The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda 
and Special Operations, eds. by Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley (London: Frank 
Cass, 2005), pp. 195-211 (p. 204). 
26 Louis, ‘Presidential Address’, p. 18.  
27 Louis, ‘Presidential Address’, p. 13.  
42 
 
important sources of U.S dollars in the whole of the British colonial empire’.28 Hong Kong was 
similarly an important contributor to the postwar British economy. In 1949, Hong Kong was 
the destination of £24 million worth (the equivalent of £765 million in 2015) of British 
exports.29 Hong Kong contained about £156 million worth (the equivalent of £4972.5 million 
in 2015) of British investment as well.30 Hong Kong’s importance was further highlighted by 
the potential loss of around £256 million (the equivalent of £8160 million in 2015) worth of 
British investment in Shanghai after the establishment of the PRC. 31  Nonetheless, the 
determination to preserve British economic interests was only one of the reasons behind 
Britain’s decision to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison in order to defend the colony in the 
event of a PRC attack in 1949.32 It was believed that a successful attempt by the CCP to reclaim 
Hong Kong would undermine British prestige and cripple the will of Asian political leaders to 
resist communist aggression.33 It was also important to demonstrate British willingness to 
defend its possessions at a time when colonies such as Malaya were threatened by communist 
insurrections. 34  In addition to the colony’s economic importance, the decision of British 
policymakers to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison was based on their resolve to maintain 
Britain’s status as a world power able to resist ‘communist expansionism’ during the Cold 
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War.35 While the forces sent to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison were subsequently reassigned 
to participate in conflicts in Korea and Malaya, Britain in 1949 simply was not prepared to lose 
Hong Kong.36 While withdrawing from Hong Kong due to its seeming indefensibility in the 
event of a Chinese invasion was certainly considered in the 1940s and 1950s, successive British 
governments repeatedly decided against this policy.37 The British status of Hong Kong meant 
that the colony was a site where London’s commitment to remain a world power was tested.  
While Britain was willing to grant independence to some of its possessions in Southeast 
Asia, it was not prepared to let Hong Kong fall to the CCP. All this demonstrates a refusal to 
be humiliated on the international stage. This image of being a reliable political actor was not 
only important in the case of Hong Kong, where British policymakers were willing to take a 
stance against the CCP, but also in areas of the world where London was prepared to retreat. It 
is important to note that during the era of ‘the Wind of Change’, when British possessions in 
Africa were granted independence, it was essential for imperial officials to be seen as reliable 
partners in colonies’ path to independence. Only by being seen as dependable would the British 
be viewed as worthy partners in negotiations. Only by engaging in orderly negotiations could 
catastrophes, be they communal riots or the emergence of radical politicians, be prevented.38 
Of course, decolonisation still occurred at a much faster pace than was hoped for by Whitehall 
officials, who were acutely close to a state of panic as they witnessed British power steadily 
eroded throughout Africa.39 The inability to impose political changes that could have alleviated 
racial tensions on the white settler regime of Southern Rhodesia was the most glaring example 
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of British weakness.40 Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that British policymakers played the 
hand that was dealt to them with utmost skill. The transfers of power were largely peaceful 
and, at least immediately after independence, British institutions and machineries of power 
remained in place. Even when British withdrawal was all but certain, British officials had one 
trump card that ensured that they were treated as partners in negotiations: The authority to 
bestow constitutional legitimacy on inheritors of the colonial state. One is struck by the 
willingness of African politicians to perform the roles that were assigned to them once British 
departure became assured. One chronicler of Kenyan history went as far as to claim that the 
1963 transfer of power in Kenya ‘proved comfortable both for [the British] and for their 
successors’. Indeed, Jomo Kenyatta received Kenya’s Articles of Independence in an elaborate 
ceremony that made it clear that he was the successor to British authority, not just a freedom 
fighter who expelled the British.41 In the end, even opponents of foreign rule had a stake in 
preserving at least the appearance of colonial power, for no aspiring leaders would want to 
assume control over status apparatuses that were broken beyond repair. Only a Britain that had 
its dignity intact could declare its successors worthy of inheriting British authority. The 
preservation of British authority was a cooperative effort; its success was contingent upon 
London playing the role of a responsible power until the very end and anti-colonial politicians 
being content to share the stage with their soon-to-be former imperial masters.  
All the pomp and circumstance in the world, however, could not hide the fact that by 
the late 1960s, Britain was gradually running out of resources to preserve its status as a world 
power. Ernest Bevin in the 1940s and 1950s could still play the role of global statesman.42 
Harold Macmillan could claim with a straight face that Britain had ‘not lost the will or even 
the power to govern’; rather, British withdrawal represented a selfless act of a people, who, 
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upon fulfilling the responsibility of spreading their values around the world, voluntarily 
bestowed self-rule on those who deserved it. Harold Wilson, due to circumstances beyond his 
control, became the prime minister who oversaw the final phase of the Empire’s dissolution.43 
After successive financial crises in the 1960s, the sterling was once again devalued in 1967, 
and the Wilson government, even amidst American protests, announced the commencement of 
British withdrawal east of the Suez.44 In an era when Britain seemed to be increasingly content 
with its role as a European middle power and policymakers there were keen to secure British 
membership in the European Common Market, why did Hong Kong remain a Crown Colony? 
Hong Kong contributed to the stability of the sterling, since it was one of the largest holders of 
the currency in the world. Decades of disciplined spending policies meant that by 1967, the 
Hong Kong government had in its possession between £350 to £400 million in its official 
reserves (the equivalent of £5730.33 to £6549 million in 2015).45 Since postwar Hong Kong 
rarely required financial assistance from London, British officials had little interest in 
maintaining strict control over the financial policies of the colony. Moreover, Hong Kong 
policymakers were determined to assert local autonomy when it was perceived that the home 
government was interfering in the city’s policymaking process. These factors ensured that 
instead of establishing a massive welfare state, a course of action judged by the Colonial Office 
in the 1940s and the 1950s as the most sensible one, successive governors and their financial 
secretaries were able to accumulate budgetary surpluses that contributed to the growth of Hong 
Kong’s official reserves.46  The preservation of Hong Kong’s sterling assets, however, should 
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not be viewed as the primary reason for continued British presence in the city. Indeed, even if 
the colony was under PRC control, Hong Kong’s sterling assets could have been frozen before 
falling into the hands of the CCP, thereby preventing its officials from flooding the market with 
the pound.47 In the end, the British remained in Hong Kong due to the lack of any other 
alternatives. During the height of the 1967 riots, Whitehall policymakers concluded that the 
PRC would not grant Britain a dignified exit if British authority in Hong Kong collapsed.48 An 
orderly emergency evacuation without the acquiescence of local CCP supporters and the PRC 
government would be nearly impossible.49 A ‘Macao-type situation’, whereby effective control 
of the colony would be handed over to pro-PRC partisans, was deemed unacceptable, as this 
manner of capitulation would leave Britain with no bargaining power in the event of an actual 
withdrawal.50 In the absence of acceptable alternative policy options, Britain preserved the 
colonial status of Hong Kong until 1997.  
 For most of the postwar period, Britain was, after the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the third world power. Even after India obtained independence and was partitioned into 
two sovereign nation-states, London still retained powerful influence in almost all areas of the 
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world. While the Suez disaster was a shocking defeat, policymakers were still remarkably 
determined to preserve Britain’s role as a world power. Harold Wilson, not exactly a Curzonian 
figure, once proclaimed ‘we are a world power and a world influence, or we are nothing’.51  An 
important factor that sustained this imperial will to power was the fact that Britain was one of 
the victorious nation-states that emerged out of World War Two. At the same time, damages 
sustained by Britain during World War Two, postwar geopolitical realties, and successive 
financial crises made it extremely difficult for London to continue to be the third world power. 
The sterling was consistently weak, making London dependent on the goodwill of Washington 
for bailouts. The most important lesson of the 1956 Suez Crisis was that there could be no 
foreign adventures without at least the acquiescence of the Americans. By the late 1960s, 
Britain was in full retreat, and the best that policymakers could hope for were dignified exits. 
A controlled retreat, one of the most difficult military or diplomatic manoeuvres, was 
something that Britain could not envision being able to engineer if it decided to withdraw from 
Hong Kong. The world was changing around it in a rapid manner, but Hong Kong continued 
to be a British enclave in South China until 1997. At a period when nationalism was destroying 
empires around the world, Hong Kong not only remained a British possession, but also retained 
its Crown Colony constitutional structure.  
Governance of Hong Kong, 1949: Distribution of Political Power within a Crown Colony 
 
Men who assumed leadership positions in Hong Kong usually began their careers as 
members of the Hong Kong Cadet Service. Created by Governor Sir Hercules Robinson in 
1861, who was alarmed by the fact that officials in his government were men of inferior 
intellectual quality and did not possess the linguistic competence necessary to communicate 
with the colony’s Cantonese-speaking population. The original purpose of the Hong Kong 
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Cadetship was to train young men from British universities as government interpreters and, 
after a period in that capacity, promoted them on a fast track to senior government positions.52 
Alexander Grantham, as well as Colonial Secretary from 1945-1949, David MacDougall, were 
products of this system.53 To enhance his career prospects, Grantham actually took a pay cut 
and requested a transfer out of Hong Kong to Bermuda, where he acquired more administrative 
experience before returning to Hong Kong in 1947 as its governor.54 The political leadership 
of postwar Hong Kong was therefore very much part of the ‘networked and circulating colonial 
world’ of the British Empire.55 The fact that senior administrative positions were either filled 
by British university graduates who entered the government as cadets or officials who had 
previously served in other parts of the Empire meant that power was concentrated in the hands 
of  ‘expatriate mandarin[s]’.56 By 1949, only one person of Chinese descent, Paul Tsui, became 
a government cadet and joined this group of elite administrators.57 According to Steve Tsang, 
the absence of efforts to encourage Chinese to join the government, the lack of pressure from 
the Hong Kong population to force the colonial administration to recruit qualified local 
candidates, and the fact that there were very few residents in the colony who actually possessed 
native fluency in English, one of the key requirements for being admitted to the Cadet Service, 
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meant that the elite administrators of Hong Kong were almost universally of European 
descent.58   
Two chambers responsible for assisting the Governor in the administration of Hong 
Kong were the Executive and Legislative Councils. By 1949, the Executive Council, which 
was an advisory body consulted by the Governor on all important policy issues, was made up 
of the senior Military Officer in the colony, the Colony Secretary, the Attorney General, the 
Financial Secretary, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, one additional official member (the 
Governor), and six unofficial members, three of whom were Chinese. In the same year, the 
Legislative Council, which was responsible for approving funds and the passing of legislations, 
consisted of the same five ex-officio members mentioned above, three additional official 
members, and seven unofficial members, three of whom were Chinese.59 While the Governor 
was by far the most powerful figure in Hong Kong, it was not in his interest to constantly act 
against Executive and Legislative Councillors, as doing so would signify that he was not 
respectful of viewpoints held by the colony’s population that unofficial members of the two 
chambers were supposed to represent.60  
Below the Legislative and Executive Councils were administrative bodies responsible 
for the governance of Hong Kong’s urban and rural areas. Upon its reestablishment following 
the restoration of civilian government in 1946, the Urban Council was responsible for public 
sanitation, parks, and recreation in the colony. It consisted of five official members, including 
its chairman, four governmental health bureaucrats, and six unofficial members. The Urban 
Council was therefore the only governing institution in Hong Kong with an unofficial majority 
during the time period covered by this chapter.61 Another important aspect in the governance 
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of Hong Kong involved the New Territories, the rural area of the colony that encompassed 91% 
of its land mass.62 It was jurisdictionally separated from the rest of the colony and still governed 
by Qing custom laws. The official responsible for the administration of the New Territories 
was the District Commissioner, a position originally intended to be the area’s ‘father and 
mother official’ possessing administrative, legal, and police powers. The District 
Commissioner was assisted by three District Officers, each responsible for a specific region in 
the New Territories. Yet another unique feature of the New Territories was the Heung Yee 
Kuk, which was essentially an assembly of village elders that offered advice to the District 
Commissioner concerning the administration of the region.63 
Attempts at Constitutional Reforms in Hong Kong, 1946-1952 
 Upon the return of Hong Kong to British rule at the conclusion of Second World War, 
there were intense discussions behind the scene among British policymakers concerning the 
introduction of representative government to the colony. Mark Young, the governor of Hong 
Kong who had been interned by the Japanese during the war, firmly believed that fundamental 
changes to the colonial political system was necessary if British rule was to endure.64 To this 
end, he proposed the creation of a municipal council with democratically elected members that 
would gradually assume greater responsibilities as councillors became more adept at exercising 
power.65 Members of the council would be chosen on the following basis: One third of the 
councillors would be elected directly by Chinese in Hong Kong; one third would be elected by 
non-Chinese residents of the colony; the rest would be nominated by Chinese and non-Chinese 
organisations.66 It was expected that the endowment of political rights and the responsibilities 
to govern the colony would enhance Hong Kong’s ties with Britain and cement the loyalty of 
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Chinese men and women of Hong Kong to the British crown.67 The ‘Young Plan’ envisioned 
that the colony would become a diarchy, with municipal councillors and colonial officials 
acting as equal partners in the governance of Hong Kong’s urban areas.68 With the municipal 
council eventually assuming control over all policy matters excluding finance and defence, 
Young hoped that Hong Kong would emerge as a self-governing city-state within the British 
Empire.69  
 If the Young Plan had been passed, the proposed municipal council would likely have 
eventually replaced the Executive and Legislative Councils as the most important decision-
making body in the colony.70 The potential game-changing effects of the Young Plan led John 
Carroll to call it the most radical reform proposal in the history of Hong Kong.71 Radical though 
it might have been within the postwar political environment of Hong Kong, the Young Plan, if 
seen within the context of changes that were occurring within the British Empire, was actually 
quite modest. As stated by John Darwin, British officials implemented constitutional reforms 
in other colonies so that indigenous leaders would be endowed with democratic legitimacy and 
authority over government departments that were most able to improve the lives of colonial 
subjects. In doing so, a new generation of local leaders that were trusted by colonial subjects 
would emerge to become useful allies to colonial policymakers.72 This deliberate attempt to 
create democratically-elected collaborators that was the central feature of the Young Plan was 
consistent with constitutional changes that were occurring in other parts of the British Empire. 
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Indeed, if compared to other colonies, the pace of constitutional changes in Hong Kong was 
strikingly slow. In 1931, the Statute of Westminster gave all the Dominions self-rule.73 The 
first election for Municipal Commission (later renamed City Council) was held in Singapore 
in 1949.74  Of course, the pace of constitutional changes in Hong Kong was significantly 
retarded by political chaos in China and the fear that the implantation of political changes 
would lead to retaliation and efforts to destabilise British rule.75 It was fear of provoking the 
PRC and the belief that constitutional changes would lead to instability that gave critics of the 
Young Plan the ammunitions needed to doom any prospect for adopting Mark Young’s 
proposal.    
 The Young Plan received cautious support from the Colonial Office, and it seemed in 
the late 1940s that despite the legislative councillors’ skepticism about the advisability of 
constitutional changes, political reforms would finally be implemented in the colony. Hong 
Kong legislative councillors were justifiably alarmed, as the triumph of the Young Plan would 
mean the emergence of an alternative power centre.76 As well, Young coupled his plan for the 
implementation of a municipal council with a reform proposal for the Legislative Council. 
According to this scheme, the membership of the Legislative Council would be reduced from 
seventeen to fifteen.77 Two legislative councillors would be selected by the democratically-
elected members of the municipal council.78 The reconstituted Legislative Council would have 
five ex-officio members, two official members, and eight unofficial members. 79  British 
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policymakers feared that the municipal council could be easily infiltrated by Chinese agents. 
While the franchise was restricted to Chinese in Hong Kong with British nationality, officials 
in the Foreign Office worried that ‘if it suited the policy of the Chinese People’s Government 
at some future date [it] could probably persuade a very large number of Chinese’ to claim 
British citizenship, thereby enabling it to influence the outcomes of elections in the CCP’s 
favour.80 If the municipal council was infiltrated by Chinese agents and had the power to 
appoint legislative councillors, then the Young Plan could lead to the contamination by Chinese 
political parties of all important political institutions in Hong Kong. As stated by Wm. Roger 
Louis, Young was never able to refute the argument that reforms would bring political 
instability and infiltration by Chinese political operatives.81 Young’s inability to placate the 
fear of his critics and his opponents’ skilful political manoeuvres meant that the governor’s 
retirement in 1947 marked the beginning of the end for constitutional reforms in Hong Kong. 
 In an attempt to demonstrate their commitment to reforms, critics of the Young Plan 
put forward their own proposal to alter the configuration of the colony’s Legislative Council. 
In 1949, unofficial legislative councillors tabled a reform plan proposing to increase the 
number of unofficial members from eight to eleven. Six of the eleven unofficial members 
would be directly elected by those in Hong Kong who held British citizenship. Four of the six 
democratically-elected unofficial members would be Chinese. Under this scheme, an unofficial 
majority of five would be produced, as there would be only six official members. 82  The 
reconstituted Legislative Council would then seek to reform and enlarge the existing Urban 
Council.83 The unofficials were decidedly unenthusiastic about constitutional reforms, and they 
saw their proposed scheme as ‘the price to pay for superseding the Young Plan’, the principal 
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aim of which was to counteract the authority of the Legislative Council through the creation of 
a powerful municipal council, and ‘for satisfying Whitehall as well as the articulate public’.84 
Whitehall officials were nonetheless unimpressed by the unofficials’ proposal, as they were 
especially concerned about the large unofficial majority and the possibility that the governor 
would have to rely on his reserve powers to preserve British interests in the event that radical 
legislative councillors came to power in Hong Kong.85 Accordingly, in 1950, a new scheme 
was put forward by Grantham after consulting the Executive Council and the Colonial Office. 
He proposed increasing the number of unofficial members from eight to eleven. Six out of 
eleven members would be elected by Justices of the Peace, the General Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Urban Council.86 The absence of direct elections significantly reduced the possibility 
that radical legislative councillors would be elected. Nevertheless, with only four official 
members, unofficial members of the Legislative Council would outnumber their official 
counterparts by six.87 Lack of interest from London, trepidation about implementing reforms 
during a time of economic and geopolitical instability, and continued fear of infiltration by 
Chinese agents allowed the unofficials, with cooperation from Grantham, to keep watering 
down their reform proposals without facing serious opposition from their superiors in the 
Colonial Office. In the end, even the 1950 proposal was pushed aside, and the introduction for 
the first time of two elective members to the Urban Council in 1952 allowed Grantham and his 
allies to claim that political changes had finally come to Hong Kong.88   
 The addition of two democratically-elected members to the Urban Council was an anti-
climactic conclusion to constitutional reforms in Hong Kong. After years of debates, the plan 
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to create a powerful municipal council was scrapped and the composition of the Legislative 
Council remained unchanged. External circumstances played an important role in the 
abandonment of the Young Plan. The most active champion of the Young Plan, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies Arthur Creech-Jones, lost his seat in the election of 1950 (by just eighty-
one votes).89 Creech-Jones actually approved the Young Plan, but nothing was done due to 
Young’s retirement in 1947. Moreover, in 1949, officials in the Colonial Office remained 
reluctant to implement constitutional changes in Hong Kong without prior consent from the 
PRC.90 Creech-Jones’ successor, James Griffiths, while supportive of reforms, simply did not 
view Hong Kong as one of his top priorities.91 In spite of the British cabinet’s formal approval 
of the Young Plan, the absence of a strong political drive at the top of the Colonial Office 
enabled officials in London, who had reservations about reforms, to essentially drag their feet. 
It is important to note that historians have yet to find within British archives notes of formal 
protest submitted by either the KMT or the CCP about objections to reforms in Hong Kong 
when the Young Plan was being debated in the colony. 92  In his memoir, Grantham did 
comment on his fear of Chinese retaliations, but according to Steve Tsang, his correspondences 
with Whitehall did not mention concerns regarding potential KMT or CCP reprisals due to the 
implementation of the Young Plan.93 Indeed, officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices even 
feared that half-baked reforms that failed to grant Hong Kong a greater degree of self-rule 
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would become propaganda materials for KMT or CCP operatives determined to expose alleged 
British hypocrisy.94 According to Steve Tsang and Wm. Roger Louis, the greatest fear held by 
British officials was the utilisation of democratic reforms by Chinese political operatives to 
infiltrate the colony.95 It was a fear that was skilfully exploited by Grantham at a time when 
the colony often appeared dangerously close to collapse.  
The situation in Hong Kong was complicated considerably by the perilous political 
climate of East Asia during the Cold War. The Korean War, which broke out in 1950, not only 
made Hong Kong a tempting target for PRC aggression, but also posed a fundamental challenge 
to the economy of the colony. Historically, Hong Kong had been an entrepôt for goods destined 
for South China. Grantham even went so far as to say that trade was Hong Kong’s ‘lifeblood’.96 
As the result of the PRC’s military intervention in the Korean War, the United States and the 
United Nations imposed embargoes on China, which had the potential of crippling Hong 
Kong’s trade relations with the mainland. 97  The negative impact of the embargoes was 
immediate. According to Grantham, the ‘total volume of trade in 1951 was a million tons less 
than in 1950’.98 In addition to the genuine fear regarding the collapse of trade with China, the 
impression that Hong Kong was always on the verge of descending into chaos was 
compounded by instability within the colony itself. In 1948, the violent eviction of squatters in 
Kowloon Wall City led to one death, which in turn sparked protests in China, culminating in 
the burning down of the British Consulate in Canton.99 In 1952, the decision to deny entry into 
Hong Kong a Chinese relief mission the stated purpose of which was to assist victims of the 
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Tung Tau village fire led to riots by disgruntled fire victims and sympathisers of the PRC.100 
With chaos engulfing the colony, there was considerable reluctance among officials, in the 
Colonial and Foreign Offices, to introduce major reforms in Hong Kong.101 It was in this 
context that Grantham sent a telegram in 1952 to J. B. Sidebothan, the head of the Hong Kong 
Department at the Colonial Office, that he and his allies had come to the conclusion that major 
reforms constituted ‘a danger’.102 According to Steve Tsang, ‘danger’ was the ‘magic word’ 
that ‘would induce the Colonial Office to apply brake on reforms’.103 It was on this basis that 
the reconfiguration of the Urban Council was accepted as the end of constitutional reforms in 
Hong Kong.  
 The abortion of the Young Plan effectively ended British efforts to democratise Hong 
Kong in the postwar period. While no other serious reform proposals were put forward in the 
1950s, as the 1960s approached, there was an increasing sense that the existing system of 
governance was not effective in representing the voices of Chinese residing in the colony. 
Governor David Trench, in a private correspondence with his colleagues in London, described 
debates at the Legislative Council between men who were supposed to be representatives of 
different segments of the Hong Kong population as ‘inexpressibly tedious’.104 There were 
attempts to revive public debates for constitutional changes by organisations such as the 
Reform Club and the Civic Association. In August 1960, these two groups held a joint meeting 
to discuss the need for political changes. They then followed up their meeting by going to 
London to forward a petition to Whitehall pressing for reforms.105 Nothing came of these 
attempts to jump start another round of constitutional talks since there was no groundswell of 
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support for political changes in Hong Kong. Changes proposed by the Hong Kong government 
in the 1960s were for the purpose of improving the line of communication between the general 
public and the highest level of the colonial state.106 Nothing as bold as the Young Plan was 
contemplated.    
 The fear of infiltration by Chinese agents, the unwillingness of local British officials to 
broaden the basis of political participation in the colony, and the lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of the general public on the need for democratic reforms all contributed to the demise of the 
Young Plan. One of the chief purposes of the Young Plan was to create a sense of civic pride 
among Chinese in Hong Kong. The Young Plan was never implemented precisely because this 
sense of identity was missing among the Chinese in the colony. Indeed, this was the key 
argument asserted repeatedly by the critics of the Young Plan. Chau Tsun-Nin, one of the 
unofficials who opposed the Young Plan, stated that it ‘would perhaps be expecting too much 
of the inhabitants to ask them to forget their native origin but to merge their respective 
individualities into a common bond of Hong Kong citizenship’.107 It was for this reason that it 
was thought to be futile to give the Hong Kong population the right to vote, since a population 
without a strong sense of civic pride or a sense of belonging would be liable to be manipulated 
by external political influences. Hong Kong and London policymakers were therefore 
convinced that Chinese in Hong Kong would never develop a sense of civic belonging that 
would act as the foundation for liberal governance in the colony.  
Postwar Colonial Educational Policies in Hong Kong  
 
Education was an especially important policy issue in a colony that was seen as lacking 
civic pride. It was assumed that a population without any cohesiveness would be difficult to 
control by its colonisers. Young and uneducated men and women were seen as liable to 
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delinquency, an issue that could develop into a serious social problem for the colonial 
government since Hong Kong’s population expanded with the influx of refugees from China 
in the 1950s and 1960s.108 In 1951, it was recognised that education was important ‘from a 
civic as well as from economic point of view’.109  Grantham was concerned about ‘street 
children’ who were growing up ‘without any ethical standards, in fact without standards of any 
kind except the will to survive’.110 In this sense, British policymakers were not unlike colonial 
administrators in other European colonies, who saw education as a method to enforce social 
control through propagating ideologies in schools and reinforcing ‘discourse[s] of legitimation’ 
that were supportive of colonial rule. 111  It was also feared that ‘in the absence of a 
comprehensive system of education’, political parties, such as the KMT or the CCP, would be 
‘willing, and indeed, anxious to establish schools as a means to political indoctrination rather 
than to education’.112 While no doubt also driven by humanitarian impulses, the uncertain 
political climate that policymakers found themselves in constituted a key reason behind Hong 
Kong government’s determination to enlarge educational structure in the colony during the 
postwar period.  
The massive expansion of the educational sector was especially impressive when one 
considers that policymakers were determined to preserve budgetary surpluses. In 1948, there 
were 110,000 pupils in Hong Kong schools; in 1949, 130,000; in 1950, 150,000; in 1951, 
169,000; in 1952, 195,000. By 1953, Hong Kong had over 200,000 pupils in its schools. 
Grantham proudly noted there were about twice the number of children attending schools in 
Hong Kong as there were at the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. The expansion of school 
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placements was a remarkable policy achievement, considering that upon re-occupation, 
policymakers had to start almost from scratch.113 By 1966, the total number of students in 
schools was more than 900,000, meaning that roughly one out of four Hong Kong resident was 
attending an educational course in the colony.114 According to Anthony Sweeting, between 
1955 and 1964, the most intense expansion of school placements in Hong Kong occurred at the 
primary level.115 By 1966, out of the total student population of 925,752, 636,455 were primary 
school pupils.116  
Secondary government schools could not absorb all the students that graduated from 
the primary level, and from 1955 to 1954, enrolments at private schools tripled.117 Since there 
were private schools funded by KMT and CCP sympathisers, the danger persisted that 
institutions within the colony would train students to become opponents of British rule.  
Prominent KMT schools included Heung Tao Middle School (香島中學) and Rennie's Mill 
Middle School (調景嶺中學), while Hon Hwa (漢華), Sun Kiu (新僑), Chung wah (中華), and Pui 
Kiu (培僑) were popular pro-PRC schools.118 It is important to note that enrolments at pro-
KMT and pro-PRC schools were underwhelming. For example, from 1959 to 1960, enrolments 
at registered primary and secondary schools totalled 370,827, while the nine schools located in 
the KMT stronghold of Rennie’s Mill enrolled only 4,560 pupils.119 Enrolments at pro-PRC 
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schools was higher than at their KMT counterparts, but schools aligned with Beijing often 
received insufficient funding and therefore could not significantly expand their student 
populations.120 In 1960, approximately 11% of the overall high school students enrolled at 
schools supportive of the CCP. 121  These shortcomings notwithstanding, the colonial 
government did not ignore the potentially explosive confrontations that could arise out of these 
political parties’ self-identification as vanguards of Chinese nationalism. Policies therefore 
were constructed to minimise the potential danger Chinese nationalism posed to the colony.   
As late as 1949, Hong Kong schools utilised curricula published by KMT authorities.122 
Reliance on KMT curricula was obviously problematic for the Hong Kong government, as its 
officials would not want students to be exposed to ideologies that were anti-British. Continued 
utilisation of KMT curricula could also provoke conflicts with local pro-PRC elements.123 
There were two conflicting visions of Chinese history that could lead to confrontations among 
students and political activists that aligned themselves on different sides of the Chinese Civil 
War. In 1953, the Chinese Studies Committee within the Education Department recommended 
that Hong Kong should develop its own curricula that focused on Chinese civilisation rather 
than on contemporary political issues.124 As argued by Paul Morris and Anthony Sweeting, 
instead of promoting ‘curriculum neutrality’, these initiatives to standardise local curricula 
were carried out with the ‘explicitly political motive’ of ensuring ‘the apoliticisation of 
education’.125 This policy was gradually implemented; in the 1960s, the KMT curricula was 
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slowly phased out and replaced with curricula approved by the colonial government and 
containing interpretations of Chinese history that officials wanted to imprint on Hong Kong 
pupils.126  
Determined to preserve British rule and stability within the colony, the colonial 
government could be quite ruthless in enforcing adherence to official curricula. Schools that 
failed to comply with prescribed standards were often shut down. Pro-Beijing schools such as 
Tak Tat Institute (達德學院) and Nang Fang Academy (南方學校) were closed in 1949 and 1951, 
respectively. 127  In addition to repression, the colonial government enforced educational 
standards by incentivising policy compliance. In 1952, the Hong Kong Chinese School 
Certificate Examination (CSCE) was instituted.128 The CSCE strictly adhered to the colonial 
government’s philosophy that the study of Chinese history was for the purpose of fostering 
internal stability. Questions in the CSCE went so far as to describe the May Fourth Movement 
as primarily a literacy movement, despite it widely being recognised as an important cultural 
and political event that centred on anti-imperialism and Chinese nationalism.129 As the only 
matriculation exam in Chinese that was officially recognised by the local government, the 
CSCE forced schools and students to subscribe to an interpretation of Chinese history deemed 
appropriate by their coloniser. In 1965, the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), the 
first Chinese university in the colony that was the by-product of amalgamation between New 
Asia College (新亞書院), Chung Chi College (崇基學院), and United College (聯合書院) two 
years prior, announced that it would base its entry exam on the 1964 CSCE syllabi. This 
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decision by the CUHK forced Chinese schools that were previously critical of the CSCE to 
adhere to official curricula.130  
As Hong Kong was transforming from an entrepôt into a manufacturing centre, men 
who managed factories instrumental to the colony’s economic transformation were rarely 
highly educated technocrats. Their business acumen was acquired through practical 
experiences rather than advanced education. Often they were former labourers who climbed 
the managerial ladders through carefully watching profit margins and promoting labour 
efficiency.131 It could not be said that the need to preserve or to create a workforce able to 
sustain Hong Kong’s status as an entrepôt and a global manufacturing centre constituted the 
primary reason behind the massive expansion of the education sector in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The initiatives to enlarge the educational sector was motivated as much by the need to 
undermine popular support for the KMT and the CCP as by humanitarian concerns. The 
policies enacted by Grantham and his successors not only provided educational opportunities 
for numerous Hong Kong Chinese, but also countered the ideological appeals of the KMT and 
the CCP.  
New Asia College, Chinese Nationalism, and Postwar Hong Kong  
 
In addition to the efforts of colonial policymakers to expand the educational sector in 
postwar Hong Kong, the colony was also fortunate that some of China’s most prominent 
intellectuals sought refuge in the city following the Chinese Civil War. These Chinese 
intellectuals arrived in Hong Kong after Mao’s rise to power in 1949 and emerged as important 
educators in the colony. The most prominent of these Chinese intellectuals, such as Qian Mu, 
Tang Junyi, and Zhang Pijie, were fierce Chinese nationalists imbued with ‘a sense of 
collective shame about the Opium War and the cession of Hong Kong to Britain’. 132 
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Nevertheless, they felt that they had no choice but to seek refuge in British Hong Kong, as they 
were even more repulsed by the PRC, which they saw as the antithesis of Chinese 
civilisation.133 In spite of their ties with the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan, once they 
settled in Hong Kong, they had to respect the colony’s neutral stance in the Cold War and 
refrain from adopting a pro-KMT stance.134  It was for this reason that Qian Mu and his cohort 
began to cultivate a type of Chinese nationalism that concentrated on China’s civilisational 
achievements in centuries past. 135  This type of cultural nationalism was by no means 
exceptional; indeed, it was quite common for Chinese living outside of China to feel attached 
to Chinese culture but not to the regime in control of the mainland.136 Similar to Qian Mu, 
Wang Fuzhi, the great seventeenth century Confucian scholar, argued in favour of a ‘separate 
Chinese community of culture’ after the fall of the Ming dynasty and the advent of the Manchu 
dynasty, which, like the CCP in the twentieth century, was seen by some as an unworthy 
inheritor of the Chinese civilisation.137 Thus, Qian Mu and his colleagues were tapping into a 
well-developed tradition among intellectuals of distinguishing between the Chinese nation that 
was made up of China’s civilisational achievements, and the Chinese state, which was a 
geopolitical entity that could be occupied by forces that were seen as lacking the sophistication 
to act as custodians of China’s cultural heritage.138   
Exiled Chinese intellectuals stationed in Hong Kong were determined to establish an 
educational base from which they could continue to evangelise their interpretation of Chinese 
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culture and nationalism. To this end, Qian Mu and his colleagues established an institution of 
higher learning in 1949 with the express purpose of ensuring that its students would come to 
‘truly understand Chinese culture’. 139  Initially called Asia School of Humanities and 
Commerce (亞洲文商專科夜校), the institution changed its name to New Asia College (新亞書
院 ) in 1950 when the school relocated to a better and more convenient location. 140  It is 
important to note that the founders of New Asia did not intend for their students to become 
detached scholars uninvolved in world affairs. They were disgusted with the state of Chinese 
politics in the Cold War and wished to preserve in a British enclave what they thought to be 
the essence of the Chinese civilisation. The purpose of preserving China’s cultural heritage was 
to safeguard it for future generations.141 Qian Mu and his colleagues therefore likely viewed 
the Mao era as a transitory period in Chinese history. If mainland China was in the state of 
cultural decay and scholars in Hong Kong were preserving the Chinese civilisation, then exiled 
intellectuals saw their responsibility as preparing for the fall of the Mao regime and 
reintroducing Chinese culture into the post-communist mainland.142 Underscoring their belief 
that Chinese culture represented the height of human civilisation, one of the goals of New Asia 
was that its students would utilise their Chinese cultural heritage not only to revitalise China, 
but also to reconcile global tensions that were provoked by the seeming irreconcilability of 
Asian and western values.143 Indeed, in the school’s twentieth anniversary publication, the 
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mission statement of New Asia was proclaimed to be using Chinese values to construct a global 
philosophical system supportive of world peace.144 
While initially possessing limited resources and often plagued with financial difficulties, 
the course options of New Asia that focused on various aspects of Chinese culture and history 
were seen as far superior to China studies programs offered by the University of Hong Kong 
(HKU).145 As stated by Grace Ai-Ling Chou, 'for...students…interested in China studies, the 
HKU was not regarded as offering much prestige or quality’.146 According to his most recent 
biographer, Qian Mu was often approached by the HKU and repeatedly offered a teaching 
position. Citing his commitment to New Asia, Qian refused these job offers.147 Thus, the 
cultural influence of New Asia in Hong Kong should not be underestimated. Indeed, many 
graduates of New Asia went on to become professional teachers and were responsible for the 
spread of the ‘New Asia Sprit’, which could be summed up as the determination to utilise 
Chinese cultural values to improve China and the world at large.148 New Asia also sponsored 
the Cultural Open Forum, which was a lecture series consisting of 139 meetings that lasted 
from November 1, 1950 to January 9, 1955, which had the purpose of introducing Chinese 
culture to what the faculty of New Asia saw as ‘a colonial, alien territory, a desert landscape 
devoid of…cultural relics and activities’.149 As the lecture series was hosted by New Asia and 
prominently featured scholars affiliated with the College, the public profile of the school was 
further enhanced by the Cultural Open Forum.150 New Asia, however, did not concentrate 
solely on the training of aspiring intellectuals. In spite of the colonial government’s 
commitment to education, it was still difficult for local educational institutions to absorb pupils 
                                                          
144 Xia, ‘Xin ya jinshen’, p. 224.  
145 Chen Yong 陳勇, Qian Mu chuan 錢穆傳  (The Life of Qian Mu) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), p. 231. 
146 Grace Ai-Ling Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War: Chinese Cultural Education at Hong Kong’s 
New Asia College, 1949-63 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 87. 
147 Chen, Qian Mu chuan, p. 232. 
148 Kan, Hong Kong’s Chinese History Curriculum from 1949, p. 74; Xia, ‘Xin ya jinshen’, p. 221. 
149 Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War, p. 39; Luk, ‘Chinese Culture’, p. 663.  
150 Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War, p. 40.  
67 
 
who came to Hong Kong as part of the refugee influxes in the 1950s. To meet this need, the 
leadership of New Asia established a primary level night school in 1952 to try to educate the 
excess student population.151 Enrolment at the night school was actually quite small, and in 
1952, only eighty students attended.152 Teachers at the night school propagated the same brand 
of Chinese nationalism espoused by other scholars at New Asia. The contributions that New 
Asia made to the postwar educational expansion at the primary level was minimum, but the 
efforts to establish the night school, at a time when the financial status of the College itself was 
perilous, was indicative of the commitment of its scholars to propagate their version of Chinese 
identity.153   
In spite of its difficult beginning, including the bankruptcy of one of its earliest financial 
backers in 1950, New Asia, with assistance from American organisations such as Yale-China 
Association, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Asia Foundation, and the Ford Foundation, gradually 
achieved financial stability and became an indispensable actor in Hong Kong’s educational 
sector.154 The financial contributions that American organisations made to New Asia should 
not be underestimated; without American backing,  New Asia would have most likely collapsed 
in the early 1950s. At that time, the colonial government was barely able to maintain the living 
standards of Chinese residing in Hong Kong and could not offer substantial financial help.155 
Preoccupied with halting the spread of communism, American philanthropic organisations 
were willing to merge their desire to improve the living standards of residents in third world 
countries with a fierce determination to undermine the efforts of the communist bloc to expand 
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its global reach.156 One of the purposes of supporting New Asia was to ensure that local 
students attracted by educational opportunities available in the PRC would instead remain in 
Hong Kong.157 American organisations were especially attracted by New Asia’s emphasis on 
traditional Chinese cultural values and its founders’ goal of eventually returning to China in an 
attempt to restore the mainland’s cultural heritage, an objective shared by the Yale-China 
Association.158 To paraphrase Cold War historian and Kissinger biographer Jeremi Suri, New 
Asia should be considered a ‘Cold War institution’ since it was recused from financial ruin by 
organisations with the raison d'etre to resist communist expansionism.159 Both seeking to 
preserve what they viewed to be traditional Chinese cultural practices, exiled scholars and 
American philanthropists were convinced that New Asia represented the best hope for them to 
achieve their common objective.  
 Financial stability begot further academic excellence and, as the 1950s progressed, 
New Asia’s library became recognised as possessing one of finest classical Chinese material 
collections in Asia. The New Asia Research Institute was created in 1955 to be a postgraduate 
and research centre for China studies, and it quickly drew praise for its scholarly rigor.160 With 
its powerful academic reputation, it should be of no surprise that New Asia was one of the three 
institutions to be merged into the CUHK.161 Indeed, its status as a founding member of the 
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CUHK can be seen as one of the lasting legacies of New Asia. New Asia Research Institute 
was retained by the CUHK as the university’s graduate training centre for aspiring China 
specialists. It preserved its separated identity even when administrators decided to create a 
centralised graduate school. The central role occupied by New Asia in the CUHK was 
recognised by historians such as Grace Ai-Ling Chou, who claimed that 'New Asia...became a 
core of Chinese studies within a broader university framework that valued Chinese studies'.162 
The establishment of the CUHK also signalled a more subtle shift in the guiding principles of 
New Asia. Being a founding member of the CUHK explicitly acknowledged that Hong Kong, 
instead of being point of refuge for scholars awaiting their return to China, was now the focus 
of New Asia scholars, as the purpose of the new university was to establish itself as the Chinese 
alternative to the English-speaking HKU.163 Despite not renouncing the New Asia objective of 
spreading Chinese culture to the PRC and the world, as ‘the New Asia leaders’ stay in the 
colony became indefinite, their educational project could not avoid becoming an increasingly 
Hong Kong-specific, Hong Kong-tailored one’.164 The establishment of the CUHK, which 
contained the New Asia Research Institute, ensured that Hong Kong, instead of being viewed 
as a cultural desert, was by 1960s acknowledged as an intellectual centre for China studies in 
its own right.  
It is difficult to escape the impression left by Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, and Zhang Pijie 
that Hong Kong was always too small, too colonial, and too peripheral. Indeed, none of them 
came to Hong Kong voluntarily; they were refugees who departed China due to the PRC’s rise 
to power, a state that to them represented the antithesis of their life’s objective to promote and 
celebrate Chinese culture. Initially, Hong Kong was not seen as anything more than a 
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temporary refuge for the founders of New Asia, who were prepared to return to China upon the 
fall of the Maoist regime. When the PRC showed no signs of imminent collapse, it became 
evident that Qian Mu and his cohort had to view Hong Kong not as a temporary refuge, but as 
their permanent home. The ambitious objective of New Asia founder to use Chinese values to 
promote global peace was too utopian to realise. A much more tangible legacy of New Asia 
was the establishment of the CUHK. In addition to scholars who achieved international 
prominence as the result of their academic training in New Asia, the school changed the lives 
of many Hong Kong Chinese for the better due to various initiatives, such as the night school 
to educated underprivileged youths. In the end, an institution of higher learning that began as 
an attempt to spread Chinese cultural values around the world found its most lasting legacy in 
the education of men and women of a small British colony during the late colonial era.165 
The Emergence of Hong Kong Identity? The Transformation of the Colony from 1949 to 
1966 
As Hong Kong would always be affected by political chaos within China, the 
conclusion of the Chinese Civil War brought severe challenges to the stability of British rule 
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in the colony. Before 1950, the British colonial state had ‘the policy, indeed almost a tradition, 
to allow freedom of movement to Chinese across the border with China’. 166  With the 
impending collapse of the KMT government at the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, 
Chinese from the mainland increasingly took advantage of the open-door policy to enter Hong 
Kong, since they saw the colony as an oasis of calm at a time when political conflicts were 
raging in China. By November 1949, Grantham was already ‘much exercised’ about the 
influxes of migrants and refugees into the colony.167  By 1950, London agreed that all Chinese 
nationals attempting to enter Hong Kong should be ‘liable to immigration control wherever 
they come from’ due to serious overcrowding in the colony.168 In May 1950, a daily quota 
system was introduced to make the number of Chinese entering the colony roughly equal to 
the number leaving, only permitting extra fifty legal migrants to stay per day.169 Responding 
to this new policy, PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Tsang Han-fu sent the British a note of protest, 
arguing that the imposition of the quota system was in violation of the traditional open-door 
policy between the mainland and Hong Kong.170 The quota system was therefore ‘not strictly 
enforced’, as the British believed the Chinese government would ‘resist such an attempt’.171 In 
this way, even after the imposition of the quota system, the actual number of Chinese arriving 
in Hong Kong far exceeded those leaving for the mainland. In February 1956, the Hong Kong 
government decided to suspend the quota system for a trial period of seven months. The result 
was a further influx of 56,000 Chinese into Hong Kong. The quota system was quickly 
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reimposed in September of the same year.172 Indictive of how successive population influxes 
changed Hong Kong, by 1961, out of the total population of 1,607,779, around 733,472 
Chinese in Hong Kong were born in Guangdong. 173  Given Hong Kong’s proximity to 
Guangdong, it is reasonable to assume that refugees who attempted to enter the city in 1962 
during the height of the Great Leap Forward were also mostly of Guangdong origin.174 By then, 
it was deemed necessary for the colonial government to actually turn back refugees seeking a 
safe haven in Hong Kong.175 Even so, while 60, 000 refugees were returned to the PRC between 
April and May of 1962, roughly the same number were able to enter and remain in Hong Kong 
illegally.176  
Successive waves of refugee and migrant influxes meant that an already crowded city 
became even more overpopulated. Shelters had to be provided for these new arrivals, as failure 
to do so could potentially have a devastating impact on the stability of the colony. Squatters 
became a serious problem in the 1950s, as their presence in Hong Kong could provide a trigger 
for a PRC intervention. Particularly worrying for the colonial government was the fact that 
squatters had already participated in the riots of 1948 and 1952.177 According to Alan Smart, 
public housing and squatter resettlement programs that began after the 1953 Shek Kip Mei fire 
were designed to alleviate the threat posed by squatters and deprive the PRC government of an 
excuse for military interventions.178 Smart was not overestimating Grantham’s distrust of the 
PRC, as the governor was a young cadet during the 1925-1926 Strike-Boycott, and his 
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formative years in the colony made him ever vigilant of external political organisations’ 
attempts to destabilise Hong Kong.179 Grantham therefore was determined to minimise threats 
posed by a discontent population and local sympathisers of the PRC.   
Between 1950s and 1960s, the Hong Kong government became involved in public 
housing and squatter resettlement projects to a degree that was unimaginable for the 
predecessors of Grantham. In March 1951, Grantham stated that ‘housing for the less well-to-
do members of the community is a matter of prime importance calling for early attention’.180  
By 1954, about 120,000 former squatters had been rehoused and begun living in resettlement 
areas due to the efforts of the newly established Resettlement Department.181 In the same year, 
the Housing Authority was created with the responsibility to provide accommodations for 
people living in overcrowded or unsanitary conditions.182 The Housing Authority’s first project 
was to build over 1,700 flats at North Point, the purpose of which was to provide 
accommodation for about 15,000 people.183 While non-governmental organisations such as the 
Housing Society and the Model Housing Society still played important roles, by 1954, low-
cost public housing and resettlement represented policy domains over which the colonial 
government was primarily responsible.184 In the annual review for the year 1966, the Hong 
Kong government labelled the preceding ten years a ‘decade of progress’, especially regarding 
the construction of cheap housing for the underprivileged.185 By then, 67,275 Hong Kong 
Chinese were residing in low-cost housing units.186 From 1954 to 1966, the government of 
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Hong Kong resettled approximately 900,000 persons.187 While a desire to stabilise Hong Kong 
was certainly the primary imperative, by providing affordable housing to those in need, the 
colonial government improved the living standards of those residing in the colony.  
In addition to public housing, Hong Kong was also fortunate that its economy was able 
to adapt quickly to external challenges and to provide sufficient employment opportunities for 
its mushrooming population. In 1949, Hong Kong’s trade mostly involved re-export; in 
contrast, by 1966, the local manufacturing sector had grown to such a degree that overseas 
markets were now destinations for goods produced in the colony.188 The impetus to transform 
Hong Kong’s economic structure was triggered by embargoes placed on the PRC by the United 
Nations and the United States.189 The economic relationship between China and Hong Kong 
was not severed, as goods were often smuggled into the PRC from the colony, and the territory 
continued to be a destination for imports originated from China.190 Nonetheless, in order to 
survive economically, Hong Kong had to develop a new alternative role besides being 
primarily a gateway for products going into China. It was in this challenging environment that 
Hong Kong emerged as a manufacturing powerhouse in East Asia. Once primarily an entrepôt 
for products going to China, by 1966 Hong Kong had become one of Asia’s most important 
manufacturing centres.   
The successful emergence of Hong Kong as a manufacturing centre has been attributed 
to the arrival of industrialists from Shanghai who possessed the technical knowhows as well as 
the financial resources needed to build prosperous factories.191 According to Siu-lun Wong, 
arguably the top expert on the Shanghainese elites in Hong Kong, Shanghai industrialists fled 
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the city as the CCP emerged as the victor in the Chinese Civil War. Choosing Hong Kong as 
their point of refuge due to lax immigration rules and favourable business climate, these 
‘emigrant entrepreneurs’ brought immense wealth and, in some cases, sophisticated 
machineries that were not available in the British territory to jumpstart local industrial 
development.192  In spite of the fact that they only represented about 4% of the local population 
(by the end of the colonial era, Shanghainese made up of 0.5% of the population), their 
economic prowess enabled these Shanghainese industrialists to become a distinguished group 
of elites in Hong Kong. Their status rose, according to Leo F. Goodstadt, to at least the equal 
of expatriate businessmen in the colony.193 According to Wong, the Shanghainese industrialists, 
who often never learnt how to speak Cantonese and relied upon the utilisation of their regional 
dialect in their private as well as professional lives, were able to form a formidable industrial 
and economic bloc in which members conducted financial transactions with each other.194 
Relentlessly ambitious, these industrialists consistently used their profits to further expand their 
businesses, and essentially transform the cotton industry into a Shanghainese enclave.195 Given 
the importance of the textile industry in Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector, the dominance of 
Shanghainese industrialists in this domain made them the key players in the city’s industrial 
rise.  
The argument that Shanghainese businessmen were almost singlehandedly responsible 
for the industrial take-off of Hong Kong had been challenged by scholars, such as Steve Tsang, 
who pointed out that there were many industries in Hong Kong before the arrival of 
industrialists from Shanghai.196 The Chinese Manufacturing Union was established in 1948, 
demonstrating that there existed significant industrial production that was ‘Chinese-owned and 
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managed’ prior to the arrival of the Shanghainese industrialists.197 David Faure and Lee Pui-
tak went as far as to claim that the postwar emergence of the Hong Kong manufacturing sector 
should be classified as a ‘revival’, since there was a well-established foundation of industrial 
production in the colony prior to the 1940s and 1950s.198 In addition to the Shanghainese 
industrialists who brought with them technical knowledge, capitals, and machineries to Hong 
Kong, there were also entrepreneurs of Guangdong origin who contributed to Hong Kong’s 
industrialisation.199 Although Shanghainese textile firms accounted for perhaps 36% of total 
domestic exports in 1953, by 1960, their share was down to 22%. In the same period, Cantonese 
textile companies produced around 39% of total domestic exports.200 Hong Kong’s industrial 
take-off would not be possible without the Shanghainese industrialists and their Cantonese 
counterparts (who either came from Guangdong after the war or were Chinese businessmen in 
Hong Kong who already had factories in the colony in the late 1940s). The existence of 
indigenous talent and capital, as well as the infusion of additional financial resources brought 
by the Shanghainese industrialists, enabled Hong Kong to become a manufacturing 
powerhouse by 1966.  
The production of electronics and plastic goods and companies that provided repair 
facilities for aircrafts and ships represented important components of Hong Kong’s industrial 
sector. The textile industry, however, was the engine that drove the colony’s economic 
growth.201 By December 1966, 424,000 workers were employed in industrial undertakings, an 
increase of 14% over the previous year. Almost half of the increase was in Hong Kong’s textile 
industry.202 In the same year, the textile industry accounted for about 41% of Hong Kong’s 
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industrial workforce.203 As a significant percentage of the colony’s industrial workforce was 
employed by the textile sector, the prosperity of Hong Kong depended considerably on the 
ability of locally manufactured products to penetrate overseas markets. In fact, Hong Kong 
textile industry was so successful in its penetration of overseas markets that the colonial 
government in the 1960s was compelled to place voluntary quotas on Hong Kong exports to 
countries such as Britain and the United States. The imposition of voluntary quotas prevented 
foreign authorities from implementing even harsher measures to shield their companies from 
competition.204 In 1966, Hong Kong’s external trade continued to be robust, with domestic 
exports increased by 14% and re-exports by 22% over the previous year.205 Expansion of the 
textile sector was made possible by the colony’s ties with the mainland market, which was 
responsible for 23% of the colony’s imports in 1966 and supplied much needed raw materials 
for local manufacturers. 206  International embargoes notwithstanding, Sino-Hong Kong 
commercial relations were never entirely severed, especially since ‘legitimate local trade of 
non-strategic materials’ between the colony and China flourished.207 Just as important to Hong 
Kong’s economic growth was the fact that Chinese banks, especially those in South China, 
often provided loans to Cantonese entrepreneurs who wanted to expand or open factories.208 
Shanghai bankers, such as K. P. Chen, were reluctant to sever financial ties with the PRC due 
a sense of loyalty.209 Cantonese businessmen, in contrast, had to cultivate relations with their 
compatriots due to financial necessity. Cantonese businessmen simply lacked the linguistic 
competence and political connections necessary to acquire financing from British banks.210 
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Alongside contributions from Chinese businessmen, be they from Shanghai, Hong Kong, or 
Guangdong, external factors were instrumental in Hong Kong’s economic take-off, such as the 
availability of foreign markets and the willingness of banks to provide loans to aspiring 
entrepreneurs.  
In spite of its undemocratic nature, British colonialism did provide Hong Kong 
residents with a degree of stability and an adequate standard of living. Taking inflation into 
consideration, real daily wages for skilled workers in 1949 were between HK$5.7 and HK$7.9, 
while those of skilled workers in 1966 ranged from HK$6.4 to HK$21.2.211 Hong Kong’s 
transformation from an entrepôt into an Asian manufacturing powerhouse did lead to 
substantive improvement in wages for many workers in Hong Kong. At the same time, 
‘considerable improvement in living conditions’ only ‘inspired the desire for still 
further improvement.’212 Just as important was the fact that for unskilled workers with the 
lowest earning potential, their real daily wages stagnated at around HK$3 from 1949 to 1966.213 
According to prominent Hong Kong anti-poverty activist Elsie Tu, for many households, 
‘father had to work at another job, and the children had to earn their coopers if the family was 
to eat at all’. The hardship of ordinary residents was compounded by corruption that permeated 
almost all levels of government. Policemen knew that ‘there was a lot of money to be earned 
in corruption’, and people from lower social classes often had to pay protection money to triad 
members and policemen.214 There was a growing impression that British colonialism, while 
able to protect Hong Kong from instability emanating from China, was not necessarily the best 
system of governance. In 1965, there were rumblings among journalists and intellectuals that 
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local men and women, instead of colonial officials, should be in charge of the territory’s 
governance.215 British Hong Kong would soon face a sterner test than a group of genteel 
journalists and academics clamouring for self-rule; 1966 witnessed an upheaval highlighting 
that beneath its veneer of stability, an undercurrent of discontent existed in the colony.   
The events of 1966 have justifiably been overshadowed by the disturbances a year later 
that would shock British colonial rule to its core. Although the 1966 riots did not fundamentally 
challenge the foundation of British rule, policymakers were alarmed by the level of contempt 
Chinese in Hong Kong had for those who occupied positions of power in the colony. The riots 
were sparked by the Star Ferry increasing its fare by 10 cents. Although the fare increase would 
be restricted to first class seats, many in Hong Kong were angered by the management’s 
announcement of the price increase without public consultation. There was also a longstanding 
fear that other companies would follow the Star Ferry’s lead and hike up prices.216 A young 
man’s hunger strike to protest the proposed price hike, his subsequent detention by local 
authorities, and the refusal of demonstrators to disperse led to confrontations between 
protestors and the police that resulted in 1,465 arrests.217 Neither the KMT nor the CCP was 
involved in the riots, and according to Governor David Trench, ‘by the standards of other 
countries’, the disturbances were ‘a minor affair’.218 Trench might have underestimated the 
level of discontent that existed in Hong Kong. During the protests leading up to the riots, a 
young man by the name of Lo Kei provocatively and loudly asked: ‘[Should] Colonialism 
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continue to exist’?219 So Sau-chung, the hungry striker who sparked the riots, claimed that he 
was disgusted by the oppressive nature of colonial rule in Hong Kong.220 ‘Mundane frustration 
which develop in an urban industrial community where many people live in terribly over-
crowded and sub-standard conditions’; ‘the fact that young people could only hope to obtain 
dulling and low paid job which offer little challenge and no hope for advancement’; in 
combination with anger against a colonial government that was not seen as responsive to the 
needs of the local population all contributed to the eruption of the 1966 riots.221  
The fact that young people of the colony would take an active role in a protest against 
an unpopular policy meant that the residents of Hong Kong could no longer be seen as apathetic 
colonial subjects. The colonial government certainly did little to foster a sense of cohesiveness 
among Chinese in the colony during the postwar era, because officials believed that such an 
attempt would have been futile due to the population’s transient character and the view that 
many would return to their home provinces after saving enough money.222 This was already 
changing in the 1950s. International observers, such as Dr. Edward Hambro, a United Nations 
official responsible for studying the socioeconomic problems that confronted Chinese refugees 
in Hong Kong, acknowledged that those who came to the colony had no intention of returning 
to China.223 The creation of affordable public housing was an acknowledgment that the Chinese 
who escaped from the PRC intended to stay, and public policies had to be formulated to 
integrate these new arrivals into Hong Kong society.224 By 1966, out of a total population of 
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3,708,920, about 1,996,640 inhabitants of Hong Kong were born in the colony. 225 
Approximately 1,487,990 Hong Kong inhabitants were in the age range of 15 to 39.226 It is 
important to note that in stark contrast to Singapore, a comparable city-state where the 
government decided to forge a strong identity among members of its multicultural population, 
Hong Kong did not initiate policies that would create a sense of commonality.227 Despite the 
absence of active identity formation policy by the colonial government, a Hong Kong identity 
did emerge, a fact recognised by Governor Trench. The generation who grew up in Hong Kong 
during the 1950s or 1960s ‘never known and have no foreseeable hope of knowing another 
home’.228 Many Chinese in Hong Kong simply had no choice but to identify the colony as their 
permanent home. By the 1960s, it was apparent that Hong Kong was indeed different from 
China. The colony possessed political, social, and economic systems that were seen as superior 
to those in China.229 In this way, British colonialism ensured that a Hong Kong identity was 
burgeoning even without efforts by local officials. The 1960s therefore witnessed the 
emergence of a sense of belonging in Hong Kong, and from this period onward, the majority 
of the population could credibly be called ‘Hong Kong Chinese’, ‘the people of Hong Kong’ 
or any other labels that connote a high degree of cohesiveness. 
 It may be useful to take a detour from Hong Kong history and begin a brief discussion 
on the arguments presented by Michael Billig regarding ‘banal nationalism’. The reproduction 
of nationalist discourse in western nation-states constituted the central aspect of Billig’s 
argument: Nationalism was not only reproduced in areas of the world such as Bosnia, where 
racial tensions threatened to overwhelm local political systems, but also in the more ‘banal’ 
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settings of western societies. The various insignificant aspects of daily living constantly 
reminded citizens within established nation-states that they resided in a geopolitical entity 
possessing unique social, economic, and political characteristics that set it apart from other 
nation-states.230 Nationalist symbols could be found within a bank, such as on currency that 
prominently displayed various historical figures and events commonly associated with the 
founding of the nation-state. Politicians played an equally important role in the reproduction of 
nationalist discourse, given the coverage accorded to them by the media and their willingness 
to play the ‘patriotic card’.231 Every time a politician invoked ‘the motherland’ in his or her 
speech, citizens were once again reminded of their nation-state.232 As politicians reduced the 
invocation of the motherland by sheer repetition to the level of cliché, their audiences came to 
see their nationalism as something uncontroversial.233 The prevalence of nationalist discourse 
and the constant reminder of the nation-state’s existence in the daily life of average citizens 
made it possible for nationalism to be seen as something natural and uncontroversial.  
Similar to the social, economic, and political conditions depicted by Billig, colonial 
officials in Hong Kong and the specific geopolitical environment of Hong Kong underlined the 
colony’s distinctiveness. Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong government did not engage in efforts 
to promote a local identity; but, according to Billig, an overt ideological campaign was not 
necessary for a sense of belonging to develop. As early as 1950, Grantham talked about 
ensuring that benefits of colonial social policies would only go to ‘bona fide Hong Kong 
residents’, thereby underlining that Chinese of the colony represented a class of Chinese 
distinct from their compatriots in the PRC.234 Every time Grantham or Trench addressed ‘Hong 
Kong residents’, they were reinforcing the impression that inhabitants of Hong Kong 
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represented a population distinct from Chinese residing in the mainland. Every time a Chinese 
in Hong Kong utilised a service that was only available to them and not to mainland Chinese, 
they were reminded that their political environment was different from the PRC. 
Concluding Remarks 
The colonial government of Hong Kong provided credible stewardship over the colony 
during a period of upheavals. The embargoes against the PRC could have crippled Hong 
Kong’s economy, but the colony successfully transformed itself into a manufacturing 
powerhouse that provided employment opportunities for Hong Kong’s expanding population. 
Even without idealising the ability of British colonisers to ensure stability, one must admit that 
compared to the PRC and many other areas of Asia, Hong Kong was relatively well-governed 
during the Cold War. Regardless of its original intent, the Hong Kong government’s 
resettlement and housing programs also helped to alleviate the problem of housing shortage. 
Stability within Hong Kong borders and an acceptable level of living standards meant that even 
in the absence of concerted efforts by the colonial government to promote industrialisation, the 
colony provided an ideal environment for businessmen to enhance their profit margins. Hong 
Kong was well on its way to becoming a capitalistic paradise in the 1960s. The lives of those 
who were not part of the economic elites often remained difficult. By the 1960s, cracks began 
to appear in colonial rule. Hong Kong residents often had to interact with corrupt officials who 
cared more about enhancing their personal wealth than improving the lives of average men and 
women. The viciously competitive nature of the Hong Kong economy also meant that a person 
could work hard and still not be able to support his or her family.  The 1966 riots reveal that a 
level of anger existed among the youth of the colony, as they became convinced that 
colonialism could not provide them with the lives they wanted. In the coming years, British 
Hong Kong would face further challenges, and it was incumbent upon British policymakers to 
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win support from those who were convinced that their well-being was ignored by their 
colonisers.  
 For all its flaws, the colonial government deserved credit for ensuring the survival of 
Hong Kong from 1949 to 1966, a period that saw the colony overcame monumental challenges 
as East Asia became embroiled in various crises. Neighbouring the PRC, a communist power 
with internal instability issues, the colony not only weathered this disconcerting political 
situation, but thrived as its manufacturing sector developed into one of the most productive 
hubs in the world. Colonial rule, of course, was not perfect. Corruption was a major problem, 
and, as argued by John Carroll, British rule could be repressive and racist.235 The absence of 
constitutional reform at a time when other parts of the British Empire were either granted 
independence or self-rule represented a missed opportunity. With the benefit of hindsight, 
historians can now see that the Young Plan was not only the most radical reform proposal in 
the history of Hong Kong, but arguably the best opportunity for the territory to take a giant leap 
forward towards self-governance. Fear of PRC retaliation and infiltration by KMT or CCP 
agents made policymakers reluctant to implement the Young Plan. The action of Grantham and 
his allies ensured that the constitutional structure of Hong Kong would remain unchanged for 
most of the postwar period.  
If the Young Plan’s original purpose was to create a sense of Hong Kong identity, 
Grantham, in contrast, was convinced that people in the territory would never become loyal 
British subjects or develop a distinct sense of belonging.236 If Chinese in Hong Kong were loyal 
to the KMT or the CCP, then it would indeed have been foolhardy to grant these potentially 
disloyal subjects self-governance.237 There was consequently no attempt to promote a sense of 
cohesion among Chinese who resided in Hong Kong. The absence of identity promotion 
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notwithstanding, most Hong Kong residents by the 1960s began to see the colony as their 
permanent home. As a new generation of Hong Kong Chinese had only lived in Hong Kong, 
they had no alternative but to see the colony as their permanent place of residence. As 
demonstrated by the 1966 riots, many Hong Kong Chinese were not content with colonial rule. 
At the same time, supporting the British administration when its very existence was threatened 
by pro-PRC partisans during the 1967 riots remained the only sensible course of action for 
Hong Kong Chinese, who intensely distrusted the CCP. In the end, it was fear of China, not 
admiration for colonial rule, that ensured the survival of the British administration when it was 
confronted by an existential crisis in 1967. 
86 
 
Chapter Two – The 1967 Riots: Pro-PRC Chinese Nationalism, Colonialism, and 
Everyday Resistance in Hong Kong 
Introduction  
 They still rage against history. Hong Kong had been a part of China once against since 
1997, but those who felt they fought against the British in the name of Chinese nationalism still 
felt they were unfairly perceived as criminals, rioters, or terrorists by the general public. The 
events described in the previous chapter, such as the 1966 riots, were entirely overshadowed 
by the disturbances of 1967, a pivotal year in the history of Hong Kong during which the 
colonial system came precariously close to collapse, as supporters of the PRC waged a 
ferocious campaign that almost crippled the British administration. The tactics adopted by 
sympathisers of the  PRC were seen as so extreme that even the most sophisticated of historians 
focused on the planting of bombs, the ‘pineapples’, and the assassination of Lam Bum, the 
popular radio talk show host, when discussing the 1967 riots.1 Supporters of the PRC and 
enemies of the British administration in Hong Kong had only been very recently portrayed in 
a more sympathetic light.2 Of course, public contempt towards those who supported the PRC 
in Hong Kong was in many ways justified, as many pro-PRC partisans did indeed have blood 
on their hands. Then again, as this chapter would demonstrate, there were no angels in a 
struggle for survival between a colonial administration and a group of fervent revolutionaries 
determined to eradicate foreign rule. Violence occurred within a climate of escalation that made 
acts of atrocity understandable, if not in any way justifiable. More importantly, there were 
many supporters of the PRC who were arrested, charged, and had their lives altered forever not 
due to their participation in acts of political violence, but as the result of their refusal to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the British court or political ties that were seen to be suspicious. 
The events of 1967 still reverberate in the politics and society of current Hong Kong, almost 
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as if to vindicate the famous statement made by the great American writer William Faulkner 
that ‘the past is…never dead. It is not even past’.3  
As demonstrated by the previous chapter, Hong Kong survived successive crises from 
1949 to 1966 that severely strained the durability of British rule. 1967, however, witnessed a 
political confrontation that, for the first time in the postwar history of British Hong Kong, 
challenged the very existence of the colonial government, as its collapse seemed eminently 
possible due to attacks and riots orchestrated by local supporters of the PRC thirty years before 
the end of the lease on the New Territories.4 Influenced by the Cultural Revolution that was 
raging in the PRC, its supporters in Hing Kong  staged a campaign of riots, demonstrations, 
and explosive attacks.5 Sparked by a labour dispute in a plastic flower factory in San Po Kong, 
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the crisis gradually escalated into a struggle involving local police and supporters of PRC in 
Hong Kong the height of which even witnessed clashes between British troops stationed in 
Hong Kong and PRC militiaman who crossed into the border village of Sha Tau Kok that 
resulted in the deaths of five Hong Kong policemen.6  The crisis would not deescalate until 
December 1967, when the Cultural Revolution entered a less violent phase and Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai, acting with the blessing of Mao Zedong, conveyed to the supporter of the 
CCP in Hong Kong to end hostility toward the colonial administration.7 The 1967 riots inflicted 
substantial damages on Hong Kong society. Fifty-one people were killed, including ten police 
officers, twenty-three rioters, four bombers and twelve civilians. There were 1,172 injured, 340 
of which were victims of the bombing campaign.8  
Rather than being a descriptive account of the 1967 riots, this chapter offers an analysis 
of how the disturbances of that year altered the trajectory of Hong Kong through the utilisation 
of various social science theories. This chapter investigates factors that propelled average men 
and women to risk their livelihoods in order to support the PRC and how their isolation from 
the rest of Hong Kong society impacted the British colony after the riots. Indeed, one of the 
legacies of the 1967 riots was the consolidation of Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong among 
pro-PRC partisans. Focus will then be turned to the actions of British policymakers in 1967 
and the methods they utilised to preserve the British status of Hong Kong. The final section of 
this chapter asserts that the common people of Hong Kong, by refusing to let the city come to 
a standstill, was demonstrating their grudging support of colonial rule and contempt towards 
the pro-PRC faction. The emergence of a highly strident form of  pro-PRC Chinese nationalism 
in Hong Kong among the self-perceived victims of British oppression, the growing awareness 
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among colonial officials that their hold on power was contingent upon the level of public 
support they received from the local population, and the grudging backing given to their 
colonisers by the Hong Kong Chinese all demonstrate that even after the British emerged 
victorious in the 1967 disturbances, the colony remained deeply divided, as the method with 
which policymakers utilised to ensure their survival was dependent upon the marginalisation 
of a signification subsection of the city’s population.     
Theoretical Framework  
 In spite of repeated assertions that postwar Hong Kong was an apolitical society the 
inhabitants of which were more interested in moneymaking than in politics, a critical 
examination of the city’s past would reveal that it was often beset by political crises during the 
Cold War era. The political conflicts that took place in the city during the postwar era reveal 
to current analysts that John Hutchinson’s analytical framework of ‘Nation as Zones of Conflict’ 
could be a useful tool to understand postwar Hong Kong. Persistent ideological conflicts within 
the same ethnic community, such as disputes within 19th century France between republicans 
and monarchists over political ownership of the Joan of Arc legend, to what degree should 
Hinduism be the foundational religious principle of post-independent India, or, within the 
context of Hong Kong, the political battles between the KMT and the CCP regarding which 
party’s version of Chinese history should take precedent over the other, could actually 
legitimise nation-states within which these struggles took place.9 The fact that there were 
different political factions fighting over which version of the past was worthy of a nation-state 
meant that there that was a nation-state that was worth fighting over. In this way, the level of 
contentiousness that characterised ideological struggles between different factions was 
proportional to the degree of attachment partisans of different political affiliations felt towards 
their nation-states. If a political faction’s raison-d'etre was to be the self-appointed defender of 
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the national community against internal or external enemies, then its members’ esprit de corps 
would evaporate in the absence of conflicts. As demonstrated by the history of postwar Hong 
Kong and the careers of several pro-PRC partisans, this type of ‘hot’ nationalism, one that was 
based upon conflicts and confrontations to reaffirm its existence, needed constant political 
struggles to reinforce its legitimacy.10  
As it became obvious that the majority of the Chinese in Hong Kong had no interest in 
engaging in political actions the purpose of which was the destruction of British rule, those 
who were loyal to the PRC and the CCP were increasingly ostracised in the city due to their 
political affiliation. It would therefore be highly useful to study the radicalisation of pro-PRC 
partisans in Hong Kong by taking into consideration the theories of Pierre Bourdieu concerning 
his concept of ‘habitus’. Habitus represented a system of social, political, and economic values 
the reproduction of which was dependent upon their operationalisation by men and women 
who had accepted their legitimacy.11 Through consistent repetition, values that once seemed 
outlandish became ‘objectively “regulated’ and ‘regular’”’12 This chapter demonstrates that 
among partisans of the PRC in Hong Kong, the fierce battles against the British in 1967, the 
perception that they were oppressed by their colonisers, and an acute sense of isolation that 
many of them experienced after the riots led to the emergence of a pro-PRC habitus in Hong 
Kong. Any habitus had to be a product of history, an artefact that was made up of values and 
ideologies of a particular epoch in time. The prominent values of this pro-PRC habitus were 
anti-colonialism and strident nationalism, both of which were reinforced by the 1967 riots and 
the perceived injustices suffered by pro-PRC partisans in the aftermath of the disturbances. 
Sympathisers of the PRC in Hong Kong were therefore ‘agents’ of this pro-PRC habitus, as 
they operationalised its values and prepositions, and they were unaware that their ‘common 
                                                          
10 Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict, p. 129.  
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sense’ view of the PRC, Hong Kong, and British colonialism were products of history and of 
their personal experiences.13  
The survival of British Hong Kong was not only the by-product of its leaders’ refusal 
to submit to their opponents, but also the result of the support the local administration received 
from its colonial subjects in the context of everyday life. To study the 1967 riots, this chapter 
utilises the concept of ‘everyday resistance’ that was popularised by James C. Scott. While 
recognising that revolutionary, full-scaled peasant revolts were more attractive to scholars 
interested in the study of resistance participated by the lower classes, Scott chose to concentrate 
on  acts of resistance that ‘were close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful 
realities of daily experience.14 While not as attention-grabbing for scholars due their absence 
from historical records, as it was often difficult to chronicle acts of defiance the effectiveness 
of which was based upon their perpetuators’ ability to deny responsibilities, these ‘everyday 
forms of resistance’ were the most reliable weapons for those who lacked formal economic or 
political power.15 Refusing to romanticise everyday resistance, Scott acknowledge that those 
who were at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum often remained powerless when 
confronted by the economic exploitations of the politically powerful.16 Nevertheless, there 
were occasions whereby ‘weapons of the weak’ achieved the objective of thwarting the 
commands of those in control of the political apparatuses. The dissolution of the Confederate 
Army as the result of poor, rural whites’ mass desertion and the failure of the Napoleonic 
Empire to force French citizens in rural areas to comply with conscription orders issued by 
Paris were cited by Scott as examples of how those without formal power undermined those 
who occupied positions of authority.17 While the people of Hong Kong did not engage in direct 
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confrontations with the PRC and its partisans, residents of the colony did operationalise 
everyday resistance and rely on this method to defuse the threat posed by those who seek to 
eradicate colonial rule.  
British Hong Kong as a ‘Zone of Conflict’   
The conclusion of the Chinese Civil War witnessed the establishment of the PRC in the 
Chinese mainland while the KMT regime fled to Taiwan. This CCP-KMT standoff would 
become a permanent feature of the Cold War in Asia, especially after Washington declared its 
intention to neutralise the Taiwan Straits in 1950, thereby further hardening the stalemate 
between Beijing and Taiwan.18  Hong Kong would become ‘a base’ for both the KMT and the 
CCP to ‘launch operations against the other side’.19 In addition to propaganda campaigns and 
the establishment of rival labour unions, there were acts of violence perpetuated by political 
operatives.20 In 1955, the plane that originally intended to carry the Chinese delegation to the 
Bandung Conference in Indonesia and had previously stopped in Hong Kong for refuel 
exploded in mid-air, killing all passengers. Zhou Enlai was aware of the plot and purposely 
stayed behind by blaming an emergency illness. By not alerting the British authorities of this 
assassination attempt and instead allowing it to go ahead while sparing himself, the PRC prime 
minister was able to subsequently exert maximum pressure on the colonial government to 
crackdown on pro-KMT partisans in the colony who were responsible for this plot.21 Of course, 
there were also the 1956 riots, which were generally regarded by historians as a KMT-
instigated incident that mostly targeted CCP-affiliated workers and organisations.22 There were 
ample (and understandable) reasons for PRC sympathisers to feel a profound sense of grievance 
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against colonial Hong Kong, as its rulers were seen as unwilling or unable to protect  supporters 
of Beijing. The CCP authorities were not above further inflaming this sense of anger against 
colonial authorities. In the immediate aftermath of the 1956 riots, People’s Daily (人民日报), 
the official newspaper of the CCP, stated that the PRC government was ‘profoundly concerned 
for the safety of…Chinese in Hong Kong and Kowloon and extend to them our deepest 
sympathy’, and that leaders in Beijing ‘feel the greatest indignation at the damage done in the 
disturbances to our fellow Chinese.23 The British charge d’affaires in Peking even wrote to his 
superiors in London accusing Zhou Enlai of exaggerating the damages inflicted upon CCP-
affiliated organisation in order to further inflame public opinions against the British and the 
KMT.24  Even before the 1967 riots, the PRC leadership was always ready to exploit the anger 
felt by its supporters in the city against the colonial administration and the KMT.  
Whereas pro-PRC partisans in Hong Kong expressed their Chinese nationalism through 
struggles against the colonial state, and its alleged ally, the KMT, ordinary Hong Kong Chinese 
with no particular political affiliation, similar to their counterparts in other overseas territories, 
expressed their Chineseness through adherence to what they viewed as Chinese cultural values, 
not loyalty to a particular Chinese political organisation.25 In addition to political opponents, 
another potential enemy of hot nationalists could be their ‘banal’ counterparts, men and women 
who saw themselves as part of the national community but, instead of demonstrating their 
national identity through confrontations with those who possessed contrary political views, 
simply took their national identity for granted, as proofs of them being part of a nation-state 
was so ingrained in everyday life that overt demonstration of loyalty was not seen as 
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necessary.26 Indeed, in spite of prolonged separation from China, the city and its inhabitants 
retained many Chinese cultural practices in the 1960s, thereby demonstrating Hong Kong 
Chinese’ adherence to what they perceived to be their cultural heritage. Cantonese remained 
the lingua-franca of the majority of Hong Kong Chinese.27 In the 1963-1964 report of the 
Department of Chinese Affairs, it was stated that the colonial government had delegated the 
administration of Chinese temples to Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, various Kaifong 
Association, and the Chinese Temples Committee established for the administration of places 
of worship in Hong Kong. The need to establish a new arrangement to manage Chinese temples 
demonstrates that traditional religious practices retained its popularity in Hong Kong, as their 
proliferation necessitated an additional administrative layer that was only possible with the 
cooperation of prominent local Chinese organisations.28 In this way, John Carroll is certainly 
correct when he stated that colonialism in no way diminished the Chineseness of the city, 
especially since ‘British law, Christianity, and modern western medicine coexist happily 
with…a plethora of religious festivals and ceremonies’ and ‘[s]mall Chinese shops sit 
comfortably on street named after British royalty’.29 
If the previous chapter reveals that a Hong Kong identity was emerging due to the fact 
that men and women of the colony were residing in a polity separated from China, it has to be 
emphasised that, similar to other overseas Chinese, the people of Hong Kong saw China as 
their cultural heritage’s point of origin.30 As stated by Rogers Brubaker and his colleagues, 
while ethnic politics might have represented an all-consuming obsession for professional 
politicians, ordinary men and women were, more often than not, simply uninterested in being 
consumed by a confrontational brand of nationalism that required constant vigilance against 
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real or potential enemies.31 If how the people of Hong Kong interpreted their ethnicity seemed 
muddled and confusing, that was likely due to the fact that they, like most average folks, never 
felt compelled to clearly articulate the various nuances of how they viewed Hong Kong and 
China to observers or to themselves.32 Nevertheless, there were clear distinctions between how 
ordinary Hong Kong Chinese and pro-PRC partisans interpreted their Chinese identity. While 
almost all residents of Hong Kong saw themselves as culturally Chinese, their motivation for 
popular mobilisation was not a sense of allegiance to the PRC, a point of departure from 
partisans sympathetic to the CCP that will be explored in future chapters. The majority of Hong 
Kong Chinese simply did not believe that their Chineseness was dependent upon continuous 
political confrontations against the KMT or the colonial administration.   
The 1967 riots were an anti-colonial conflict, as pro-PRC partisans in the city not only 
had to confront their colonisers, but also the entire colonial Hong Kong society, as almost every 
segment of the population was against the eradication of British colonialism. The unwillingness 
of the local population to adhere to the political demands of the pro-PRC faction in 1967 further 
fuelled the anger of its members, as the apparent apathy of Hong Kong Chinese most likely 
was viewed by Beijing loyalists as an indication of British colonisers’ success in undermining 
patriotic sentiments in the city. In order to prove their worth as Chinese patriots, partisans of 
the PRC had to engage in political combat with the British, a course of action that alienated 
them from the majority of Hong Kong Chinese, thereby condemning them to the margins of 
Hong Kong society.  
External Factors Impacting Hong Kong, 1966-1967 
It was unfortunate for the colonial administration of Hong Kong that a nearby neighbour, 
and another relic of European imperialism in Asia, was humbled by local sympathisers of the 
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CCP. From 2nd to 3rd of December, 1966, protestors in Macau who were angered by the local 
government’s refusal to allow schools to be built on land that had already been allocated to 
organisations sympathetic to the PRC stormed the Government House, the nerve centre of the 
colonial administration. In the ensuring chaos, symbols of Portuguese colonial power, such as 
the status of Coronel Mesquita, were destroyed. 33  The crisis had been escalating since 
November, and while newspapers in Hong Kong such as the Wenweipo (文匯報), a prominent 
pro-PRC publication, repeatedly broadcasted alleged Portuguese atrocities committed against 
pro-PRC partisans, thereby suggesting that the local government did make an effort to resist 
attempts to cripple its authority, in the end there were nothing that could be done by the 
Portuguese governor other than to submit to the will of operatives sympathetic to Beijing.34  
On the January 29th, 1967, the Portuguese Governor Nobre de Carvalho issued an official 
apology.35  
The events in Macau did not escape the notice of PRC sympathisers in Hong Kong, 
whose political imagination were already set ablaze by the Cultural Revolution that was raging 
in the PRC. Even before the apology issued by the colonial administration, Wenweipo was 
already publishing vivid accounts of pro-PRC partisans in Macau being inspired by the words 
of Mao and being excited over visits to the Portuguese colony by groups of Red Guards.36 
Young students, workers, and activists angered by what they saw as injustices inflicted on the 
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local population by their colonisers, and believing that the revolutionary fervour provoked by 
the Cultural Revolution could similarly inspire popular uprisings in the city, were willing to 
travel to Macau to learn from partisans there lessons concerning how the ideology of Mao could 
successfully humble a colonial administration. Prominent pro-PRC publisher Zhai Nuan Hui 
(翟暖暉) even claimed that those who were sent to Macau for training obtained the colourful 
codename of ‘Eight Thousand Brotherhood (八千子弟)’. It is impossible for analysts to ignore 
the degree to which the political energy unleashed by the Cultural Revolution served as a source 
of motivation for pro-PRC partisans in Macau, the actions of which then inspired their 
counterparts in Hong Kong.37  
In this way, as much as Hong Kong supporters of the PRC were angered by socio-
economic conditions in the colony, they were just as influenced by the partisan fervour 
provoked by the Cultural Revolution. Some former participants of the riots have been relucent 
to link what transpired in Hong Kong in 1967 with the Cultural Revolution, especially given 
how negatively political chaos in the PRC during the 1960s is perceived in Hong Kong.38 
Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to ignore the extent to which the Cultural Revolution 
influenced those who were involved in the 1967 riots. Albert Ko, a former Young Prisoner (YP) 
who was imprisoned during the 1967 riots and a devout reader of People’s Daily, went as far 
as to claim that he and his comrades were not at all engaging in critical thinking. Instead, they 
were eagerly following the instructions given to them by People’s Daily and were invigorated 
when they thought that the PRC government was encouraging them to declare war on the 
British.39 Jasper Tsang, the President of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong from 2008 to 
2016, someone who was quite opened about political enthusiasm provoked by the Cultural 
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Revolution, stated that while he certainly recognised the human cost of revolutionary fervour, 
he saw causalities as an acceptable outcome for epochal changes in China and Hong Kong.40 
What transpired in Hong Kong in 1967 therefore could not be separated from revolutionary 
chaos that had descended upon the PRC during the Mao era.  
Nevertheless, the 1967 riots should be seen as the by-product of the Cultural Revolution, 
and not its exact replica, as they were related but ultimately distinct political events. The 
Cultural Revolution was fundamentally an intra-party struggle that came perilously close to 
provoking a Chinese civil war as different segments of the CCP, especially members of the 
Red Guards, struggled viciously for supremacy. There were certainly intense political rivalries 
that existed within pro-PRC elements in Hong Kong, especially among the younger partisans.41 
Nevertheless, one is struck by the sense of unity that is still prevalent among former participants 
of the 1967 riots, especially among those who went to prisons as the result of their involvement 
in the disturbances.42 Going back to the analytical framework of John Hutchinson, the need to 
confront a powerful opponent in the form of the colonial state and the majority of a population 
made up of men and women who, in the eyes of the pro-PRC camp, had betrayed their native 
nation-state by refusing to support its partisans, certainly provided the supporters of Beijing 
with a powerful stimulus to stay united. The ‘divisions with collective memories’ among 
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Chinese in Hong Kong, with those in the pro-PRC camp believing that colonialism in Hong 
Kong represented a strain on national honour that must be eliminated, and the rest of the 
population a significant segment of which came to Hong Kong believing that colonialism was 
preferable to PRC rule, represented the line of demarcation in the city.43  In its core, the Cultural 
Revolution was a series of internal PRC conflicts; in contrast, the 1967 riots represented an 
anti-colonial struggle between partisans supportive of the PRC, the colonial authorities, and 
Hong Kong Chinese who grudgingly supported colonial rule.   
The Further Radicalisation of PRC Sympathisers in Hong Kong  
 Colonial Hong Kong could be seen as an ideal site at which Bourdieu’s theories could 
be applied and tested, as a pro-PRC habitus emerged during and after the disturbances. Indeed, 
the profound anger felt by men and women who rebelled against the British in the 1967 riots 
could be seen as epitomising Bourdieu’s assertion that ‘each member of the same class is more 
likely than any member of another class to have been confronted with the situations most 
frequent for the members of that class’, as pro-PRC partisans were almost universally viewed 
with suspicion by the majority of Hong Kong society at the conclusion of the disturbance.44 
Even after their crushing defeat in 1967 and physical defiance became unrealistic, sympathisers 
of the PRC in Hong Kong were more than willing to continue to play the roles of adversaries 
of colonial Britain, even if their acts of defiance were confined to continued loyalty to Beijing 
or expression of contempt for colonial rule. 45  As stated by Bourdieu, ‘only escalation, 
challenge answering challenge, can signify the option of playing the game’.46 Therefore, by 
continuing to be highly antagonistic to the colonial administration, PRC supporters were 
accepting the societal roles given to them after the 1967 riots. Their intense antagonism against 
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British Hong Kong and its society indicated the emergence of a habitus inhabited by the PRC 
supporters that saw anti-colonial sentiment as the defining principle of their subsociety.     
At this point of the inquiry, it will be useful to shift focus to men and women who 
actually participated in the 1967 riots, and how their life experiences before and during the 
disturbances consolidated the pro-PRC habitus even after the survival of colonial rule became 
certain. Albert Ko, a former YP who was imprisoned for the distribution of inflammatory 
materials at the age of seventeen in 1967, claimed that he would have willingly risked his life, 
and the wellbeing of everyone in his family, to advance the objectives of the PRC due to his 
‘total obedience’ to the CCP.47 Not surprisingly, he was the product of a prominent pro-PRC 
school, Chung Wah Middle School.48 Even before the 1967 riots, Ko was a devoted PRC 
sympathiser, as in addition to his educational affiliation, he was a delivery boy for the 
prominent pro-PRC newspaper, Wenweipo.49 He was therefore exposed to the anger felt by 
those sympathetic to Beijing against the colonial administration at a relatively young age. His 
living conditions also made him an ideal recruit for those who were determined to destabilise 
British rule. The apartment in which he lived had twelve families in it, and when he was merely 
a student, he had to wake up at 5am to deliver newspapers.50 As it was stated repeatedly by 
Bourdieu, educational institutes were powerful sites at which habitus could be reproduced and 
reinforced.51 Given his educational background, as well as his miserable living and working 
conditions, it was almost a given that he would be supportive of those who seek to eradicate 
colonialism, a system of government that Albert Ko saw as inherently unjust.  
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During the 1967 riots, Hong Kong’s political climate was one in which violence 
steadily intensified, with law enforcement agents and pro-PRC partisans becoming 
increasingly determined to gain the upper hand in the struggle for the city’s future. In this 
context, those who were supportive of the PRC but did not participate in the violent campaign 
to eradicate British rule often became victims of police actions. Xu Yun Cheng (許雲程), a 
journalist who worked for the pro-PRC publication, Jingji Daobao (經濟導報) and someone 
who was left-leaning but claimed not to have committed any acts of violence against the 
government, stated that he was viciously beaten by Hong Kong police officers when he was 
sent to report the protest that was gathering on Garden Road on May 22nd.52 Many other 
protestors also stated that they were assaulted by the police during this ‘Garden Road Incident’, 
an episode that became infamous within the pro-PRC circle due to the violent acts allegedly 
committed against peaceful protesters by the Hong Kong police on that day.53 If a habitus had 
to be established upon values and belief that were unquestioned, then certainly the 
establishment and consolidation of it required a foundational myth that could be served as a 
bedrock of unquestioned assumptions. For many pro-PRC partisans, the Garden Road Incident 
represented an event that not only forever changed their lives, but also transformed them into 
diehard members of the pro-PRC camp in the colony. The British claimed that what transpired 
on May 22nd demonstrates not the ‘brutality’ of the police, but their ‘very considerable restraint’, 
as there were only a limited number of protestors who were harmed. In the confidential report 
on the 1967 disturbances, it was mentioned that ‘communists’ were intending to use what had 
transpired on Garden Road to defame the police and achieve publicity for their cause. 54 
Notwithstanding repeated denials by British officials, there were definitely protestors who were 
seriously harmed by the police.55 As stated by Elsie Tu, policemen in the colony were infamous 
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for their high-handed manner with which they interacted with local residents.56 As admitted by 
former police officer James Elm, policemen in 1967 became very aggressive against those 
whom they perceived as threats as the riots intensified.57 Given the past actions of the police 
and their increased willingness to react violently against any perceived threats in 1967, one 
could safely assume that there were protestors who were seriously harmed during the Garden 
Road Incident, especially as pro-PRC partisans were not above shouting provocative slogans 
to agitate policemen who already felt threatened.58 Gary Cheung went as far as to claim that 'it 
was undisputable that some demonstrators were beaten and injured by the police with batons’.59  
While British officials were undoubtedly correct in stating that there were those who 
used artificial bloodstain to feign injuries during the Garden Road Incident, one should not 
discount the fact that there were protestors who were seriously injured by the police on May 
22nd. 60  Xu stated that his skull was cracked opened by police batons and that he lost 
consciousness for a day due to police beating.61 Upon waking up in a hospital, he was arrested 
on the charges of assaulting a police officer and participating in an unlawful assembly.62 As 
there was a significant number of men and women who were arrested or injured due to what 
were perceived as incidents of police brutality, the anger of pro-PRC activists began to harden 
against British authorities in Hong Kong. The establishment and consolidation of a habitus was 
dependent upon the acceptance of certain value as well as viewpoints that could be seen as 
unusual by neutral observers. Indeed, while the practices of tribesmen in Kabylia could indeed 
be seen by observers possessing western sensibilities as highly unusual, the unquestioning 
acceptance and even embrace of practices such as adherence to a code of honour that 
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encompassed physical duels was essential to the preservation of the local habitus.63 For those 
whose lives were forever altered by the Garden Road Incident, what transpired on May 22nd 
represented a turning point at which they began to acquire viewpoints that were contrary to 
those held by many in the colony, namely, the British colonisers were representatives of a 
system of unjust governance that had to be opposed at every turn.    
It was often in prisons that pro-PRC partisans’ views concerning Chinese nationalism 
and colonialism further hardened, as political novices were given the opportunities to bond 
with hardened veterans of past struggles. As stated by Albert Ko, those who were imprisoned 
due to their involvement in the riots all had an identical rite of passage: Prisoners either 
witnessed assaults or were victims of vicious attacks by prison guards while in custody, so 
much so that some former inmates to this day are ‘scared to think about’ their past 
experiences. 64  As attested by partisans of the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya who were 
imprisoned by the British, it was through common suffering that a sense of cohesion was 
formed among those who had similar anti-British political views. Unity and lasting bonds were 
then further developed in opposition against the colonial power and its collaborators.65 A sense 
of comradery similarly emerged among those who were imprisoned due to their participation 
in the 1967 riots. Being imprisoned by the British could be seen as an ‘act of constitution – the 
cementing of differences’, as the stigma of being branded as criminals would haunt the lives 
of those who were convicted by the Hong Kong court.66 The recognition that they would be 
outcasts in Hong Kong society, not surprisingly, had a bonding effect on the prisoners.  Ko was 
looked after by older prisoners, who provided him with medications as well as (some truly 
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dubious) advices on how to maintain his health while in custody.67 Friendships that were 
formed in prisons could last a life time, as it was the case with Zhai and other inmates in Stanley 
Prison, as they continued to socialise after their release.68 In this context, prisons became 
venues where inmates reaffirmed their common political conviction. As recounted by Xu, there 
were several hunger strikes in Stanley Prison, organised by the YPs and other prisoners, to 
obtain better provisions and the right to celebrate the National Day of the PRC.69 The prison 
environment, where behaviours of inmates were closely observed by their peers, no doubt 
encouraged acts of confrontation against prison officials, as doing so would garner praises from 
fellow prisoners. Indeed, strengthening of ties within members of the pro-PRC circle in prisons 
arguably was the only sensible choice for the prisoners, as they probably recognised that upon 
their release from prison, they would be ostracised by mainstream Hong Kong society. In this 
way, peer pressure in prison, the awareness of impending social isolation, and the 
stigmatisation of being branded as criminals created an environment that [discouraged] 
‘permanently any attempt to cross the line, to transgress, desert, or quit’ the pro-PRC camp.70 
Persistent refusal of the YPs to admit guilt, even if such a course of action would have ensured 
the reduction of sentences, was most likely a by-product of unusual circumstances within 
colonial prisons that encouraged perpetual resistance against the British.71       
The radicalisation of former moderate pro-PRC Chinese nationalists in Hong Kong 
fully manifested itself when men and women who saw themselves as unjustly imprisoned were 
given the opportunities to confront the colonial government in public. Zhai, when he had to 
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make trial appearances after his incarnation, began to quote the sayings of Mao Zedong over 
the course of his trial, a course of action he had almost certainly never undertook before and 
that he would likely have thought to be ridiculous prior to his imprisonment.72 Indeed, the 
alteration in the personality of Zhai when he first encountered law enforcement officials and 
when he was brought in front of a judge, an occasion which saw him stating that ‘whenever 
there was repression, there would be resistance’, a famous quote from Mao, is striking.73  When 
police came to his house for the first time, he even tried his best to be polite to officers who 
were searching his residence.74 Imprisonment represented ‘an act of communication’, since ‘it 
signifies to someone what his identity is…in a way that both expresses it to him and imposes 
it on him by expressing it in front of everyone…and thus informing him in an authoritative 
manner of what he is and what he must be’.75 In this way, if the purpose of a public trial was 
to cemented the notion that PRC sympathisers in Hong Kong were criminals and outcasts that 
deserved social isolation, it appears that men such as Zhai were embracing their newfound 
status as outlaws, a choice based on the fact that since there already existed a pro-PRC 
subsociety, or habitus, their membership within which would at least afford a degree of 
emotional satisfaction after their effective ostracisation from the rest of Hong Kong society.  It 
should be noted that while the utterances of a post-imprisonment Zhai still lacked the 
ideological fervent of younger partisans such as Tsang Tak-sing, Hong Kong's Secretary for 
Home Affairs from 2007 to 2015 and a supporter of the PRC in Hong Kong during the 1967 
riots, who apparently asked his sister to hit him repeatedly so to prepare him for prison assaults 
by the jail guards after his inevitable arrest, the proclamations of the young radical and the 
recently radicalised middle-aged man did begin to converge.76 Both focused on how grateful 
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they were that being imprisoned allowed them to suffer for their country; both were stating the 
Maoist view that western powers were fundamentally weak and could not survive against 
repeated assaults by the nationalistic Chinese masses; and both were angered by the suffering 
inflicted on their compatriots at the hands of British law enforcement officials.77 Physical pain 
endured by activists was seen as a badge of honour, a sentiment consistent with Bourdieu’s 
assertion that  ‘physical suffering, in all the negative rites which are destined’, were seen as 
able to produce people ‘who are out of the ordinary’ and ‘distinguished’.78 The immense 
physical suffering pro-PRC partisans endured served as a baptism of fire for their entry into 
the pro-PRC habitus in Hong Kong.79  Had the 1967 riots never occurred, Zhai would probably 
have ended his life as someone who was supportive of the PRC in a moderate and temperate 
manner. The disturbances that came close to eradicating the British status of Hong Kong, 
however, transformed him into a fervent pro-PRC Chinese nationalist.  
The 1967 riots ended with the total victory of the British administration, as the colony 
not only withstood attacks orchestrated by sympathisers of the PRC, but also acquired a new 
legitimacy as a credible defender of local residents’ interests. As stated by Steve Tsang, while 
it was not easy for Hong Kong Chinese to admire their colonisers, given the choice between 
the Chinese government and the British, it was almost inevitable for local men and women to 
side with the devil they knew.80 With the benefit of highlight, Jasper Tsang recognised that it 
was difficult for local residents to support partisans of the PRC, as many Chinese in Hong Kong 
came to the colony precisely because they wanted to escape from the CCP.81 The pro-PRC 
habitus became marginalised, as the general public associated supporters of the CCP with the 
bombing campaign and the murder of Lam Bun.82 As stated by Jasper Tsang, he was abandoned 
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by his university friends, as he was openly supportive of the PRC during the crisis. 83 
Employment opportunities in mainstream Hong Kong society, especially for those who had 
criminal records, became scarce.84 It often became necessary for pro-PRC activists to secure 
employment in institutions affiliated with the PRC. Jasper Tsang became a teacher in a 
prominent pro-PRC school, Pui Kiu Middle School (培僑中學).85 If their criminal records were 
regarded by the rest of Hong Kong society with great suspicions, the suffering they endured at 
the hands of the British often served as ‘symbolic capitals’, meaning what they had gone 
through during the events of 1967 would be rewarded materially within the pro-PRC habitus.86 
The subsequent political career of Tsang Tak-sing was no doubt aided by the fact that he was 
seen as being unjustly imprisoned by the British, a rite of passage that granted him the trust of 
the government in Beijing.87 Nonetheless, pro-PRC organisations were largely ostracised from 
mainstream society, a state of affair that would not end until Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms that partially rehabilitated the image of the PRC, as the mainland became a lucrative 
market for Hong Kong businessmen. Pro-PRC circle in Hong Kong was self-sustaining and 
detached from the rest of society, with its own schools, employment opportunities, and social 
events.88 Whereas sympathisers of the PRC prior to 1967 were united solely by their shared 
loyalty to Beijing, a chief legacy of the 1967 riots was the further consolidation of a pro-PRC 
habitus, one consisting of its own values, beliefs, and even employment opportunities that were 
vastly different from the rest of society.89     
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Perceived mistreatment at the hands of British officials and subsequent ostracisation by 
the rest of Hong Kong society embittered supporters of the PRC in the colony, a development 
that still have far-reaching effects on politics in the city. For men such as Chen Shi Yuan (陳仕
源), their loyalty to the PRC only strengthened after 1967. Being a member of the Hong Kong 
Seamen's Union, an organisation that played important roles in some of modern China’s most 
prominent labour movements, Chen’s contempt for the British was only reinforced by what he 
viewed as his unjust arrest in 1967, after which he was trialled and convicted of disorderly 
conducts and resisting arrest.90 His wife, Huang Liangying (黃良英), was herself a partisan who 
claimed that her spine was fractured due to the actions of the police. Not surprisingly, Chen 
stated that he would never forgive the suffering inflicted upon him and his wife by the ‘barbaric’ 
British.91 In fact, their pro-PRC Chinese nationalism was strengthened to such a degree that 
Chen and Huang, upon getting married in 1970, travelled to China to personally experience the 
Cultural Revolution.92 This willingness to endure hardship not only validates  Bourdieu’s 
assertion regarding the inclination of those within a certain habitus to utilise physical suffering 
to distinguish oneself, but is also indicative of partisans’ internalisation and acceptance of 
values associated with a habitus  that valued unquestioning loyalty to the PRC.93 For those who 
were imprisoned by the British, marginalisation from the rest of Hong Kong society reinforced 
the perception that they were martyrs for a just cause, especially as other residents of the colony 
were seemingly ignoring how the 1967 riots were sparked by alleged British oppression of 
Hong Kong’s Chinese working class.94 In Hong Kong, there was an emergence of a new set of 
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common sense values among the pro-PRC activists that centred on fervent loyalty towards 
Beijing, a mindset not conductive to enlarging their level of support among the general public, 
but one that was remarkably able to foster internal cohesion. Of course, the consolidation of a 
pro-PRC habitus in Hong Kong was not enough to defeat the British, and it is to the mindset 
of the colonisers we now turn.  
British Determination to Resist the PRC and Its Sympathisers 
The colonial government had been preparing for a confrontation with the PRC for more 
than a decade. In the aftermath of the 1956 riots, officials in the Colonial Office stated that ‘[a] 
desire to join the winning [side], or at least to avoid the losing side, is likely to form a prime 
motive in time of emergency’.95   Indeed, it was calculated that ‘if there seemed to be a 
possibility of the Chinese Government shortly taking control of the Colony many would, if not 
actively assist, at least passively do nothing to oppose them’.96 It was therefore imperative that 
the colonial government and local law enforcement officials ‘made clear from the outset that 
they were determined to put down disorders and to defend the Colony, and that they had the 
means to do so’ in order to prevent the city from being crippled by pro-PRC partisans.97 The 
1956 riots taught the local administration the importance of remaining absolutely vigilance 
against potential threats, especially when the colony was situated in an area of the globe where 
numerous external dangers existed that could fatally destabilise colonial rule. 
The local police force began to implement new anti-riot tactics almost as soon as the 
1956 riots were concluded, as it was believed that the previous arrangements would be 
insufficient if and when the colony was once against confronted with a serious political crisis. 
Indeed, as the 1956 riots had to be suppressed with the assistance of the military, it was obvious 
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that Hong Kong police force lacked the requisite training to contain urban disturbances.98 As 
it was ably described by Georgina Sinclair, almost immediately after the 1956 riots, it became 
clear that ‘the police had to become more efficient in terms of their crowd and riot control 
capabilities’.99  The sixty-four-man, eight-section platoon was seen as the large and unwieldly, 
and the Police Training Contingent (PTC) was established to modernise the Hong Kong police 
force’s anti-riot tactics so that in the future, disturbances would be met by squads that would 
be ‘fast, compact, well-armed, very flexible, and sensibly structure’.100 By the 1960s, the Hong 
Kong police was well-trained in anti-riot tactics, and its members even got an opportunity to 
practice how to contain urban disturbances in the 1966 Star Ferry Riots.101 The reliability of 
the police to restore public order enabled the colonial administration to use its military as the 
trump card when extraordinary measures were deemed necessary to complement the efforts of 
police officers.   
Notwithstanding the successful containment of the 1966 riots, at the outset of the 1967 
crisis, the British government was not at all confident about its capacity to successfully confront 
the threat that was presented by pro-PRC partisans. Consequently, beneath the veneer of poise 
under pressure, one could sense that there were moments during which British officials were 
beginning to panic. An indication of this sense of panic could be seen from the somewhat 
outlandish suggestion that the ‘stationing in Hong Kong of a small nuclear strike force similar 
to that stationed in Singapore at the time of confrontation with Indonesia might be studied’.102 
To even suggest the stationing of nuclear warheads in Hong Kong reveals the desperation of 
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the British, as it became increasingly evident to policymakers that an orderly withdrawal 
without Beijing’s consent was an impossibility. It was not even clear that the British could 
devise a credible evacuation strategy, as any such plan ‘could not be drawn up without the co-
operation of a significant number of officials in Hong Kong’.103 Indeed, if ‘any hint emerged 
that evacuation was being contemplated’, such a disclosure ‘would have the most grave effects 
on the confidence of the Hong Kong population’. Public morale would collapse, and, what 
policymakers feared the most, paralysis and the resulting ungovernability of the colony, would 
ensue.104 At the same time, it was determined that ‘with a very large majority of the local 
Chinese in Hong Kong on our side, we could hold out in the Colony’.105 It was therefore 
essential to ensure that local residents would continue to support the British, as survival of 
Hong Kong was dependent upon the public having confidence in the colonial administration. 
Recognising that any demonstration of weakness could be fatal, and gradually coming 
to the conclusion that even the contemplation of British withdrawal would endanger the 
survival of the colony, local policymakers became determined to use any means necessary to 
neutralise the threat posed by supporters of the PRC. In this way, the British was certainly 
willing to be ruthless in order to contain the threat posed by activists supportive of Beijing. As 
stated by Jasper Tsang, there were incidents during which police would enter into premises that 
housed pro-PRC activists and began to shoot indiscriminately.106 From former policemen to 
former prisoners, we now have a fairly comprehensive picture of the length to which the 
colonial authorities would go to maintain the British status of Hong Kong.107 The ruthlessness, 
not to say the brutality, of the colonial authorities notwithstanding, British policymakers were 
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convinced that they were acting with the full support of the public. During a deliberation within 
the Cabinet Office, it was stated that ‘a small proportion of the Chinese in Hong Kong can be 
described as pro-communist’ and, ‘unless the communists can create conditions which will 
give general grounds for dissatisfaction or the impression that they are winning’, it was highly 
unlikely that they would be able to obtain wider public support.108 Acting with the assumption 
that it had the support of the general public, and gambling that Beijing would not retaliate, the 
Hong Kong authorities launched a ferocious counterattack against pro-PRC activists. On 
August 4th, a sensational raid was launched against three strongholds of the pro-PRC camp. 
One thousand policemen and soldiers were supported by three helicopters in this raid that 
arguably crippled the pro-PRC camp and demonstrated the Hong Kong government’s will to 
resist.109  
Of course, the British were never entirely passive in its efforts to cultivate public 
support during this period of acute crisis. Schools and newspapers with ties to Beijing were 
routinely shut down by British authorities as part of the efforts to undermine the campaign of 
pro-PRC partisans to publish damaging propaganda materials against the local government.110 
There were also extensive propaganda operations established by the British.  According to Gary 
Cheung, a publicity committee, the government’s de facto ‘war room’, was established on May 
16th to coordinate the colonial state’s propaganda efforts. The raison-etre of the committee was 
to ‘refute rumours and discredit the leftist camp’.111 According to Jack Cater, who was Hong 
Kong’s defence secretary in 1967, the committee was not above planting articles in the popular 
press. He further claimed that Jimmy McGregor, a former legislative and executive councillor 
as well as a member of the publicity committee, often submitted articles supportive of the 
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colonial government to popular newspapers.112 Purportedly non-partisan newspapers such as 
the Ming Pao were staunchly pro-government during the crisis. At one point, the newspaper 
even argued that 'although it is unavoidable to see isolated extreme measure, or imprudent 
decision made by individual police officers', overall, the police were acting in a responsible 
and prudent manner.113 While it is still difficult to establish that the colonial government was 
directly communicating with reporters at Ming Pao, its journalists were adopting a position 
that essentially excused the police of its worst excesses.  
Everyday Resistance in Hong Kong 
 The survival of British Hong Kong, and the success of colonial officials’ propaganda 
efforts, could be contributed to the fact that Hong Kong Chinese, after years of residing in a 
colonial jurisdiction, came to see British rule as an acceptable political system. Whatever its 
flaws, living under British rule was preferable to residing in the PRC. According to David 
Faure, the belief that they had no choice but to reside within a British jurisdiction engendered 
a ‘colonial mentality’ among the people of Hong Kong, one that prevented them from seriously 
challenging the profoundly undemocratic nature of colonialism.114  This refusal to challenge 
the colonial regime gradually hardened into a ‘sense of dependence’, meaning that political 
leadership could only be exercised by British colonials.115  There was a perception that ‘history 
has imposed a divide between colonial subjects and the colonial master, such that the subjects 
at some point in time are devoid of a leadership that might allow them to govern themselves’.116 
This sense of inferiority was pronounced among the local Chinese elites, as in the absence of 
electoral politics, their positions within the colonial political hierarchy was almost entirely 
dependent upon their ability to move up the greasy pole of ‘appointment politics’ that was 
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controlled by the British. 117  Their dependence on their colonial masters for political 
advancement and the belief that disruption of the colonial state would create instability, which 
would then be exploited by the external enemies of the British, prevented Chinese elites from 
challenging their colonisers.  
There had been works by prominent sociologists who characterised Hong Kong as a 
fundamentally apolitical society, especially during the 1960s. The view that Hong Kong during 
the 1960s was an apolitical society was most forcefully expressed by Siu-kai Lau, whose work 
asserted that Hong Kong Chinese ‘have a strong need for an authority to serve as the bulwark 
for a stable society, yet they fear relationships with that authority with which they have 
unavoidably to maintain in one way or another’.118 According to Lau, living in a colonial 
society with almost no electoral process, Hong Kong Chinese gradually became more and more 
aloof from politics.119 This sense of political powerlessness was further accentuated by the fact 
that Hong Kong was situated just outside of the PRC, which possessed almost unlimited power 
to dispute lives in the colony.120 This sense of political powerlessness, in combination with the 
pragmatism of Hong Kong Chinese, who only became involved with the political process to 
advance their immediate individual or familial interests, ensured that Hong Kong remained an 
apolitical society well into the postwar period.121  
It is difficult to argue against David Faure’s assertion that members of the Chinese elites 
who held appointive positions in the Executive or Legislative Council were not strong figures 
who were able to rally public opinions for the local administrations. In this sense, British Hong 
Kong was able to achieve its victory over its rivals in the absence of reliable collaborators that 
could have acted as ‘intermediaries of hegemony’ or as credible spokesmen for the cause of 
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British colonialism.122 Studying the testimonies deposited in Hong Kong University Library’s 
Special Collections, it is indeed striking that none of the witnesses of the 1967 riots mentioned 
speeches made by legislative or executive councillors that reinforced the public’s faith in the 
colonial government.  It is similarly difficult to refute Lau’s argument concerning the refusal 
of Hong Kong Chinese to engage in partisan politics, as with the noticeable exception of the 
1966 riots over the Star Ferry’s fare increase, the colony was rarely a site of political 
confrontations. Essentially, both Lau and Faure were arguing that confrontational politics very 
rarely occured among Hong Kong Chinese with no affiliation with the KMT or the CCP.  
The concluding section of this chapter argues that while the majority of the city’s 
population was often unwilling to engage in partisan affairs, had its members been as apolitical 
as Faure or Lau claimed they were, British Hong Kong would have collapsed in 1967. As it 
was convincingly argued by Wai-man Lam, even in the absence of partisan politics and the 
existence of genuine fear concerning being involved in the KMT-CCP rivalry, men and women 
residing in Hong Kong, even during the 1950s, were able to rely upon actions such as signature 
collection campaigns and the submission of petitions to defend their welfare.123 In this sense, 
lack of faith in appointed members of the Legislative and Executive Councils as well as 
aloofness from the political process did not mean incapacitation, especially when collective 
interests were being undermined. Had the Hong Kong population been totally paralysed, then 
the colony would have come to a standstill, a development that would have been difficult for 
the colonial regime to stage its counter measures against pro-PRC partisans. Accordingly, 
while there were almost no public demonstrations against the PRC, Hong Kong Chinese did 
participate in ‘everyday resistance’, uncoordinated acts of defiance expressed through character 
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assassination, non-compliance, sabotage and other forms of deception the purpose of which 
was to undermine the legitimacy of political partisans who were seen as harming the colony.124  
This section highlights how Hong Kong Chinese expressed their disapproval of those 
who seek to undermine British rule by engaging in everyday resistance against the PRC’s 
sympathisers in the city.125 The majority of Hong Kong Chinese did not support the PRC and 
its sympathisers and essentially did their best to ignore the chaos that were engulfing the colony, 
thereby enabling the colony to function during the 1967 riots. More importantly, by refusing 
to heed the commands of the pro-PRC faction, Hong Kong Chinese were depriving supporters 
of the CCP the political support necessary to be the credible alternative to the British. The 
failure of the pro-PRC camp to paralyse the colony, the British’s capacity to secure the 
acquiescence of the local population, and Hong Kong Chinese’s willingness to ensure the 
continued functioning of the colony all demonstrate that everyday resistance against pro-PRC 
partisans was instrumental in the survival of colonial Hong Kong. Lack of public 
demonstrations notwithstanding, Hong Kong Chinese did prefer the colonial administration 
over the CCP, and this section proves that it in spite of their reputation as members an apolitical 
population, residents of the city played an instrumental role in thwarting attempts by the 
supporters of Beijing to cripple the British administration.  
It was not that the British expected Hong Kong Chinese to rise up against the PRC and 
its supporters, especially since such a course of action would most likely have further escalated 
the downward spiral towards violence in the colony. Instead, what British Hong Kong most 
needed from the local people was to act as if the political disturbances in the city was having 
minimum effect on their lives. In order words, if British Hong Kong was to survive, Hong 
Kong Chinese had to support the colonial administration in a manner that was ‘informal, even 
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convert’ as public demonstrations of loyalty would have attracted retaliations.126 There had to 
be a campaign of support for the British administration that would avoid ‘direct symbolic 
confrontation’ against Beijing, whereby a series of seemingly insignificant gestures of support 
by the average people would culminated in policymakers concluding that they had the public 
backing needed to use all means necessary to confront the PRC and its sympathisers.127 In 
many ways, it is surprising that the majority of Hong Kong Chinese did not rebel against the 
colonial government, as although the living conditions in the colony was bearable, life in the 
city was still a struggle for many residents. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1966 
riots reveal the Hong Kong population’s discontent towards its colonisers. The fate of British 
Hong Kong was dependent upon colonial subjects who had been highly dissatisfied with their 
lives in Hong Kong during the 1960s. 
Dissatisfaction with British rule notwithstanding, distrust towards the CCP was likely 
exacerbated by the actions of its supporters in Hong Kong. In addition to the planting of bombs, 
confrontations against the PRC and pro-CCP partisans also led to restriction of water usage, 
making the flushing of toilets almost a luxury in Hong Kong.128 The lives of Hong Kong 
Chinese were rendered even more difficult by the actions of PRC sympathisers in 1967. It 
should be noted that not all Hong Kong Chinese personally encountered bombs on the streets, 
and many did try to live as normally as possible during this confrontation between pro-PRC 
partisans and British colonialism. Huang Miao Ping (黃妙萍), a young parent at the time, 
actually never saw a bomb.129 Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine the resentment and anger that 
were provoked by pro-PRC partisans. Freedom of movement was severely restricted not only 
due to the imposition of curfew, but also the realisation that there were locations in Hong Kong 
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into which one should not venture, especially as there were always the fear of bombs and 
violent conflicts.130 Su Yong Chang (蘇永昌), then a clerk at the University of Hong Kong, 
stated that he avoided going out in order to avoid troubles.131 Moreover, the lives of Hong Kong 
Chinese were often disrupted by the bomb threats. As stated by Mai Shuo Cheng (麥碩成), a 
train station attendant in 1967, there were at least two to three incidents at Tai Po Market Station 
during which bombs, real or fake, were placed on the rails.132 Liang Qian (梁謙), a working 
class Hong Kong Chinese, complained about the inconvenience caused by the riots, and he was 
stranded on the streets at one point due to the unavailability of pubic transits during the height 
of the riots.133 The chaos caused by the 1967 riots even undermined the profits of small 
businesses. Yin Mei (尹妹), at the time a food stall owner, claimed that she had to close her 
business early as she was afraid of attracting unwanted attention if she left her store opened at 
its usual hours.134 
The inconvenience created by the riots notwithstanding, the colony, contrary to the 
wishes of the pro-PRC camp, did not come to a standstill, and the inhabitants of the city 
attempted to establish a sense of normalcy in their daily life during this period of chaos.  
Graphic designer Feng Yuan Chi (馮元熾)was so angered by the constant rock throwing and 
protests outside his office that he wanted to retaliate. Thankfully, his co-workers intervened 
and stopped him from shouting insults or throwing projectile at protestors just outside of his 
office. In the end, he just ignored the protests and continued his works, thereby nullifying the 
efforts to undermine his productivity.135 Had Feng succeeded in his attempt at reiteration, his 
office would most likely have been sacked by angry protestors, thereby putting his life, and the 
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lives of his co-workers, at risk. While Huang Miao Ping was worried about the constant bomb 
threats, she nevertheless continued to send her child to school in 1967.136 Housewife Chen 
Qiong Xian (陳瓊賢) claimed that her everyday life was not greatly affected by the events of 
1967, as she could still purchase daily necessities for herself and her family. 137  The 
proclamations of the Hong Kong Chinese listed above regarding their insistence on continuing 
their daily life in spite of the chaos that was raging around them lacked a clear political 
consciousness. Hong Kong Chinese like Chen Qiong Xian and Huang Miao Ping were merely 
trying to live their lives.138 As stated by Scott, direct confrontations with those in positions of 
power were ‘nearly always crushed unceremoniously’.139 In contrast, ‘minimal compliance’ 
with the demands of pro-PRC sympathisers effectively crippled the campaigns to destroy 
British Hong Kong while at the same time deprived them a target against which to retaliate.140 
The everyday resistance participated by Hong Kong Chinese, essentially a political campaign 
‘with no formal organisation, no formal leaders, no manifestoes, no dues, no name, and no 
banner’, kept the colony functioning during a period of severe crisis.141  
If the purpose of the pro-PRC camp was to paralyse the colony, then, judging from the 
industrial production of the city, their plan was a failure. The productivity of industrial 
employees was seemingly unaffected by the 1967 riots, repeated calls by the pro-PRC camp 
for strikes notwithstanding.142  Indeed, David Trench in 1968 even boasted that industrial 
production in the previous year actually increased as Hong Kong’s ‘remarkable growth’ 
continued.143 In addition to the net increase of 819 registered and recorded factories, there was 
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a net increase of 19, 800 persons employed in various Hong Kong industries.144 Workers could 
have intimidated by the demonstrations staged by supporters of Beijing and refused to show 
up for work. They could also have been so disturbed by the city’s political chaos that they 
became less productive. The fact that they continued to work meant that they played an 
instrumental role in defeating pro-PRC activists’ plan to disrupt Hong Kong to such a degree 
that the city would grind to a halt. The collective capacity of Hong Kong Chinese to live their 
lives as if the riots did not exist should be seen as a form of resistance against sympathisers of 
the PRC and a sign of support for the British administration.  
Given the profound inconvenience caused by the ongoing political crisis and the already 
negative attitude adopted by members of Hong Kong society towards the CCP and its 
supporters, it should surprise no one that most residents of the city were against attempts by 
pro-PRC partisans to destabilise the colony. As stated by Jasper Tsang, those who escaped to 
Hong Kong from China were attracted by the colony’s reputation as a safe haven during a time 
when Asia was highly unstable. Racial abuses and economic exploitations perpetrated by 
colonial authorities and their allies were almost seen as the prices to pay for being members of 
a society that was relatively peaceful.145 In this way, active participation in political campaigns 
to destroy colonial rule was seen as detrimental to the collective welfare of Hong Kong Chinese. 
University students were quite vocal in their denunciations of pro-PRC activists in Hong Kong; 
but even then, they were careful to appear to be apolitical. Criticising the actions of the pro-
PRC camp, HKU’s Student Union was at pain to point out that they were not taking side in the 
struggle, but was merely hoping for ‘stability’ in Hong Kong.146 Even when he was putting out 
an advisement stating that he was supporting the government to preserve societal peace (協助
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助政府,維謢和平), Zheng Xue Xian (鄭學賢), a community leader in Causeway Bay in 1967, 
also stressed that he was not taking side in the conflict.147 By maintaining that they merely 
wanted to preserve societal peace, men such as Zheng and student leaders at HKU were 
undermining the pro-PRC camp’s effort to destabilise Hong Kong without criticising its 
partisans and doing so in such a way that allowed them to avoid being labelled as pro-British; 
in this way, they escaped being targeted by supporters of Beijing.  
Supporters of Beijing were not seen in a positive light by most members of society, and 
by almost all accounts, the tough actions of the police to undercut PRC sympathisers were 
widely supported. Huang Miao Ping claimed that most people found the actions of the police 
acceptable, and she continued to support British efforts to maintain law and order even after 
seeing a young pro-PRC activists suffering serious injuries, presumably at the hands of law 
enforcement officials.148 Similarly, Chen Qiong Xian even claimed that the government was 
being too lenient on partisans who supported the PRC.149 Further demonstrating the level of 
support enjoyed by law enforcement officials, former policeman James Elm claimed that a 
woman offered to help him escape if and when the colonial regime collapsed.150 A Police 
Education Fund was set up for the postsecondary education of policemen’s children, which 
raised a total of HK$3 million in a fortnight.151 If observance to social norms ‘confer reputation, 
status, and prestige on those who observe them’, then ‘those who systematically violate them 
[become] the object of character assassination’.152 Pro-PRC partisans portrayed themselves as 
patriots who were resisting the oppressive British, and yet Hong Kong Chinese were supporting 
their so-called oppressors. The general public was rejecting the characterisations PRC 
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sympathisers had given to themselves and to their opponents.  By showing support for the 
police, the majority of Hong Kong Chinese was denying PRC sympathisers moral legitimacy 
they sought as the defenders of their compatriots in the city.  
The danger presented by the PRC and its supporters were effectively contained by the 
colonial government’s tough countermeasures that were arguably supported by the majority of 
Hong Kong Chinese. Hong Kong residents supported the colonial government by refusing to 
endorse the actions of the pro-PRC camp. Everyone possessed the ‘desire to be thought well 
of, or at least not despised’.153 Acts of violence, such as the murder of Lam Bum, destroyed 
whatever goodwill those who were supportive of the PRC might have been able to acquire.154  
Widespread negative opinions of the CCP and their supporters ‘chips away at the reputations’ 
of' pro-PRC partisans in Hong Kong, and at the same time, encouraged positive views of the 
police and of the colonial government.155 Hong Kong Chinese, by consistently refusing to 
support those who were partial to the PRC, by demonstrating their appreciation of law 
enforcement officials, and by continuing to live their lives with as much normalcy as possible 
in 1967,  were defying pro-CCP partisans who seek to eradicate British rule. In Hong Kong, 'a 
social avalanche of petty acts of insubordination’ against the PRC and its supporters ‘carried 
out by...a coalition with no name, no organisation, no leadership, and certainly...no conspiracy 
behind it' effectively doomed the campaign to destroy British colonialism. 156  Whereas 
prominent and vocal critics of the pro-PRC camp such as Lam Bum invited violent retaliations, 
the actions of the majority of Hong Kong Chinese were too ephemeral to attract 
counterreactions. After all, if the majority of Hong Kong Chinese were voicing their criticisms 
of the CCP, it would have been unrealistic for its supporters to retaliate against almost everyone 
in the city. It was harder still for pro-PRC partisans to pick a specific target if support for the 
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police was expressed in an anonymous manner, such as private donations to the Police 
Education Fund. As stated by Scott, ‘[w]hen (petty) acts are rare and isolated, they are of little 
interest; but when they become a consistent pattern (even though uncoordinated, let alone 
organized) we are dealing with resistance’.157 In Hong Kong, a counterrevolutionary result, 
whereby the colonial status of the city was preserved, was created through repeated acts of 
insubordination against supporters of Beijing. 
For the pro-PRC camp, the defeat they suffered at the end of the 1967 riot was total. 
The fate of pro-PRC activists could be interpreted as a demonstration of the power of everyday 
resistance. There were almost no dramatic demonstrations of public anger against pro-PRC 
partisans, but support for them slowly dwindled until they were seen as pariahs by other Hong 
Kong Chinese. In this way, everyday resistance represented a highly potent form of protest, for 
its targets in Hong Kong are still to this day distrusted by many in the city. While Yeung Kwong 
(楊光), a prominent supporter of Beijing and the director of the Anti-British Struggle Committee 
in 1967, was awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in 2001, 
there had been no wholesale efforts to re-examine cases of pro-PRC sympathisers who claimed 
that they were unjustly imprisoned by the British.158 There are now concerns that new history 
curricula would not even mention the 1967 riots, leading to accusations that the government is 
trying to erase a difficult chapter in Hong Kong’s past. 159 Nevertheless, as more information 
concerning the motivations of the CCP and its supporters in 1967 are being discovered by 
dedicated writers such as Ching Cheong (程翔),  it appears that more than fifty years after the 
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riots and twenty years after retrocession, the actions of pro-PRC supporters have not been 
forgotten by neither the general public nor academics who are interested in the city’s past.160  
Concluding Remarks  
 
After the crushing defeat suffered by supporters of the PRC in the colony, a significant 
minority of the Hong Kong population was forced to create a parallel society that was self-
sustaining and viewed with suspicion by other Hong Kong Chinese. The public image of the 
PRC suffered a severe blow, as the CCP became associated with the excesses of the Cultural 
Revolution and damages inflicted on Hong Kong by its supporters. Paradoxically, the more the 
PRC was reviled by Hong Kong Chinese, the more loyal and united its supporter became. The 
pro-PRC subsociety in Hong Kong had by the late 1960s became an echo-chamber in which 
criticisms from the outside world only intensified the solidarity of its members. The existence 
of a community that was strongly nationalistic also enabled the emergence of a segment of 
population that saw itself as vanguard of pro-PRC Chinese patriotism in Hong Kong. The 
assertion that Hong Kong somehow became more united during and after the 1967 riots 
undersold the complex society that the colony was on track of becoming at the time. Instead of 
emerging as a unified society, Hong Kong in 1967 was becoming a deeply divided one, with 
PRC sympathisers essentially becoming pariahs distrusted by many in the colony.  
Support given to the British by ordinary Hong Kong Chinese during the 1967 riots was 
especially striking, given that anti-colonialism was becoming a preeminent ideology in many   
parts of the world in the 1960s.  Common men and women of the colony were convinced that 
in spite of its many flaws, colonial governance was preferable to PRC rule. In the end, it was 
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this belief that saved British Hong Kong from destruction. While universally accepted as 
imperfect, British colonialism had by 1967 achieved a level of grudging acceptance that 
allowed the agents of the colonial state to triumph over their adversities. Even today, the heavy-
handed techniques utilising by the police in 1967 were mostly seen as legitimate. Instead of 
allowing the city to become paralysed, Hong Kong Chinese did their best to ensure that the 
colony would continue to function in 1967. During a confrontation between British colonialism 
and pro-PRC Chinese nationalism, the everyday resistance utilised by Hong Kong Chinese 
ensured the survival of colonial rule. 
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Chapter Three –  Protests, Student Activism, and the Consolidation of a Local Identity 
in Hong Kong, 1967-1979 
Introduction 
 He was looking for trouble. He had to know that publishing a series of articles in HKU’s 
flagship student publication, the Undergrad (學苑), concerning his alienation from China 
constituted an opened invitation for scorns, especially since merely two years prior, pro-PRC 
Chinese nationalism was the cause of an existential crisis for British Hong Kong; and yet, he 
did it anyway. In November 1969, an  unnamed young undergraduate, under the pen name of  
Geng Yun (耕耘) published four articles, the collective thesis of which was that he was first and 
foremost, a ‘Hong Konger’.1 Written in traditional Chinese and English, and sometime mixing 
these two languages within the same sentence, claiming that this kind of patois represented the 
true language of Hong Kong (香港文), Geng Yun proclaimed himself to be unable to feel a 
sense of emotional attachment to mainland China, as Hong Kong represented his permanent 
home.2  Rejecting the emotional pleas of exiled Chinese scholars such as Qian Mu (錢穆), who 
always extolled youths in Hong Kong to serve China’s greater interests, Geng Yun retorted 
that talks concerning serving China were illusionary if one could be even help his or her ‘Hong 
Kong compatriots’ (香港的同胞).3    
 Not surprisingly, Geng Yun’s articles were extremely controversial, and he was accused 
of being delusional and treasonous. Responding to Geng Yun, Lin Xiafeng (林下風) angrily 
asserted that Hong Kong was merely a colony, and therefore would eventually be returning to 
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China. Thus, all talks concerning ‘Hong Kongers’ and ‘Hong Kong language’ represented the 
mumblings of a patient suffering from mental illness.4 Another writer stated that all talks 
encouraging Hong Kong independence would be attacked by Chinese around the world.5 These 
ferocious counterreactions should not be a surprise to anyone, as the campus of HKU, like other 
university campuses in the colony, would come to be dominated by student activists 
sympathetic to Beijing.   
Controversies surrounding Geng Yun’s articles could be seen as the opening salvo in 
the conflicts between the pro-PRC faction and other groups within the postsecondary student 
movement in Hong Kong for most of the 1970s. While one could be tempted to utilise Henry 
Kissinger’s famous observation that ‘university politics are vicious precisely because the stakes 
are so small’ to dismiss the Hong Kong student movement, such curt dismal would be a mistake, 
as student leaders in that era played important roles in various protests that took place in the 
colony.6 In spite of the fact that the student movement was deeply divided between those who 
saw Beijing as the principal focus of political allegiance and activists who were convinced that 
reforms of Hong Kong society constituted their prime focus, its impact was citywide. The pro-
PRC faction in Hong Kong was able to quickly rebuild its strength after the debacle of the 1967 
riots, and many of its sympathisers gained entry into the colony’s elite educational institutions. 
At the same time, the colony witnessed the emergence of a new generation of residents who 
were locally born, meaning that the colony was the only home they ever knew, and political 
loyalty to mainland China was antithetical to their emerging local identity. While both sides 
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were able to cooperate for a brief period, they eventually became estranged, with one side 
becoming increasingly strident in its pro-PRC Chinese nationalism, while its opponents were 
heightening their focus on social reforms in Hong Kong. The dominance of the pro-PRC faction 
did not end until 1976, when the fall of the Gang of Four fatally undermined its esprit de corps. 
The existence of a pro-PRC faction that advocated a strident form of Chinese nationalism, 
repeated campaigns to improve local welfare in Hong Kong, and local activists’ conviction that 
Hong Kong represented a distinct polity ensured that the student movement of the 1970s further 
consolidated a local identity in Hong Kong, as endless debates concerning the colony’s status 
further emphasised how unique it was, especially when compared to other cities in the PRC.  
The Underground Front in Hong Kong 
It would be worthwhile to provide in this section a brief summary of Michel Foucault’s 
theories, as they will be the analytical lenses through which PRC sympathisers’ activities will 
be investigated. According to Foucault, as European societies modernised, it became 
increasingly rare for governments to stage theatrical forms of punishment against those who 
had committed serious crimes. Physical punishment for those who had committed treasons or 
crimes against the crown became more infrequent, and criminals were detained in more 
‘humane’ prisons.7 Indeed, ‘torture as a public spectacle’ for the most part disappeared by the 
19th century, and in its place, ‘detention became the essential form of punishment’.8 While 
historians often attributed this humanisation of the mode of punishment to the emergence of a 
more liberal, and tolerant age, Foucault argued that reforms of the penal code represented 
another means by which those in positions of power enforced their authority. Punishment that 
became spectacles could, instead of inspiring fear, provoke anger and resentment against royal 
powers, especially when the criminals assumed the mantle of martyrdom.9 A new way of 
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punishment, one that was more effective in exerting control over criminals, was therefore 
devised under the guise of tolerance and humanitarianism.10 A form of punishment that would 
not provoke outrage from the lower classes and would assert greater control over criminals by 
putting them into institutions in which their every moves would be monitored, was 
implemented. ‘Coercive, corporal, solidary, secret model of the power to punish replace the 
representative, scenic, signifying, public collective model’.11  Instead of inflicting gruesome 
punishment in public, the state assumed total control over criminals by putting them in prisons 
where their every move was under supervision.  Like European elites from the dawn of the 19th 
century, the lesson was quickly learnt among members of the pro-PRC faction that naked 
demonstration of power could backfire, especially as  ‘the [local population], drawn to the 
spectacle intended to terrorise it, could express its rejection of the punitive power and 
sometimes revolt’.12 For the pro-PRC faction in Hong Kong, power had to be exercised in a 
discreet manner that enabled more effective methods to enforce internal cohesion and maintain 
a more positive relationship with the Hong Kong public.  
Even after men and women sympathetic to the CCP were marginalised by the rest of 
Hong Kong society after 1967, it was essential for the pro-PRC faction that schools sympathetic 
to Beijing would continue to function, as educators would be given the task to train a new 
generation of pro-PRC activists, and educational institutions were best equipped to enhance 
the party-state’s influence in a discreet manner. Pro-PRC institutions were able to attract 
talented teachers, and someone with the status of Jasper Tsang, the future President of Hong 
Kong’s Legislative Council, became a teacher at Piu Kiu Middle School after graduating from 
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the HKU.13 It became obvious that adherence to official curricula notwithstanding, schools and 
teachers sympathetic to the PRC were nonetheless able to propagate loyalty to the PRC. It was 
institutions like Piu Kiu that enable analysts to truly appreciate the fact that the pro-PRC faction 
in Hong Kong retained its support base even after 1967, as demonstrated by partisans’ 
willingness to send their sons and daughters to educational institutions associated with Beijing. 
According to Tsang, the guiding principle of Piu Kiu was that Hong Kong would eventually 
be returned to China, and therefore it would be essential for those in the city to prepare for this 
eventuality by learning how to serve the interests of the PRC.14 While many in Hong Kong 
were proud of their Chinese heritage, those who were loyal to Beijing constituted, at most, a 
strong minority, especially as the PRC was associated with the excesses of the Cultural 
Revolution and the 1967 riots. Attendees of pro-PRC institutions were marking themselves, as, 
at minimum, students of highly unusual schools, the teachers of which preached values that 
were alien to many in the city. While there were students from pro-PRC institutions who were 
able to attend universities, upon graduation, many of them had to either stay in pro-PRC schools 
as teachers, or work in companies with ties to Beijing. All these career options require 
adherence to pro-PRC ideology, meaning that loyalty to the Beijing was absolutely essential. 
In the pro-PRC ecosystem, where everyone knew everyone, where institutes such as Piu Kiu 
‘assume responsibility of all aspects of the individuals, his physical training, his aptitude to 
work, his everyday conduct, his moral attitude, his state of mind’, it would be impossible for 
young members of the pro-PRC faction to rebel against the ideologies that were taught at their 
school, even if they wanted to.15 In this way, ideological dominance became the prime method 
by which the pro-PRC faction retain its internal discipline after the 1967 riots. 
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Of course, the pro-PRC faction did not rely solely on educational institutions 
sympathetic to Beijing to replenish its rank after the debacle of the 1967 riots, as there were 
more subtle methods with which CCP supporters maintained their influence in the colony. 
According to the memoirs of Szeto Wah, organisations such as Hok Yau Dancing Club (學友
中西舞蹈研究社) were used to attract promising youngsters in the colony to become party 
members or sympathisers.16 As an organisation that, on the outside, appeared to be a dancing 
club for fashionable youngsters, Hok Yau was the perfect recruitment site for CCP members 
in Hong Kong who operated within the ‘greyline’ (灰線), as they were determined to find young 
men and women who could, in the future, obtain the power to influence events in British Hong 
Kong without having to publicly declare their ties with Beijing.17 As stated by Florence Mo (梁
慕嫻),  Paul Yip Kwok-wah (葉國華), the man who would emerge as Chief Executive Tung 
Chee-hwa’s special advisor, was particularly adept at installing pro-PRC youngsters at 
institutions of higher learning in Hong Kong. According to Mo, after the 1967 riots, Yip found 
some of his most talented recruits in Hok Yau, who, upon accepting Yip’s invitation to join the 
grey line, promptly terminated their association with the dancing club, as the organisation was 
by then seen as being too overtly pro-PRC. These talented students gained entry into some of 
the most prominent postsecondary institutions in Hong Kong, who would advocate stridently 
pro-PRC position while maintaining the façade of neutrality, as they were not openly linked 
with any organisations associated with Beijing.  Yip’s recruits would form the backbone of the 
pro-PRC faction within the postsecondary student movement in the 1970s.18   
Given the immense societal problem that confronted Hong Kong during the 1960s and 
1970s, it should surprise no one that the PRC and its ideology was attractive to idealistic youths 
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who were alienated by colonial rule. Jasper Tsang, then and now a level-headed political figure, 
admitted that he would have been happy to see the British status of Hong Kong eradicated 
during the 1967 riots. 19  Besides genuine idealism, it is not hard to see that there were 
performative aspects to these demonstrations of loyalty, as each member of the pro-PRC 
faction was aware that he was she was in competition with his or her peers in the quest for 
advancement within the party hierarchy or the greyline.20 Besides formal evaluations, a process 
Mo accused Yip of being obsessed over, it is also important to note that these young men and 
women were attempting to impress their peers with their actions. The pro-PRC faction, 
especially within the greyline, was very closely knitted, and men and women within it often 
socialise, and on occasion, even marrying, one another.21 There were occasions whereby even 
entire families were made up of members of the greyline or party sympathisers.22  In addition 
to members within the faction reinforcing the loyalty of their peers during period of acute crisis 
such as the 1967, allegiance to the CCP was also strengthened within the context of daily life 
due to familial ties. Betraying the CCP could mean the abandonment of a party sympathiser’s 
friends and family. Alternatively, actions that demonstrated one’s loyalty to Beijing would be 
perceived positively. Familial and social ties within the pro-PRC faction functioned like 
‘complete and austere institutions’ that ‘[assumed] responsibility for all aspects of the 
individual, his physical training, his aptitude to work, his everyday conduct, his moral attitude, 
his state of mind’. In this way, perceived betrayal of the PRC would gravely undermine a 
partisan’s standing in within his or her social circles and family.23 All these developments 
ensured that it would be proper to classify the pro-PRC faction after the 1967 riots as a 
Bordieuan habitus within Hong Kong society, as its members possessed their own values, 
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employment opportunities, and social as well as familial ties that were quite separated from the 
rest of Hong Kong society.  
‘Homelandisation’ and the Emergence of an ‘Unwritten Moral Code’ in Colonial Hong 
Kong   
As the pro-PRC faction continued to harden into a habitus in the 1970s, the rest of Hong 
Kong society was developing its distinctive moral code. It would therefore be useful to take a 
slight detour and examine the theories of Michel De Certeau to see how they could be applied 
within the context of 1970s Hong Kong. According to De Certeau, in any society, there existed 
is ‘a tacit collective convention, unwritten, but legible to all dwellers through the codes of 
language and of behaviour; any submission to these codes, just as any transgression, is 
immediately the object of commentary’.24 As Hong Kong emerged as a society with a largely 
settled population, an unwritten moral code emerged among its residents, one that men and 
women of the colony needed to abide if they wished to be seen as respected members of society. 
Members of a settled population had to establish a pattern of daily living whereby rules of 
engagement would be agreed upon so that coexistence within an occasionally difficult urban 
context would be made predictable and tolerable.25 The willingness to obey the unwritten 
societal rules would lead to one being seen as a decent and proper member of society, and if 
‘propriety is the royal road to…symbolic benefit[s]’, then impropriety would result in a person 
being seen as a pariah.26 Within an urban environment, everyone was interdependent of one 
another, which meant that any action that grossly violated the unwritten societal code 
threatened to undermine the fragile equilibrium on which the prosperity of the society was 
dependent upon would be frowned upon by men and women who valued peace and stability.27  
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The emergence of an unwritten moral code in Hong Kong was inextricably tied with 
the homelandisation process that continued to transform local society after the 1967 riots. By 
1970, about 57% of the local population was born in Hong Kong.28  in the same year, out of 
the total population of 4,127,800, around 2,352,846 local residents were born in Hong Kong.29 
As argued by Geng Yun in his infamous series of articles, he was ‘born in Hong Kong’, but 
‘have done so little for it and its people’. He planned to rectify his past failures by abandoning 
the option of emigrating to another country and instead choosing to remain in his home ‘to 
cultivate a sense of belonging – not as a nation – but as a community – a Hong Kong community, 
and a desire to work for a better society’ among local residents.30 In a not so subtle criticism of 
those whom he saw as too obsessed with China while ignoring local societal ills, Geng Yun 
argued that it was unrealistic to believe that  ‘anyone who refuses to fight the injustice and 
inequality right before their eyes, anyone who refuses to sacrifice for his own community will 
somehow sacrifice and fight for the 700 million Chinese in China’.31 Geng Yun was by no 
means alone; in the January 1st, 1970 edition of the Undergrad, a student writer writing under 
the penname of Lin Fu (林斧) proudly stated that it had been the local population of Hong Kong 
that acted as the engine for the colony’s growth since its inception in 1841, and the people of 
the city would work tirelessly to ensure their home’s continued prosperity.32 The implication, 
of course, was that if it was the men and women of Hong Kong whose hard work had enabled 
the economic success of the colony, then they deserved better than being exploited by the 
economic elites, who had henceforth done little to improve the wellbeing of the working class. 
The belief that Hong Kong was merely ‘a borrowed place’ was no longer true by the 1970s, as 
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an entire generation of activists would be mobilised to wage campaigns to enhance the welfare 
of the city’s residents.33 By the 1970s, more than any other period in the history of the colony, 
homelandisation had taken hold in the city, as Hong Kong became the permanent home of the 
overwhelming majority of Hong Kong Chinese. For politically-minded young men and women, 
if Hong Kong, a colony that was plagued with corruption and inequality, represented their 
home, then it was their responsibility to reform the city.  
The life of and career of Albert Ho encapsulated how an unwritten moral code was 
developing in 1970s Hong Kong and came to dominate those who would emerge as prominent 
figures of the city. As we shall see later, Ho would emerge as a prominent member of the 
Liberal Democratic faction within the student movement that was pro-social reforms, but anti-
colonial and antagonistic to the PRC.34 Before entering university in 1971, he was a regular 
attendee of free lectures given to local youths by historian Xu Guansan (許冠三), who taught 
him how to analyse issues critically and examine recent political development in China.35 It 
was within this relatively loose structure, one that lacked the institutional support of a major 
university but took place within the context of daily life that Ho developed his views on China 
and his responsibilities to it. Before encountering Xu, Ho’s daily life during his youth already 
prominently featured Chinese literature that espoused the heroism of those who defended China 
against external aggressors or internal enemies.36 Attending Xu’s lectures would give him the 
chance to discuss how he could best serve China not only with his teachers, but also outside 
the classroom with men such as Mak Hoi Wah (麥海華), his future partner within the student 
movement.37 Thus, there was a consensus, one that was reinforced among teachers and students 
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as well as among friends, that China and its past civilizational achievements should be admired 
and respect, while the Chinese government could be questioned or even opposed. Of course, 
this critical attitude towards the PRC was reinforced by the fact that Ho constantly interacted 
men and women of the previous generation who came to Hong Kong to escape the rule of the 
party-state. 38  The chaos caused by pro-PRC partisans during the 1967 no doubt further 
cemented the perception that Beijing represented a disruptive influence in the colony, thereby 
making it acceptable to admire Chinese culture while refusing to support the regime currently 
in power. His respect towards the Chinese civilisation enabled Ho to present himself as a 
patriotic Chinese, a posture that was accepted by his peers in spite of his repeated criticism of 
the PRC.    
While Ho certainly admired Chinese culture, he was by no means immune to the 
process of homelandisaton, as his father was born in Hong Kong, and like many of his peers 
who were born and raised in Hong Kong, he likely viewed the colony as his permanent home.39 
He described his youth as a purer time, one that was filled with happy memories of playing 
with his companions on mountains or the streets.40 Ho certainly saw the colony’s flaws, as he 
often encountered the underprivileged during his youth.41 He was more than willing to use his 
pocket money to buy meals for those in need, a habit that won him accolade among his friends, 
thereby demonstrating a belief among Ho’s social circle that Hong Kong, instead of being a 
society made up of individuals with little or no shared interests, actually constituted a 
community in which the poor deserved sympathy and assistance, especially as the city was 
evolving into a permanent home for many of its inhabitants, thus making it possible for a 
common identity to emerge. 42  The respect that he won from his friends through acts of 
                                                          
38 Oral Interview with Albert Ho, p. 1.  
39 Oral Interview with Albert Ho, p. 1.  
40 Oral Interview with Albert Ho, p. 7. 
41 He，Qianbei de fendou,, p. 1.  
42 Oral Interview with Albert Ho, p. 7. 
137 
 
selflessness no doubt motivated Ho to pursue actions that could further help the lower classes 
of Hong Kong, something that could be accomplished through a career in public life. A healthy 
ego that enjoyed positive attention, a genuine desire to help to underprivileged, and a belief 
that Hong Kong represented his permanent home all motivated Ho to become a student activist 
and a budding politician by the 1970s.   
In the absence of everyday resistance participated by Hong Kong Chinese that saved 
the British status of the city in 1967, Hong Kong Chinese would not have developed among 
themselves an unwritten moral code in the 1970s. If the motivation behind the majority of Hong 
Kong Chinese’s everyday resistance was to preserve the status-quo in 1967, then by the 1970s, 
a significant segment of the local population had acquired an unwritten moral mode that put 
the welfare of local residents as well as the maintenance of local peace and stability above all 
other political considerations. The survival of British Hong Kong in the 1967 riots facilitated 
the emergence of a local society in which a significant number of local men and women came 
to see the welfare of Hong Kong Chinese as their primary motivation for political mobilisation. 
Everyday resistance not only represented a defensive campaign, but it also supplied the 
foundational values for future mobilisations. It was over the course of their participation in 
everyday resistance that Chinese in the colony came to the conclusion that Hong Kong society 
and its inhabitants possessed interests that had to be uphold. By the 1970s, there was also a 
higher level of prosperity that made it possible for local young men and women to engage in 
political actions rather than to focus single-mindedly on survival in a highly competitive 
society.43 In realpolitik terms, while the British could certainly be ruthless when confronted 
with existential threats, they were less likely to use lethal means to suppress young protestors 
whose aim was to improve local welfare. This awareness of their colonisers’ relative restraint 
likely contributed to young activists’ willingness to engage in political actions.  
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 Of course, as this chapter would demonstrate, love and affection for China, especially 
if its territorial integrity was under threat, could still be a motivation for political actions. As 
the 1970s progressed, however, it became increasingly evident that the Chinese nationalism of 
the pro-PRC faction was specifically focused on the CCP party-state, and all those who failed 
to be similarly loyal to Beijing were seen as naïve as best, treasonous at worst.  As we shall see 
later, the pro-PRC faction was able to achieve a degree of unity that was simply absent among 
its opponents. As it was argued by John Hutchinson, a sense of being besieged, and of being 
surrounded by enemies, could enhance internal cohesion among members of a nationalist 
movement, especially if they saw themselves as playing an important role in the revival of the 
national community.44 In the coming conflicts within the student movement, this sense of unity 
would allow the pro-PRC faction to dominate the 1970s postsecondary student movement.  
The Dawn of the Student Movement: Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language 
(1967-1974)  
 
 The division within the postsecondary student movement between those who were 
steadfastly loyal to the PRC and those who saw Hong Kong as the focal point of their political 
mobilisation was temporary papered over during the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official 
Language. Public interest in making Chinese the official language began in September 1967, 
when a meeting of the Heung Yee Kuk (essentially the assembly of village elders in Hong 
Kong’s New Territories) ended with a motion calling for the government to grant official status 
to the majority’s mother tongue.45 The Campaign truly became citywide when the Society to 
Promote Chinese Education was formed in October 1969 among educators in the colony.46 The 
All Hong Kong Working Party to Promote Chinese as an Official Language was formed by 
Urban Councillor Denny Huang in June 1970, and the Joint Committee to Strive for Chinese 
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to be an Official Language was formed in 1970 by a coalition of youth magazines.47The 
activists involved were angered by colonial officials’ perceived arrogance and condescending 
manner. Paul Tsai, one of the few Chinese serving as a senior official in the colonial 
government, claimed that miscommunication between the government and the public was few 
and far between, the inability of the majority to understand English notwithstanding. He also 
stated that it was not necessary for the government to ensure public understanding of the 
colonial administration’s policy options, one of the anticipated benefits of making Chinese an 
official language, as in doing so would enable residents to express their viewpoints to 
officials.48 As stated by Lam Wai-Man, the actions of postsecondary students were relatively 
tame, especially when compared to other student-led political mobilisations in the decade; 
nevertheless, the Hong Kong Federation of Students did form the Committee to Study the 
Deserved Status of Chinese in Hong Kong, an organisation that put addition pressure on the 
Hong Kong government. 49  There was also the production of T-shirts containing slogans 
supportive of the Campaign.50 The highlights of the Campaign were protests and signature 
collection campaigns, the purpose of which was to force the government to recognise 
widespread public support behind the efforts to grant official status to the Chinese language.51 
The Campaign arguably peaked in 1971, when the Chinese Language Committee, an organ 
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established by the government, recommended the granting of official status to Chinese, thereby 
laying the foundation for the colonial government’s decision to recognise Chinese as an official 
language in 1974.52 
During the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language, the student movement in 
Hong Kong enjoyed a high degree of unity that would soon disappear as the 1970s progressed. 
By all accounts, university students, regardless of their political orientation or views towards 
the PRC, worked together for a common goal, a surprising development given that during the 
1967 riots, many university attendees were highly contemptuous of the CCP. Indeed, most of 
the views expressed on the pages of the Undergrad at the time were almost universally critical 
of the CCP and supportive of the government.53 This sense of unity that was achieved during 
the Campaign could be attributed to the fact it was relatively apolitical, as hardly anyone of 
Chinese descent in the colony would object making Chinese an official language (Paul Tsui, 
was a prominent exception).54 In this particular instance, the two ideological poles of the 
student movement, homelandisation, a sentiment that was manifested in the belief that having 
the  mother tongue of the majority population recognised as an official language would make 
daily life of those living in Hong Kong easier, and a Chinese nationalism that was conveyed 
through genuine respect and admiration for Chinese culture as represented by repeated attempts 
to win official status for the Chinese language, became the foundation a cooperative and 
productive relationship among student activists with divergent political viewpoints. Although 
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the Campaign to Make Chinese an Official Language was not overtly partial to the PRC, its 
strong nationalistic undertone was sufficient to win over the support of student partisans 
sympathetic to Beijing. 
The Intensification of the Student Movement: The Defend Diaoyutai Islands Campaign 
(1970-1971) 
 
At the 1960s came to an end and the 1970s commenced, one should not underestimate 
the powerful force exerted by Chinese nationalism over those who participated in the student 
movement. Indicative of postsecondary students’ fierce Chinese nationalism, on May Fourth, 
1969, the student newspapers at New Asia College, Chung Chi College, University of Hong 
Kong, and United College published a joint issue celebrating the 50th anniversary of the iconic 
May Fourth Movement, the driving forces of which were Chinese nationalism and anti-
colonialism.55 It should be noted that anti-CCP sentiments were expressed in this joint issue, 
and there was a sense that mainland China had yet to have a regime that was capable of ruling 
it effectively. One writer even claimed that while China had defeated old idols such as 
Confucius, new ones had been erected, implying that the cult of Mao was detrimental to the 
intellectual and political development of China.56 One could reasonably assume that there were 
pro-PRC students who were angered by these negative characterisations of Beijing. Observers 
could now come to the conclusion that there existed at least two varieties of Chinese 
nationalism in the student movement, as pro-PRC partisans were convinced that loyalty to the 
CCP ought to be the foundational political value of any Chinese, while most other Hong Kong 
Chinese were convinced that affection and admiration for Chinese culture, as well as a 
willingness to defend China when it was under threat, were sufficient to safeguard their self-
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perception as patriotic Chinese. These divergent views notwithstanding, as subsequent events 
would demonstrate, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were values embraced by all 
factions within the student movement and served as linchpins uniting different strands of 
Chinese nationalism, thereby enabling all self-proclaimed Chinese nationalists in the colony to 
temporarily present a united front. 
Events outside of Hong Kong’s borders greatly impacted the development of the local 
student movement. In 1969, the United States and the Japanese governments issued a joint 
communique formally acknowledging Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa and Diaoyutai 
Islands (Senkaku Islands to the Japanese), the latter of which were territories claimed by both 
the CCP government in the mainland and the KMT government in Taiwan as parts of China.57 
It is important to note that even before protests began among Chinese students in the United 
States, within Hong Kong, concerns regarding the sovereignty of the Islands emerged as early 
as July 1970. A rising number of wen she (literary clubs), columnists, and university students’ 
magazines had by then expressed their concerns, demonstrating that Hong Kong was the 
Defend Diaoyutai Islands Campaign (henceforth the Baodiao Campaign)’s point of 
commencement.58 Towards the end of 1970, Chinese students at Princeton University began to 
protest Japanese claims over the Island.59  Similar protest broke out in Washington, D.C., 
California, and Michigan (Ann Arbor) in the fall and summer of 1971.60 By then, Hong Kong 
was fully involved in this trans-border campaign against perceived Japanese encroachment of 
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Chinese territories. Protests in Hong Kong concerning the Diaoyutai Islands were participated 
predominately by youths. On April 10th, 1971, a protest march the final destination of which 
was the Japanese consulate was stopped by the police, a confrontation that resulted in twenty-
one arrests, including seven postsecondary students.61 
When the Baodiao Campaign was becoming intensely nationalistic, postsecondary 
students took on a leading role in this political mobilisation against perceived Japanese 
aggression. After the protest on April 10th, 1971, the Hong Kong Federation of Students and 
the College Students Association of Hong Kong almost immediately called for mass protests 
on different campuses across the city.62 Student newspapers were certainly supportive of the 
Baodiao Campaign and highly critical of police responses on April 10th, as a day later, a joint 
issue was published by the CU Students, (中大學生報), Undergrad,  Federation of Students 
Newspaper (學聯報), Catholic Post-Secondary (曙暉), and three other student publications to 
severely criticise the actions of the police.63 At this point, the themes of anti-colonialism, anti-
imperialism, and Chinese nationalism were made even more explicit, as a postsecondary 
student was recorded to have pointedly asked a policeman if he was Chinese during the April 
10th protest, the implication being that a patriotic Chinese would not have arrested other 
                                                          
61 Lam, Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong, p. 149;  ‘Shiwei zao jingfang baoli zhizhi’ ‘示威遭警
方暴力制止’(Police Violently Stopped Protest), Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao 中國學生周報,  中華民國六十
年四月十六日 (The Chinese Student Weekly, 16 April 1971), p. 1 
62 ‘Baowei diao yutai yundong: (yi) bao diao yundong chansheng de beijing ji jingguo’ '保衛釣魚台運動：（一
）保釣運動產生的背景及經過' (The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Campaign: Part One – Background and 
Proceeding), zai xianggang xueshengyundong huigu 在香港學生運動回顧, Xianggang zhuan shang xuesheng 
lian hui bian (Xianggang : Guang jiao jing chu ban she : Fa xing Hua feng shu ju, 1983 Chu ban), 
pp. 33-35 (p. 33). 
63 ‘Baowei diao yutai yundong’ ‘保衛釣魚台’(Defend  Diaoyutai Islands), zhongda suesheng bao/xue 
yuan/xue feng/shu hui/xue lian bao/hao kan: Lianhe haowai 中大學生報/學苑/學風/曙暉/學聯報/號刊: 
聯合號外, 一九七一年四月十一日 (11 April 1971), pp.1-4.  
144 
 
Chinese for defending Chinese territorial sovereignty.64 On April 17th, there was a protest on 
the HKU campus with 700 attendees, while 500 persons attended the one that took place on 
Chung Chi College.65 Again explicitly using Chinese nationalism as a means for mobilisation, 
on May 4th,  another protest occurred in Edinburgh Place, which resulted in twelve persons 
being arrested.66 A parallel protest was organised in Kowloon; during and after the protest, the 
‘May Fourth Spirit’ was referenced as the driving principle of the protestors, many of whom 
not only protested on the streets, but also marched inside convenience stores owned by 
Japanese multinational companies. 67  It is not difficult to sense the intensification of 
nationalistic sentiment in Hong Kong, especially as the Federation of Students submitted a 
request for the right to stage a protest on July 7th, the date prominently associated with the 
commencement of the Sino-Japanese war.68 When the request to use Victoria Park as the site 
of protest was denied, student protestors and their supporters went there anyway, and not 
surprisingly, there was a clash with the police that led to seventy-one persons being arrested.69 
While there would be more protests centring on the defence of the Diaoyutai Islands in 
Hong Kong, the events of July 1971 were arguably the highpoint of the entire Baodiao 
Campaign. Indeed, the July 7th protest was attended by around 3000 persons, making it the 
gathering with the highest number of attendees over the course of the entire Baodiao 
Campaign.70  Although the march to the Japanese consulate on May 13th, 1972 that were 
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participated by 2000 persons was certainly impressive, it did not have the emotional resonance 
of the July 7th, 1971 march. Very tellingly, in his retrospective article covering the Campaign, 
Zhang Jing Kun (張靖堃), a student activist during this period, did not mention any protests after 
July 7th.71 Indeed, while the May 1973 protest was held without prior authorisation by the 
government, no arrest was made. 72  In the absence of confrontations against the British 
administration, the Baodiao Campaign lost an opponent against which to mobilise. Without the 
British as the powerful opponent to galvanise public opinions and in the absence of physical 
confrontations against colonial law enforcement agents, marches after 1971 simply lacked the 
dramatic flairs of their predecessors.  
Another reason that the July 7th, 1971 protest was seen as the highpoint of the Baodiao 
Campaign was that cracks began to appear within the student movement almost immediately 
thereafter. It is important to note that for many participants of the Campaign, ‘China’ was 
presented as a relatively apolitical concept that transcended the KMT-CCP divide, one that 
nonetheless had to be defended against perceived Japanese aggression. In fact, an article on the  
Undergrad even at one point contemptuously asserted that the CCP party-state was sitting on 
the sideline during the Baodiao Campaign.73 This article, which appeared in June 1971, stated 
that both the KMT and the CCP needed encouragement from the masses so that the two 
respective parties would have the spines to stand up against imperialist bullies.74 Given the 
CCP’s lack of wide public support in Hong Kong, when pro-PRC student activists began to 
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advocate for the unification of Taiwan with the mainland under the leadership of the CCP in 
August 1971 by asserting that such an arrangement was best suited for the defence of national 
sovereignty, many student activists were dismayed by this sudden change in direction of the 
Baodiao Campaign without prior public consultations. Similarly, when members of the pro-
PRC faction began to praise the CCP and articulate the notion that student activists, instead of 
focusing on international affairs, should concentrate on the propagation of social, political, and 
economic achievements of the CCP to the general public, unity within the student movement 
further broke down. 75  In absence of continuous confrontations against the British and 
provocation supplied by the Japanese and American governments, contradictions that existed 
between different strands of Chinese nationalism began to overwhelm the fragile unity that 
held together the student movement.  
The Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Beginning of China Week 
 While the Baodiao Campaign arguably did little to alter the international climate that 
played such an instrumental role in creating the global controversy in the first place, as the 
decade progressed, student activists would become more involved in local issues that impacted 
the daily life of those who resided in Hong Kong. It is difficult to overemphasise the degree to 
which corruption contaminated almost all levels of Hong Kong society in the postwar era.76 As 
stated by Elsie Tu, the famous social welfare activists, there were British policemen who came 
to Hong Kong with the expressed purpose of trying to get wealthy, as it was common 
knowledge that ‘there was a lot of money to be earned in corruption’.77 Those who suffered the 
most were of course the average residents of the colony, as they had to pay protection money 
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to both policemen and gangsters. 78  Imagine how idealistic youngsters like Ho, whose 
educational upbringing was full of tales of Chinese men and women who struggled for the 
welfare of the underprivileged, had to have felt when confronted by the vastly unjust social 
conditions in Hong Kong. 79  This type of young and idealistic men and women entered 
universities at a period when a sense of homelandisation was becoming prominent, and the 
conviction that Hong Kong represented their permanent home was leading to calls for social 
reforms. In 1968, an unsigned editorial on the pages of the Undergrad contemplated that maybe 
riots were necessary to compel the government for further social reforms.80 Within university 
campuses, there came to be a conviction that acts of rebellion against the colonial government 
possessed ‘high symbolic value’, especially since its functionaries were acting in a manner 
contrary to the interests of Hong Kong residents, thereby justifying popular confrontations 
against the British for the betterment of Hong Kong residents’ lives.81  
It should therefore surprise no one that the Godber controversy was fully participated 
by student activists, many of whom were at the frontline of a Campaign that took on a 
confrontationally anti-colonial tone as it intensified. Peter Godber was a seasoned police officer 
whose performance during the 1967 riots earned praises. In April 1973, however, it was 
discovered that he was sending large sum of money outside of Hong Kong, and subsequent 
investigations revealed that his net worth was about six times larger than his salary that he had 
accumulated over the past twenty years.82 As it became increasingly clear that Godber most 
likely had committed, at minimum, some sort of professional misconducts, he was somehow 
able to escape from Hong Kong.83 The general public was furious, and most observers were 
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angered by the fact that there appeared to have been no attempts at forcing Godber to surrender 
his travel documents or any efforts to place him under surveillance.84 Reactions on universities 
campuses were especially ferocious, with an editorial on the  Undergrad labelling him ‘a 
person who is good enough to be a dustman in England’  who had come ‘to Hong Kong to be 
a duke’, and a fraudster who promptly escaped to Britain to ‘lives happily ever after’ after it 
was discovered that ‘he grabs millions of dollars from the little man in Hong Kong’ by  illegal 
means’.85  
Just as the people of Hong Kong were developing a sense of belonging, one that 
motivated them to develop a moral code that was based on the ‘common history’ of Hong Kong 
Chinese and the purpose of which was to uphold the 'collective well-being' of the local society, 
the Godber case exposed to all that colonial officials had no hesitation at enriching themselves 
at the expense of the city’s population.86 Ho was certainly aware of the fact that there was a 
collaborative relationship between policemen and gangster in the postwar era, as he once stated 
that police essentially left criminal organisations alone as long as there were no major incidents 
and policemen got a share of the profit.87 When corruption was that obvious, and could not 
even ‘hide itself in the darkness’, then its practitioners not surprisingly were subjected to severe 
criticisms. 88  If adherence to existing societal norms allowed one to ‘continue collecting 
expected symbolic benefits’, then ‘propriety imposes its own coercion’ also, as those who 
failed to live up to the agreed upon moral code would be targets of ridicule.89 What most likely 
inflamed the political passion of student activists was the fact that they most likely had 
experienced official corruption or knew people who were victims of it. Indeed, in postwar Hong 
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Kong, bribes had to be paid in domains as diverse as education, construction, and education.90 
The Anti-Corruption Campaign that broke out was a protest against colonial Hong Kong, the 
functionaries of which, instead of doing their foremost to ‘to make everyday life possible’, 
were conducting themselves in such a manner that was repulsive to the Hong Kong public.91 
Once again, postsecondary student activists in Hong Kong played a leading role in the 
Anti-Corruption Campaign that would have wide ramifications in the city during the 1970s. 
While the colonial government, responding to escalating public anger, announced in June 1973 
that Sir William Alexander "Alastair" Blair-Kerr, a respected public servant, would be 
appointed to head a one-man Commission of Inquiry, the general public remained unconvinced 
that Godber would ever be brought to justice.92 As it became clear that public sentiments were 
supportive of further demonstrations of indignation, especially since the issue was even raised 
on the floor of the Legislative Council, student activists were able to build a Campaign that had 
already begun to mount immense pressure on the government.93 Indeed, the first Blair-Kerr 
report merely stated that the reasons for Godber being able to escape was that he had used the 
special permit issued to senior police officers, and that in the future, officials accused of similar 
crimes be put under close supervision.94 By the end of July 1973, the Federation of Students 
began to mobilise. Press releases and letters were issued calling for the extradition of Godber, 
the beginning of wider investigations regarding corruption, and the establishment of an 
organisation to combat official corruption. 95  A subsequent signature collection campaign 
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collected 50, 000 signatures.96 Student activists even began to cooperate with workers and other 
civic organisations, and thirteen youth and student organisations merged into the Thirteen 
Anticorruption Groups in mid-August.97 
At student protestors became fully involved in the Campaign, their actions assumed an 
increasingly confrontational and anti-colonial tone, and activities that were explicitly staged to 
enraged colonial authorities became integral to the efforts against official corruption. The 
Thirteen Anticorruption Groups, of which student activists played a leading part, originally 
planned to stage a protest at Morse Park, but due to rain, its members instead marched to 
Victoria Park in August 26th.98 It should be noted that all these activities, strictly speaking, were 
illegal, as participants had not obtained the required governmental consent for their actions. 
Twenty-one participants were arrested during the march.99 Another protest that was deemed 
illegal by colonial authorities took place in Morse Park in September 2nd, and twelve persons 
who were arrested refused to show up at court, and in doing so made themselves wanted 
criminals.100 By this time, the Campaign was likely supported by the majority of those residing 
in the colony, and this public backing served as a stimulus for further actions.101 As a further 
act of rebellion against ‘unreasonable colonial rules and regulations’, there was another public 
meeting on September 16, 1973 that took place in Victoria Park, the theme of which was 
‘Corruption Guilty, Public Meetings not Guilty’. Activities on that date included a march to 
the Government House to present a letter of containing the demands of the protestors, the most 
prominent of which were the immediate extradition of Godber, a public declaration of the 
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government’s determination to stop corruption, the cessation of governmental efforts to 
undermine the Anti-Corruption Campaign, and the dropping of charges against protestors. The 
letter was subsequently burnt at the conclusion of the march. Not surprisingly, this march drew 
the ire of the police, who later arrested twenty-six participants.102 
The second Blair-Kerr Report of 1973 actually did not explicitly argue for an 
independent agency to eliminate official corruption; nevertheless, the new Governor, Murray 
MacLehose, ultimately decided to establish the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) in 1974.  It is difficult to imagine the establishment of the ICAC in 1974 and the 
extradition as well as the subsequent conviction of Godber in 1975 in the absence of the 
Campaign that was led by student activist.103 At a time period when the capacity of the student 
movement to influence changes in society was arguably at its peak, so much so that a new  
agency was set up mostly due to protests that was led by student activists, unity within 
university campuses begun to fracture and different factions began to emerge. The Trotskyites 
were seen as too confrontational and too radical, especially as they never hid their 
determination to overthrow the colonial government through the mobilisation of the working 
class, an outcome they attempted to engineer during the early stage of Campaign in spite of the 
fact that opened rebellion was not supported by the majority within the student movement. As 
a result, the Trotskyites were sidelined by other student activists who did not want to be 
associated with a faction that was openly advocating for armed revolts.104 There was also the 
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socialist faction, the members of which were convinced that the energy of the student 
movement should be focused on the reform of Hong Kong society through the implementation 
of socialist ideology.105 The pro-PRC faction did not concur with the conviction held by the 
Trotskyites and the socialists that local affairs should be the focal point of the student 
movement. Pro-PRC activists’ determination to concentrate single-mindedly on developments 
within the PRC that would sharply divide the student movement.   
 At this stage, the pro-PRC faction had become increasingly uninterested in Hong Kong 
affairs, even if its official slogan was now ‘Recognise China, Care About Society’ (認中關社).  
This slogan was actually highly misleading, as it was by the mid-1970s an article of faith within 
the pro-PRC faction that understanding the PRC, and dissimulating positive information about 
it, represented the most important duty of its partisans in Hong Kong.106 While it had been 
suggested that the refusal to participate in movements for social reforms was motivated by a 
belief held by some activists that they were simply too weak to affect changes, Albert Ho 
argued that it was the increasingly confrontational tone of the protests that led to this alternation 
in the policy direction of the pro-PRC faction. After the 1967 riots, there was simply no appetite 
for further confrontations against colonial authorities.107 One should also not discount the fact 
that during this period, the international standing of the PRC was rapidly transforming, and it 
was recognised as a great power on the world stage. Significant events such as the replacement 
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of Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) by the PRC at the United Nations in 1971 and President 
Richard Nixon’s historical visit to China in 1972 occurred in rapid succession, and it should 
therefore surprise no one that members of the pro-PRC faction were convinced that history was 
on their side.108 This rising patriotic sentiment was already evident in January 1971, when trips 
were being organised so that students could return to mainland China, a practice that would 
continue throughout the 1970s the purpose of which was to demonstrate the domestic 
achievements of the PRC.109   
A manifestation of the pro-PRC faction’s reorientation from Hong Kong affairs to 
campaigns to promote awareness and acceptance of the PRC was the staging of the first China 
Week in the summer of 1973.110 The first China Week was proposed by students at the Hong 
Kong Baptist College when the Anti-Corruption Campaign was reaching its height in the 
summer of 1973, which in hindsight, deprived the Campaign the political energy needed to 
evolve into a full-fledged anti-colonial movement, as a significant segment of its partisans lost 
interest in local affairs.111 The first China Week was made up of a photo exhibition of modern 
Chinese history in HKU, which attracted 5000 visitors and exhibitions at the Baptist College 
as well as Hong Kong Polytechnic concerning fossil fuel and energy development in the 
mainland.112 The success of China week, which ran annually from 1973 to 1978, ensured that 
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the pro-PRC faction would remain the predominant force within the student movement for 
most of the 1970s.113 By any measure, the first China week was a considerable success, as 
nearly six years after the 1967 riots, the pro-PRC faction was able to compel a significant 
portion of the population to become keenly interested in not only Chinese culture, but also the 
social, economic, and political developments within the PRC. Not surprisingly, members of 
the pro-PRC faction were infused with a great sense of self-confidence, for if the PRC was 
emerging as a great power, then they were vanguards of the party-state in the British colony, 
and China week was the perfect occasion that allowed them to express and promote their 
nationalism.114 
The success of the first China Week, the enthusiasm that it engendered, and belief that 
they were on the right side of history ensured that the pro-PRC faction would dominate the 
1970s Hong Kong student movement. The pro-PRC faction also most likely received 
instructions, from leaders of the grey line such as Paul Yip Kwok-wah, to not be too 
confrontational against the British.115 It was not that members of the pro-PRC faction were 
totally unmoved by the injustices that occurred within colonial Hong Kong, it was just that they 
were convinced that they were powerless to eliminate them.116 The pro-PRC faction, therefore, 
did not want to reform colonial society. Nor did its members wanted to eradicate colonialism. 
Instead, they were determined that the pro-PRC nationalism they espoused, one that placed 
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loyalty to Beijing above all else, be the dominant ideology in the colony. In other words, they 
wanted their ‘habitus’ to be the dominant one in the colony in preparation for Chinese 
resumption of sovereignty in the near future. The fact that the pro-PRC faction had its own 
schools, social events, social circles, employment opportunities all but guaranteed that its 
partisans would possess viewpoints regarding Hong Kong that would be vastly different to 
those of their peers who were not affiliated with the PRC.117 The ideological foundations of 
other factions of the student movement were much more pluralistic, thereby making them more 
tolerance of differences, and at the same time, much more difficult to enforce internal discipline 
or preserve unity. In contrast, a partisan sympathetic to the PRC interpreted conditions in 
British Hong Kong mostly through the lenses of being a supporter of Beijing. It was this unity 
of purpose that enabled the pro-PRC faction to take over the student movement and began its 
quest to extend its dominance over the wider Hong Kong society.   
The Rise of Alternative Forces within the Student Movement and the Decline of the Pro-
PRC Faction   
 Just when the influence of student activists sympathetic to Beijing was reaching its apex, 
new political actors with different ideologies were emerging to challenge the pro-PRC 
orthodoxy within the student movement. In his memoir, Albert Ho proclaimed the political 
beliefs of the pro-PRC faction to be highly illogical, as its members had to accept the PRC in 
its totality and essentially ignore all its flaws.118  Even more damningly, Ho asserted that 
members of the pro-PRC faction of being partisans of an authoritarian regime for the sole 
purpose of boosting their own egos, as they wanted to be seen as patriots of a great power while 
not having to live under the harsh rule of the party-state.119 Not surprisingly, he was highly 
critical of various trips postsecondary students took to China in the 1970s, and compared them 
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to propaganda events staged by the PRC.120 This hostile attitude towards the PRC, the influence 
of Xu Guansan, who taught him to be sceptical of dogmas, and his reading habit that included 
a heavy dose of works written by Karl Popper that stressed the importance of testing and 
challenging existing theories, constituted the foundation of Ho’s intellectual beliefs.121 By the 
mid-1970s, Ho was emerging as one of the founding members of the liberal-democratic faction, 
a segment within the student movement that was critical of both the PRC and the British, while 
at the same time, aimed for progressive reforms in Hong Kong and the city’s eventual 
retrocession to a democratic China.122 The liberal-democratic faction would become a force to 
be reckoned with in the student movement in the mid-1970s.  
At this stage, the socialist faction still played an important role within the student 
movement, but on its own, it lacked the sheer manpower, or even the inclination, to take on the 
pro-PRC student activists, as both camps actually shared a high degree of ideological affinity 
due to their belief in socialism.123 As a result, in the mid-1970s, the pro-PRC faction remained 
by far the most powerful bloc within the student movement, so much so that its members 
essentially controlled the editorial direction of the Undergrad.124 In 1974, a candidate was even 
slated to succeed the pro-PRC head of the HKU student union unopposed, as it was assumed 
that the faction had achieve such a degree of dominance that dynastic succession was 
possible.125 What was ignored, however, was that the increasingly arrogant ways with which 
members of the pro-PRC faction treated their peers, and the fact that their opponents had been 
scheming for months for some kind of counterstrike. In November 1974, Mak Hoi Wah, A 
member of the socialist faction, with Ho as his campaign manager, was elected as the head of 
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the HKU student union. 126  According to Ho, the victory of Mak was made possible by 
widespread dissatisfaction with pro-PRC partisans on campus, which in turn was the 
foundation of a coalition of all the factions that were unhappy with the current direction of the 
student movement, with its heavy emphasis on PRC affairs at the exclusion of all other 
viewpoints. The intense dissatisfaction with the pro-PRC faction created a coalition that made 
the victory of Mak possible. 127 
While the socialists and the liberal democratic faction were emerging as challengers to 
the pro-PRC faction’s dominance, Hong Kong society continued to evolve, and there were still 
numerous issues that provoked the outrage of activists determined to improve the welfare of 
Hong Kong Chinese. In January 1975,  the Hong Kong Telephone Company announced a 
whopping 70% price increase, a move that was, not surprisingly, widely decried as putting the 
profit margins of big businesses ahead of the middle and working classes of the colony.128 In a 
recent interview, Mak stated that he was outraged by the price increase, but curiously, while 
there were subsequent citywide protests, postsecondary students, in a stark contrast to previous 
social movements,  played a minor role.129 In the end, the Hong Kong University Students 
Union, the College Students’ Association of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Federation of 
Catholic Students planned signature collection campaigns and issued a joint publication that 
protested the price increase.130 The inaction of the student movement was due in large part to 
pro-PRC faction’s continued dominance, and its members’ refusal to confront the colonial 
government. Members of the socialist and liberal democratic factions were indeed able to fight 
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their ways into positions of power within various student organisation; at the same time, the 
pro-PRC faction remained the preeminent force within the student movement. Even after the 
victory of Mak, most student unions in other institutions of higher education were led by 
members of the pro-PRC faction.131 For members of the pro-PRC faction, the imperative of 
promoting the interests of Beijing still took precedent over defending the welfare of men and 
women residing in Hong Kong.  
The critics of the pro-PRC faction were targeted for vicious personal attacks by those 
who felt that men and women of Hong Kong who refused to display loyalty to the PRC were 
ignorant at best, treasonous at worse. The fact that most members of the pro-PRC faction 
formed an interconnected network united by educational, social, and ideological ties enabled 
them to form a strong united front against other blocs in the student movement who refused to 
accept the legitimacy of the PRC. Indeed, if members of the pro-PRC faction possessed a 
habitus, then it was one that was particularly of intolerant of competitors or oppositions. It was 
not at all clear that the pro-PRC faction’s Beijing-centric nationalism was supported by the 
majority of Hong Kong society, its members’ dominance within the student movement 
notwithstanding. The pro-PRC faction was determined to destroy their opponents by using the 
charges of disloyalty, for they knew they were at a position of disadvantage, especially since 
even after achieving dominance within their student movement, only a minority segment of the 
population hold views that were highly supportive of the PRC. It was therefore it necessary to 
adopt an aggressive stance so that the ideological conviction of pro-PRC partisans could be 
advanced in Hong Kong.   
The capacity of the pro-PRC faction to combat its opponents were tested again and 
again during the 1970s, as Beijing experienced one political crisis after another, and its critics 
in Hong Kong were given repeated opportunities to question the legitimacy of the party-state. 
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Of course, the most important historical events in 1976 were the deaths of Mao and Zhou Enlai. 
There were, however, other important political episodes within the PRC as well. There was the 
Tiananmen Square incident of April 1974, during which protestors who put up signs 
commemorating the passing of Zhou Enai and highly critical of the Gang of Four were 
forcefully and violently dispersed.132 There were also signs protesting Deng Xiaoping’s second 
fall from power earlier that month.133 The HKU delegation to the Hong Kong Federation of 
Students actually tried to pass a motion protesting these events in the PRC, arguing that the 
Gang of Four was acting in an unconstitutional manner.134 The student activist responsible for 
this motion, President of College Students Association of Hong Kong and a member of the 
liberal-democratic faction active in HKU, Mai Zong Min, (麥宗民),  then submitted a 
declaration of human rights on May 4th, 1976 to the headquarter of New China News Agency 
(NCNA), the PRC’s de facto consulate in the city.135 In what would be remembered as the ‘Mai 
Zong Minu Incident’, Mai was severely attacked by members of the pro-PRC faction who saw 
him as their sworn enemy.   
 The series of escalating verbal attacks launched against Mai would become an infamous 
chapter in the history of the Hong Kong student movement. Using a verbal attack technique 
that would become common against men and women in Hong Kong who were critical of the 
CCP, Mai was accused of collaborating with foreign powers determined to undermine the 
internal stability of the PRC.136 Regardless of their political affiliations, all student activists 
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saw themselves as Chinese patriots; in fact, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were 
ideological unifiers of all factions within the movement. To allege that someone was serving 
as a foreign collaborator, therefore, was to aim for the total annihilation of his or her reputation. 
If enemies of the pro-PRC camp could not be eliminated by physical means, then they had to 
be put into an existence that was ‘unnatural, useless, and dangerous’, so much so that they 
would become pariahs. 137  Indeed, the techniques that the pro-PRC faction utilised in its 
members’ attacks on Mai were reminiscent of how criminals were treated by state authorities 
in 18th and 19th centuries Europe, a period during which prisoners were isolated, and their 
integration back into societies was made as difficult as possible due to having been branded as 
lawbreakers.138 The calls to unite against alleged traitors such as Mai, a move that was quite 
explicitly designed to isolate him, was a clear indication that the pro-PRC faction was 
determined to conduct character assassination campaigns against their opponents.139   
While the deeply personal attack against Mai provoked widespread revulsion, for a 
while at least, opposition against the pro-PRC faction remained, at most, a significant minority. 
In October, however, everything changed, as the Gang of Four suddenly fell from power.140 
Most members of the pro-PRC faction at first thought it was a rumour, then they had to pretend 
it was business as usual.141 Eventually, the pro-PRC faction was dealt a harsh blow, as there 
was a perception that everything they had preached was a lie – they had thought that the Gang 
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of Four was the legitimate vanguard of Maoist thoughts. According to Albert Ho, the pro-PRC 
faction was convinced that Hong Kong would eventually be returned to a China ruled by the 
Gang of Four or its successors.142 It is therefore difficult to overstate the psychological shock 
that was dealt to the pro-PRC faction. Yang Bao Xi (楊寶熙), the head of the CUHK Student 
Union in 1975 and the head of Hong Kong Federation of Students in 1976, stated that after the 
fall of the Gang of Four, she came to the conclusion that student leaders were merely being 
manipulated by the PRC into propagating the interests of Beijing in the colony.143 The rapid 
fall of Gang of Four revealed to its supporters in Hong Kong that politics was indeed a cynical 
game; there was no room for idealism or sentimentality.     
The decline of the pro-Beijing faction did not lead to the rise in power of an alternative 
bloc; instead, after 1976, there was a sense that the student movement was gradually losing its 
influence. There was still the Campaign to Reopen the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee 
Secondary School from 1977 to 1978, during which university students played prominent roles 
in organising protests and providing tutorials for high school students who missed classes due 
to their school’s closure; but the peak of the student movement was from 1970 to 1976, during 
which British Hong Kong was often explicitly challenged.144 The spectacles of student activists 
protesting at sites that were not designated as areas for peaceful gatherings were not repeated 
after 1976. Postsecondary students were quite vocal about their displeasure at Beijing, London, 
and other leaders of British Hong Kong in the years leading to retrocession, but deliberate 
attempts to challenge the very legitimacy of colonial rule became increasingly rare in the 
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1980s.145 So why does the student movement during the 1970s still matter? Firstly, it was a 
training ground for future Hong Kong leaders. Albert Ho represents a prominent example in 
this regard. Just as important was that the Hong Kong student movement did make the city a 
better place, as it would be difficult to imagine the establishment of the ICAC without the 
involvement of student protestors in the Anti-Corruption Campaign.  
Concluding Remarks 
While the pro-PRC faction did not make everyone in Hong Kong Beijing loyalists, its 
activists arguably demystified the mainland, making it easier for people to see it as a potential 
destination for investment in the Deng era. While not all Hong Kong Chinese were enthusiastic 
about the PRC, the popularity of the China Week at least demonstrates that men and women of 
the city were willing to learn about internal developments within mainland China and that 
efforts to create a positive image of Beijing among the local population did not contradict Hong 
Kong’s unwritten moral code. Intentionally or not, the pro-PRC faction did establish a social 
network, through its partisans and supporting institutions, that served as a point of linkage 
between the city and mainland China.  As stated by Jasper Tsang,  while he was effectively 
abandoned by his high school and university friends upon becoming obvious that he was a PRC 
supporter, figures from his past began to approach him again after the commencement of the 
economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, as it was obvious that mainland China would 
be full of economic opportunities in the post-Gang of Four era, and prospective investors would 
need someone like Tsang to provide guidance on how to conduct business there.146 Indeed, it 
was now clear to all observers that economic interactions between Hong Kong and mainland 
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China would intensify.147 By 1979, it also was obvious that a new era was dawning in Hong 
Kong. Many who were involved in the student movement were now emerging as successful 
figures in Hong Kong society. The stage was set for those who played influential roles in Hong 
Kong’s student movement to utilise the skills they had acquired when they were activists to 
become public figures in debates concerning the colony’s future. 
 Without ever intending to do so, the pro-PRC faction in the student movement 
significantly strengthened an already growing sense of belonging in Hong Kong. This 
particular development, while surprisingly, should not be seen as entirely unexpected. In the 
struggle within the student movement between those who were sympathetic to Hong Kong and 
those who were stridently loyal to the PRC, partisans of Hong Kong enjoyed a distinct 
advantage, as the very controversy concerning whether the city was deserving of emotional 
attachment represented a recognition that the colony as a polity was distinct from the PRC, as, 
unlike any other cities in South China, its proper status was a source of contention among 
student politicians of different political persuasion. To adopt a sport motif, activists like Ho 
enjoyed a kind of ‘home court advantage’ in the 1970s, as his actions could directly impact 
those residing in Hong Kong.  
 While activists who saw Hong Kong as the principal focus of their political allegiance 
could be seen as victors in the 1970s student movement, the defeat of the pro-PRC faction was 
by no means total. Indeed, many activists from the pro-PRC side emerged as successful 
professionals and opinion makers in the colony. The collective personal successes of prominent 
members of the pro-PRC faction, their various activities in promoting emotional attraction to 
the PRC, and Deng’s economic reforms all ensured that when the 1980s arrived, almost the 
majority of the population in Hong Kong was willing to, at minimum, see mainland China as 
a potential destination for their investment, a dramatic turnaround from how the PRC was 
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perceived in 1967. Indeed, by the 1980s, even Ho was making regular trips to Shenzen to train 
PRC officials.148 Activists like Ho did not deal a death blow to the pro-Beijing faction, most 
likely because they didn’t want to, and it is difficult to imagine them being able to pull off such 
a measure even if there existed the political will. The political dramas of 1970s ended with both 
sides ready to resume their conflicts when negotiations concerning Hong Kong’s future came 
to the forefront during the sunset era of colonial rule.  
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Chapter Four – Protests, Constitutional Reforms, and Consolidation of a Hong Kong 
Identity: The Politics of Mobilisations during the Sunset Period of Colonial Rule  
     
Introduction 
Martin Lee was never particularly interested in politics. When his eventual successor 
as leader of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong, Albert Ho, was commencing his career as a 
student activist, Lee was busy saving money to study law in London, a career path that would 
see him rising to the top of the legal profession in Hong Kong. Given that by the 1980s, Lee 
had a thriving legal practice, there was no incentive for him to enter politics. He likely found 
politics distasteful anyway; according to him, Zhou Enlai’s determined effort to recruit his 
father, KMT Lieutenant-General Lee Yin-wo, a personal obsession of the Chinese prime 
minister that began when he met the elder Lee while studying in Lyons, forced the Lee family 
to move several times to escape the recruitment efforts of the CCP.1 Lee’s non-involvement in 
politics during the earlier period of his life contrasted strongly with the ways in which he 
wholeheartedly throw himself into the local political scenes during the sunset period of colonial 
rule. In a way, Lee’s metamorphosis strongly mirrored how the men and women of Hong Kong, 
seemingly overnight, became politically engaged after years of societal peace from the 1970s 
to the 1980s.  
This chapter will examine how the British and local administrators were able to 
establish such a well-functioning colonial administration that the PRC was determined to 
inherit en tout after Beijing’s reassumption of sovereignty in 1997. Recognising the PRC’s 
intentions, the British quickly abandoned the efforts to liberalise Hong Kong before 1997, the 
protestations of local activists notwithstanding. The efforts to deny liberal constitutional 
governance to those residing in Hong Kong would have been successfully had it not been the 
outbreak of earthshaking political events before the end of the colonial era that deeply strained 
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the relationship between the city and its future sovereign power. The final decade of colonial 
rule witnessed mass protests and the emergence of partisan politics in Hong Kong, two 
developments that rendered irrelevant Beijing’s plan to inherit an apolitical city in 1997. The 
refusal of the majority of the Hong Kong population to accept that the post-1997 political 
system should be the carbon copy of the British colonial regime, the shock created by the 
political disturbances within the PRC that motivated an impressively large number of residents 
to participate in protest marches, and the rise of a confrontational brand of politics that made 
clear that politicians with public support could conceivably challenge both the British and 
Beijing all demonstrate that by the end of colonial rule, the people of Hong Kong possessed a 
sense of local identity, one that often motivated them to confront their current as well as future 
sovereign power.    
Theoretical Framework  
It is worthwhile to take a deeper look into the theoretical case presented by Crawford 
Young regarding how colonial administrators constructed what they perceived to be ideal 
governing machineries most able to enhance the living standards of the native population. 
‘Rational, prudent management of the colonial estates by a professional cadre of administrator’ 
enabled the  colonial state to be seen as legitimate when it was being challenged by a growing 
local bourgeoisie the members of which were well-schooled in the political discourses of their 
colonisers, thereby most able to expose colonial hypocrisies.2 Clear, efficient governance had 
to be complemented by a nascent welfare state, one that improved the ‘life chances’ of the 
subject population.3 Through the implementation of efficient governance, the effectiveness of 
was enhanced by its providence of social welfare to those under its charge, the colonial state 
aimed to not only outmanoeuvre the educated native elites who were becoming less and less 
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enamoured with colonialism, but also to secure the loyalty of lower class colonial subjects, 
whose allegiance to their colonisers would become the bedrock of political stability.  
In addition to seeing Hong Kong as a well-functioned colonial state with a population 
that was seen as satisfied with British rule, Beijing viewed Hong Kong as a city that was devoid 
of history and the primary utility of which was the creation of wealth for its sovereign power. 
It would therefore be useful to give a summary of the theory introduced by Henri Lefebvre on 
power, politics, and the occupation of space. Instead of seeing space as a neutral property, 
Lefebvre saw it as something that was infused by the dominant ideology of a specific era. In a 
capitalist society, space was arranged in such a way that would ensure the maximisation of 
profit. At the same time, the capitalist arrangement of space is often presented as natural, 
something that should not be questioned. In this way, capitalism, and its adherents’ 
arrangement of space, create a singular mode of life, one that was wholly unnatural but was 
nonetheless seen as regular and unexceptional. 4   The ‘representations of space’, which 
Lefebvre understood to be how planners, architects and other bureaucrats with power over their 
societies conceived and conceptualised the space around them, would, in a capitalist system, 
concentrate overwhelming on the production of ‘abstract space’, spatial region that was 
presented as having no prior history and the sole purpose of which was to generate wealth.5 In 
this power dynamitic, ‘spaces of representation’, which Lefebvre identified as the spaces of 
everyday existences, were transformed by the dominant societal ideology into abstract space 
through the alteration of  ‘spatial practices’, which was how members of a society utilised the 
spaces they had around them.6 
Protests during the final years of colonial rule could be seen as spatial practices utilised 
by an engaged population to prevent Beijing from transforming Hong Kong into an abstract 
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space governed by an unreformed colonial state. The mobilisation efforts in the late 1980s and 
1990s were aimed at the transformation of Hong Kong’s constitutional structure the 
significance of which stemmed from the fact that they were participated by a record number of 
Hong Kong Chinese. While a reformed and liberalised Hong Kong was the aim of the 
protestors, as this chapter will go on to demonstrate, protests in Hong Kong from 1980s 
onwards increasingly focused not only on the achievement of a defined objective, but also on 
the ‘legitimation’ and ‘expression’ of a collective identity.7  A collective determination to 
prevent the transformation of Hong Kong into an abstract space was the foundation upon which 
a local identity became consolidated.    
Colonial Governance of Hong Kong during the Sunset Period of Colonial Rule  
While he was responsible for reforms in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 riots that 
witnessed the introduction of the City District Officer (CDO), the chief purpose of which was 
the improvement of communication between the urban population and the colonial 
administration, by the end of David Trench’s mandate (1964-1971), many in the city were still 
unsatisfied with the social conditions they encountered in Hong Kong.8 It is not surprising that 
Trench’s successor, Sir Murray MacLehose (1971-82) was confronted with an enormous 
political crisis, almost as soon as he came into office. Initially sceptical of the need to carry out 
a widespread anti-corruption campaign, in spite of the fact that his predecessor, to his credit, 
actually set up a commission to investigate graft in Hong Kong almost immediately after the 
1966 riots, MacLehose went as far as to convey to local prominent journalists that ‘the Chinese 
community was not interested in getting rid of corruption’.9 The escape of Peter Godber, a 
high-ranking police officer suspected of corruption led to such an outpouring of condemnation 
against official corruption that MacLehose had to overcome his initial reluctance and take 
                                                          
7 Calhoun, ‘The Problem of Identity’, p. 52.  
8 Tsang, Modern History, p. 190. 
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dramatic actions.10 Displaying ‘a keen instinct for political survival’, MacLehose called for the 
establishment of the ICAC in 1973 in order to damper public anger.11 As described by Elsie 
Tu, before the Godber case, ‘informers on corruption are treated as liars, their evidence is 
discarded, and they are intimidated’.12 Not surprisingly, ‘in the local Chinese community there 
existed a widespread and well-entrenched idea that the colonial government was corrupt from 
the bottom right up to the very top’.13 The fact that Sir Jack Cater, who was appointed to be the 
inaugural director of the ICAC due mostly to his leadership skills demonstrated in counterriot 
efforts in 1967, carried out the initial anti-corruption campaign with almost an religious zeal 
did much to convince that public that the new governor was not merely interested in ‘swat the 
flies’ while not catching ‘the tiger’.14 While by 1977, the colonial government did became 
unnerved when a full scale revolt mounted by policemen suspected of corruption became a 
distinct possibility, and MacLehose relented by issuing ‘a general amnesty of doubtful legality’ 
that promised besides ‘heinous’ cases, there would be no new investigations against suspected 
corrupted officials, it was clear to the public that by then ‘honest administration had become 
part of the civil service culture’.15 While the anti-corruption campaign did not persecute all 
corrupted officials, it did establish that members of the MacLehose administration as ‘skilled 
practitioners in the reason of colonial state’ who could manage Hong Kong with a high degree 
of efficiency, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the British rule in the eyes of the general 
public.16  
In addition to the establishment of the ICAC, another pillar of policy achievement, that 
over time, cemented MacLehose’s reputation as one of the best rulers in the history of British 
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Hong Kong, was another policy initiative that further expanded public housing in the city. Just 
like the anti-corruption campaign, the successful implementation of MacLehose’s housing 
policy was assisted greatly by the efforts of his predecessor, who, in 1969, boasted that about 
‘one third of the population [were residing in] publicly provided homes’, and that his 
administration planned to ‘accommodate a further 830,000 between 1968 and 1974’.17 Trench, 
however, lacked MacLehose’s flair for the dramatic, and it was the latter’s  ‘high-profile 
approach that caught the imagination of the local Chinese’.18 Aiming to ‘take determined action 
over a considerable period’ over a ten year period from 1972 to 1982, the stated objective of 
MacLehose’s plan was to build 180, 000 housing units to house 1. 8 million persons per year, 
a policy goal that would be assisted by the efforts of private developers as well.19 MacLehose 
proudly proclaimed that ‘[s]uch a target, if achieved, would lead to the virtual disappearance 
of squatter areas, eliminate overcrowding and sharing in both private and public housing, 
and…would also keep pace with the natural expansion of the population’.20 By 1983, more 
than 40% of the Hong Kong population was residing in public housing.21 
While MacLehose also introduced a public assistance scheme and universal education 
for nine years, as well as investment in social welfare and transportation, the Ten Years 
Housing Scheme was definitely the flagship social program during an era when the Hong Kong 
public found its governor and his administration to be ‘too good to be true’.22 The massive 
improvement in social welfare, in combination with the success of the ICAC, led Steve Tsang 
to conclude that by around 1980, ‘the British colonial government of Hong Kong’ had ‘reached 
the best standards of government practicable in the traditional expectations of the Chinese’.23 
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According to Tsang, the Chinese expectations of being left alone by their rulers, who would 
nevertheless provide honest and efficient governance, were fulfilled by the British.24 Careful 
readers would notice that ‘the best possible government in the Chinese political tradition’ 
closely reassembles the ideal colonial state as described by Crawford Young, as both modes of 
governance would provide a degree of social welfare to the general population, the members 
of which would largely be left alone by rulers who, while almost totally unaccountable to those 
they ruled, were supposedly able to provide sound and efficient administration.25 To his credit, 
Tsang recognised that by the 1980, irrespective of how British colonial officials were able to 
abide by ‘the standard[s] of the ideal government in the Chinese tradition’, colonialism had by 
then become ‘a nasty word’.26 A colonial government, even one able to conform to ancient 
Chinese political tradition, should not exercise dictatorial power over a Chinese population; 
budding democrats such as Martin Lee would agree with this statement, and  for completely 
different reasons, so would the CCP.  
The Opening Salvo of the Sino-British Negotiations 
 Besides ensuring the acquiescence of the local population, British insistence on good 
governance was no doubt inspired by the conviction that a well-functioning Hong Kong would 
deprive the CCP a reason to encroach on local affairs, and that when the time came that London 
had to engage with the PRC on the question of transfer of sovereignty, especially when the 
expiration of the ninety-nine year lease on the New Territories was fast approaching, Beijing 
would insist on minimum change to Hong Kong’s way of life.27 Indeed, since the 1967 riots, it 
was assumed that by ruling Hong Kong with such an efficiency that its economic usefulness to 
the PRC would be maintained, Britain would be able to preserve a degree a leverage when the 
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need for formal negotiation arose.28 By 1979, Hong Kong was already an engine for economic 
changes for the PRC during the reform era launched by Deng Xiaoping. 29  Specifically 
concerning southern China, the rapid development of Guangdong in the 1980s would not have 
been possible in the absence of Hong Kong as a role model to emulate, a partner in economic 
as well as infrastructure development, and a financial centre from which potential investors 
and capitals could be obtained.30 A highly competent local administration, one that would 
greatly improve local living standards, would also reveal British commitment to remain in 
Hong Kong for the long haul, a stance that was deemed vital to continued British rule.31  
 With the expectation that given its economic importance to the PRC and the capacity 
of the local administration to effectively govern the city, the PRC leadership would be willing 
to allow the British to continue to rule Hong Kong post-1997, MacLehose departed for Beijing 
in 1979 to informally begin discussion over the colony’s future. By then, with only eighteen 
years before 1997, there were already significant concerns within the business community 
regarding potential instability when the New Territories lease expired.32 The decision to begin 
discussion with the PRC leadership, and doing so in an informal manner, was consistent with 
the British government’s internal policy stance that talks had to begin when the local economy 
was booming, and that reaching an informal understanding with a Chinese leader in control of 
a moderate regime, a description that fitted Deng, would be most advantageous to both Hong 
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Kong and Britain.33 To the shock of the governor, Deng, while asking the British to put 
investors’ heart at ease, was absolutely determined to reclaim Hong Kong, a policy stance that 
the British side would later attempt to obscurate. 34  British efforts at obscuration was so 
successful that when Martin Lee was unexpectedly invited to have an informal discussion on 
Hong Kong’s future while he was in Beijing on a business trip in 1981, he was shocked to 
discover the CCP leadership’s determination to reclaim Hong Kong.35  
Lee’s meeting with CCP cadres, Li Kan and Lu Ping, both members of the Hong Kong 
Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), had to be extremely unnerving, as he was meeting prominent 
politicians for the first time.36 While Lee was probably too shocked to examine the thinking 
behind these two Chinese officials’ tough stance, their conversation did leave some clues on 
how the CCP wanted to govern Hong Kong and shape its ruling institutions. When Lee 
questioned whether Hong Kong could preserve its prosperity after a Chinese takeover, Li 
retorted that if Chinese in Singapore could rule the city-state effectively, then so could the CCP 
and its Hong Kong supporters.37 Even then, the Beijing leadership was determined to put at 
ease the troubled minds of potential and actual investors with business interests in Hong Kong, 
and it was to this end that the team of cadres that met with Lee proclaimed that the Chinese 
leadership wanted to alter two things after 1997: The flag and the governor. Essentially, the 
Union Jack would be replaced by the Chinese flag, and the governor would be a Chinese from 
Hong Kong. 38  Explicit in this statement was that the CCP would pursue a relatively 
conservative strategy in its recovery of Hong Kong, as its leaders envisioned that post-1997, 
Beijing would inherit a Hong Kong with its classic colonial governing structure intact. 
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Accordingly, while the vaulted One Country, Two Systems formula, a constitutional model 
originally devised for eventual unification with Taiwan, guaranteed a high degree of autonomy 
for regions that the PRC saw as belonging to China proper so that the rule of law, something 
was noticeably absent within the PRC, could continue to function as the bedrock of Hong 
Kong’s capitalist system, there was no question of allowing the colony to be further liberalised 
politically before 1997.39  
The Road to the Sino-British Joint Declaration  
 
When negotiations over Hong Kong’s future began in 1982, the British side, especially 
its leader, Margaret Thatcher, actually entered the talks with a remarkable degree of confidence. 
Originally intended to be a reciprocal visit after then Premier Hua Guofeng’s trip to London in 
1979, Thatcher’s meeting with Chinese leaders in 1982 possessed additional significance as it 
was preceded by conversations between Lord Privy Seal Humphrey Atkins and Prime Minister 
Zhao Ziyang, who once again conveyed the official CCP position that the PRC was determined 
to reclaim Hong Kong, and that PRC leaders were highly confident that the city’s prosperity 
would continue under Chinese sovereignty.40 Even so, Thatcher was highly ebullient, maybe 
overly so, on the eve of the Sino-British negotiations, as she was convinced that her recent 
victory in the Falklands War significantly enhanced her standing and that of Great Britain, 
thereby granting her a greater capacity to extract concessions from the Chinese.41 Arguing that 
‘confidence and prosperity’ of Hong Kong ‘depended on British administration’, Thatcher 
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advocated to Zhao a continued role played by Britain after 1997, an arrangement that she 
believed was the best defence against ‘wholesale flight of capital’.42 
 As soon as Thatcher finished her statement, Zhao countered with an ‘unyielding’ 
prepared statement that clearly expressed the PRC’s absolute determination to recover 
sovereignty in 1997 and that the prosperity of city would be protected by the One Country, 
Two Systems formula.43 According to veteran British diplomat Percy Cradock, the PRC side 
was willing to risk the collapse of Hong Kong to reclaim sovereignty.44 Thatcher’s meeting 
with Deng was even stormier, as he not only reiterated ‘the absolute necessity of recovering 
sovereignty’, but also stated that the PRC reserved the right to unilaterally assume control over 
Hong Kong.45 At one point, Deng even threatened an earlier takeover of Hong Kong should 
negotiations break down.46 At this point, Thatcher made ‘her strongest intervention’ stating 
that ill-considered PRC action would profoundly destabilise Hong Kong, thereby destroying 
the stability of the city, and in the process, ruin the PRC’s international reputation.47 According 
to Thatcher, Deng ‘seemed taken aback’ by her remark, and ‘his mood became more 
accommodating’.48 It was on this basis that both sides issued a short joint statement promising 
the beginning of negotiations to decide the future of Hong Kong.   
Notwithstanding apparent PRC willingness to become more accommodating after the 
clashes between Deng and Thatcher, From October 1982 to June 1983, the British and the CCP 
entered into ‘a Kafkaesque episode’, in which Beijing demanded London to agree to its 
preconditions before the official commencement of the negotiations. In essence, Beijing 
wanted London to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong before the start of the talks. 
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Beijing refused to accept the legitimacy of treaties that transformed Hong Kong into a British 
colony, thereby ignoring an international legal convention that territorial concessions created 
by treaties retained their legal validity until there were new agreements replacing the old ones.49 
The impasse was overcame only when Thatcher made it plain that she ‘would be prepared to 
recommended to Parliament that sovereignty over the whole of Hong Kong should revert to 
China’.50 The term ‘revert’ implied that the Beijing would be resuming sovereignty over a city 
that its leaders considered to have always been a part of China. This ‘fitness’, as it was called 
by Cradock, was interpreted by the Chinese as an indication of ‘the British government’s 
readiness to move towards a transfer of sovereignty and thereby to make a nod in the direction 
of [Beijing’s] premise’. 51  With Beijing assuming that London had ‘accepted [Chinese] 
precondition in disguise’, real negotiations could now begin.52  
One of the primary British objectives entering into the negotiations was the retention 
of London’s ability to continue to administrate Hong Kong, while sovereignty would rest with 
Beijing.53 Beijing, not incorrectly, argued that it was impossible to separate sovereignty from 
administrative responsibilities and negotiations once again became deadlocked. Responding to 
this diplomatic standoff, in September 1983, Hong Kong’s financial market went into ‘a mild 
panic’, and the Bank of England, the British government, and the Hong Kong government had 
to link the local currency to the US dollar, a move that averted a greater crisis.54 Most likely 
unable to understand the complexities of Hong Kong’s economy, Beijing assumed that the mild 
panic was created by London to put pressure on the PRC to extract concession. The PRC 
government declared that if a deal could not be reached within a year, a unilateral solution 
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would be imposed.55 Responding to this threat, London authorised Craddock, who was by then 
the de facto chief British negotiator, to concede that Britain ‘intended no link of authority 
between Britain and Hong Kong after 1997’.56 With this major concession offered by London 
in November 1983, the Sino-British negotiations entered into the last phase and a final 
agreement was within reach.  
With the objective of administrating Hong Kong now abandoned, the British team  
became determined to secure a favourable agreement from Beijing.  According to Craddock, 
the British team was bent on ‘extracting concessions of substance from Peking and enshrining 
them in a binding agreement’.57 London was moderately successfully in drafting, with the 
PRC’s consent, an agreement that would enable Hong Kong to retain its existing political 
system. Worried that Beijing would be able to appoint all senior officials in the post- 1997 
HKSAR that would not be accountable to the public, London successfully argued for the 
insertion of the term ‘accountability’ into the final draft of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 
The British team argued that since the governing team of Hong Kong was already accountable 
to the legislature as expenditure had to be approved by sitting legislators, this particular 
insertion merely confirmed existing practices.58 British officials, however, were not entirely 
successful in extracting as much concessions from CCP officials as possible. Most noticeably, 
Craddock and his team were unable to enshrine in the Joint Declaration that the post-1997 
Legislative Council would be made up of legislators elected by ‘direct geographical election’.59 
At the urging of the PRC team, the phrase ‘direct geographical’ that qualified the noun ‘election’ 
was removed, which was then changed to its plural form ‘elections’.60 It became clear that the 
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PRC was unwilling to entertain the notion of having to rule a Hong Kong that possessed a 
highly liberal political culture. Nevertheless, the Sino-British Joint Declaration that promised 
the creation of a HKSAR government with a high degree of autonomy was agreed upon and 
made public in the autumn of 1984. It was also agreed upon that a Basic Law for the HKSAR, 
essentially the city’s constitution that further entrench the principle of One Country, Two 
Systems as laid out in the Joint Declaration, would be promulgated by the National People's 
Congress, which would be in effect for fifty years.61 
British Attempts at Political Reforms and Continued Confrontations with the PRC 
While the British negotiating team was able to successfully enshrine into the Joint 
Declaration clauses that ensured the preservation of Hong Kong’s colonial administrative 
system, it was likely that Craddock and his colleagues were successful because the PRC was 
not averse to the continuation of an undemocratic political system after 1997. The British 
appeared to be oblivious to the Chinese intention of preserving Hong Kong’s existing political 
structure. Indeed, in 1984, Foreign Office Minister Richard Luce responded to questions about 
reforms in Hong Kong by stating that Britain sought to establish a ‘democratic administration 
in Hong Kong in the years between now and 1997’.62 It was in this spirit that months before 
the Joint Declaration was signed, the government of Hong Kong published a White Paper and 
a Green Paper in 1984, proclaiming that the British aimed to reform local governing 
machineries, most noticeably be Legislative Council, so that they would be would be ‘more 
accountable to the people of Hong Kong’.63 The principal reforms dealt with the Legislative 
Council, where twenty-four members were to be chosen for the first time by elections within 
functional constituencies, the electors of which would be made up of members drawn from 
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professional groups.64 The composition of the Legislative Council would also increase from 
forty-six to fifty-six in 1985.65  The White Paper featured a promise that in 1987 there would 
be a review concerning the possible introduction of direct Legislative Council elections in 
Hong Kong in the near future.66   
Given the pace of reforms in Hong Kong, it was unlikely that British governors would 
see their authority challenged by democratically-elected lawmakers before the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1997. Conversely, from the perspective of the CCP, who was fairly paranoid 
concerning potential British attempts to thwart a successful retrocession, all these talks 
concerning political reforms, the consequences of which the colonial administration would 
conveniently escape, likely further fuelled anger. The British misconception that that local 
policymakers could remain in the driver’s seat on policy domains that were sensitive to the 
CCP was dispelled once and for all by when Xu Jiatun, the head of NCNA, angrily proclaimed 
that the Joint Declaration clearly stated that the CCP had to be consulted before major 
constitutional changes, thereby making British unliteral attempt to introduce political changes 
a violation of the Sino-British agreement.67    
It now became clear that the PRC saw itself as the principal political force in Hong 
Kong, especially since the Joint Declaration confirmed that London would play no further role 
in the city’s affairs post-1997. As the date of retrocession drew closer, it was inevitable that 
London’s power to influence events in Hong Kong would diminish, especially if the PRC was 
determined to thwart political changes that were viewed as detrimental to Beijing’s interests. 
As stated by Chris Patten, one of the failure on the British side was the inability to establish 
some kind of arbitration system that would ensure the proper implementation of the Joint 
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Declaration.68 Therefore, whenever there arose a contradictory view on whether one side was 
violating the Joint Declaration, the party that was more powerful would inevitably win. In this 
way, when the PRC vehemently protested a British proposal, London had to back down 
because the rapid decline of its power to affect political changes in Hong Kong. Beijing 
publicly proclaimed that all political changes before 1997 had to conform to the Basic Law, 
the draft of which had barely begun. As Beijing envisioned that its sympathisers would 
dominate the drafting process of the Basic Law, the PRC effectively gave itself a veto over 
future constitutional reforms in Hong Kong. 69  With 1997 soon approaching, it became 
increasingly obvious that Beijing was fast emerging as the preeminent power in Hong Kong.  
The 1984 White Paper promised that there would be a public consultation in 1987 on 
the possibility of introducing direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988.70 Knowing 
that to ignore or break this promise would likely destroy the credibility of his administration, 
Governor Edward Youde decided that he had no choice but to conduct some kind of public 
exercise so that a commitment previously made could be fulfilled; at the same time, a poll 
would likely reveal public desire for the introduction of a degree of representative governance 
to Hong Kong, a development that would be embarrassing to the British, as it could not 
contradict the PRC’s objective of preserving the local political system before 1997.71 In the 
end, upon the release of a highly problematic poll containing a serious of overly long questions 
the sole purpose of which was to produce a ‘no’ answer, the government determined that those 
residing in Hong Kong ‘continued to be in favour of retaining the functional constituencies as 
a system for selecting members of the Legislative Council’.72 Almost three decades later, 
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Martin Lee still bristled at the dishonesty of the government, as in addition to the almost 
incomprehensibly long questions in both English and Chinese, the respondents were given the 
opinions of picking which years (1988, 1991, 1994, or 1997) direct elections should be 
introduced to the Legislative Council, thereby diluting the level of support shown by those who 
were in favour of greater level of democracy in 1988.73 The Hong Kong government had 
committed a blatant act of dishonesty that could justifiably be criticised, or even attacked; the 
question remained: Would the public be angry enough to mobilise against politically against 
the Youde administration? 
While there were clearly people outraged by the flagrant dishonesty of the colonial 
administration, they were unable to intimidate the government into changing its policies 
regarding constitutional changes. While many in Hong Kong was moderately impressed by the 
fact that around 500 people gathered outside of the Government House in February 1988 to 
protest the decision of the government to, based on the recently conducted public opinion 
survey, shelve any reform proposals, the Youde administration simply ignored it.74 Lee did 
attempt to begin another round of debate concerning the necessity of constitutional reforms on 
the floor of the Legislative Council; he was, however, mocked by his opponents for being too 
out of touch with the daily life of ordinary residents. When Lee, paraphrasing Hamlet, 
proclaimed that the government’s ‘caution (emphasis in the original) doth make cowards’ of 
government  functionaries to enact reforms, Selina Chow, a legislator appointed by the 
government, mocked her opponent for  ‘associat[ing] his call for direct elections, in 1988 with 
almost any subject we happen to discuss in this Council’.75 She even called Lee’s criticisms of 
the government ‘negative and emotional’.76  Lacking a popular support base, Lee seemed 
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destined to be a sort of Don Quixote, forever engaging in a quest for local reforms that not 
many people actually cared nor understood.  
Everyday Life in Hong Kong during the 1980s 
At this point of the inquiry, it is now time to take a detour from high politics and 
academic theories so that the readers can get a better sense of everyday life in Hong Kong as 
1988 was coming to a close. The emigration wave that would further accelerate after the 1989 
tragedy was already gaining stream a couple of years prior.  In May 1988, it was established 
by the British government that from 1981 to 1986, about 20,000 persons left the territory 
annually. In 1987, the figure increased to 30,000; and in 1988, it was 45,000.77 At the same 
time, while there were indeed a sense of fear and apprehension, in many ways, life in Hong 
Kong simply continued as before. Housewife Chen Qiong Xian (陳瓊賢) was initially planning 
to emigrate, but after a while, she simply decided to stay in the city. After all, her entire life 
was in Hong Kong, the decision of her daughter to immigrate to Canada with her boyfriend 
notwithstanding.78 Having survived the 1967 riots, Chen’s assumption was likely that things 
could not get much worse than what had transpired that year, and having already experienced 
the most dangerous moment in the history of Hong Kong, there was really nothing to fear after 
that.79 In many ways, Hong Kong simply went on as before, as there were no other choices. A 
young salesman working in the city at the time astutely stated that many people just did not 
have sufficient resources to finance a move to another country.80 In this way, they simply had 
to make the best out of a very uncertain situation, and many decided that the best course of 
action was to make as much money as possible. Accordingly, Kitty Shum Ka-dik, a high school 
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student in 1988, proclaimed that she had little interest in politics, and her top priority was to 
ensure ‘money would get into [her] pocket’.81  
What could be surprising to current observers is that while there existed a certain degree 
of condescension among Hong Kong residents when discussing internal developments within 
China, and one interviewee even claimed that when it was ‘possible that China may develop 
as Hong Kong did, but it will surely take a long time’, there was a marked lack of hostility 
towards the PRC, a somewhat surprising development given that the 1967 riots nearly 
eradicated colonial rule occurred only twenty-one years prior.82 There was certainly a degree 
of distrust towards Beijing, a sentiment that coexisted with a healthy dose of admiration for 
Deng Xiaoping, as he was seen by many as a ‘very open minded person, and a wise 
politician’.83 What is even more surprising was the total lack of animosity towards the British 
at the colonial era was coming to a close, indicating that British rule, by eradicating corruption, 
and creating the conditions for sustained economic growth, thereby enhancing the local living 
standards, had, in the eyes of Hong Kong Chinese, became at least acceptable. With an 
adequate colonial master soon to be replaced by a sovereign power that was on its way to 
becoming internationally respectable, it appears that the men and women of Hong Kong were 
resigned to the fact that they could not control their own political destiny.      
The 1989 Incident and Its Impact on Hong Kong 
 As 1988 came to a close, its seems that the two ingredients that were vital to past 
successful popular mobilisations, a belief that the city’s unwritten moral code was being 
violated, and the activation of a Chinese nationalism that transcended partisan allegiance but 
instead found its expression through admiration of Chinese culture and defence of China 
against a perceived enemy of the Chinese people, were absent in Hong Kong. Then, in the 
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summer of 1989, everything changed. The passing of CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang,a 
Chinese politician universally admired for his personal integrity, led to an outpouring of grief, 
most noticeably among students attending universities in or outside of Beijing.84 A effort to 
commemorate a respected public figure quickly became very worrisome for the CCP leadership, 
as public remembrance of a leader possessing a high degree of moral integrity was rapidly 
transmuting into an explicit criticism of current socioeconomic conditions. Before long, called 
for reforms emerged in the Chinese capital.85 Never mind  that many of the student activists 
involved were ‘distinctly lukewarm about the idea of giving the vote to the country’s 
uneducated masses’, or the willingness of some of their leaders to enjoy full meals while 
supposedly on hungry strikes, what was transpiring in Beijing captured the world’s imagination 
in the summer of 1989, and many in Hong Kong can’t help but be supportive of their 
compatriots, who were seemingly fighting for values that the majority of the city found 
attractive.86  
In stark contrast to the mockery levelled at Martin Lee when he was attempting to 
discuss constitutional reforms, there came to be a sense of excitement among the normally 
docile legislative councillors, who suddenly lost interest in bread and butter issues and became 
consumed with the dramas that were unfolding in Beijing.  Legislative Councillor Donald 
Chow Mei-Tak even proudly proclaimed that in the past, a rally “with an attendance of over a 
thousand [was] considered to be of a very large scale.”87 Before and after the Tiananmen 
Square incident, tens of thousands of people attended multiple rallies and marches in support 
of reforms in the PRC.88 Chan Ying-lun, again, a legislative councillor not known for his liberal 
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politics, made a speech in the legislature stating that ‘after witnessing the two spontaneous 
protest marches of one million people which took place one after the other in Hong Kong’, he 
became more ‘confident that no matter how capricious the political situation in China may be, 
Hong Kong people will, at the critical moment, put aside their differences and voice their views 
in unity’.89 Even normally apolitical Cantonese popstars became involved, as on 27 May 1989, 
over 150 entertainers held a fundraising concert to raise money for the students in Beijing that 
collected over U.S$ 1.5 million (the equivalent  of U.S$ 2.87 million in 2015) .90  
Given the degree to much Hong Kong Chinese became involved with the political 
developments within the PRC, it should surprise no one that when words reached the colony 
that a crackdown had begun, the city demonstrated a level of public grief that was 
unprecedented. The memoirs of Xu Jiatun dispelled any doubt the negative effects the 
Tiananmen Square incident had on China-Hong Kong relations. While asserting that many in 
the colony were disappointed in the events that had transpired in Beijing, Xu claimed that 
those in the city who participated in the popular mobilisations before and after the Tiananmen 
Square incident were prominently motivated by a sense of patriotism, love of China, and 
frustration with the various inadequacies of the ruling party in power.91 In formulating an 
argument that love and admiration for China would inevitably encompass criticisms of the 
political party currently in power, Xu was echoing Hong Kong residents’ sentiment that their 
Chinese nationalism was not based upon loyalty to the CCP party-state, but on allegiance to 
their ancestral homeland and the Chinese civilizational and historical legacies that went far 
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beyond Beijing’s assumption that Chinese in and outside of China should be loyal to the regime 
in power.  
Another prominent theme that stood out in Xu’s memoir was and the degree to which 
the men and women of the city came to view the CCP with a sense of suspicion. With a 
prominent financier who was a leading university activist within the pro-PRC faction worked 
actively to attempt to use all means at his disposal to destroy PRC state-owned financial 
institutions in Hong Kong, it could safely be assumed that the reputation of the CCP was at an 
all-time low. 92  Indeed, within the walls of NCNA, there were even signature collection 
campaigns in support of the Beijing student movement.93 In the ‘politics of reputation…a good 
name is conferred in exchange for adherence to a certain code of conduct’.94  The actions of 
the CCP leadership were clearly seen as unacceptable to many in Hong Kong. The fear, of 
course, was that the CCP would similarly mistreat the Hong Kong population after the transfer 
of sovereignty in 1997. According to Scott, even an unequal relationship, the ‘moral standing’ 
of the strong party would be ‘contingent on how closely would-be patrons conforms to the 
moral expectations of’ its inferiors.95 In this way, when the expectations that the PRC would 
be more modernised and even liberalised politically were seemingly dashed, the public image 
of the CCP suffered greatly as the result.    
Given Hong Kong’s active support towards the student movement, it was only natural 
for the CCP to see constitutional reforms in Hong Kong as a threat. Indeed, Steve Tsang even 
went as far as to claim that Hong Kong supporters of the student movement in Beijing, in the 
euphoria of the movement, overlooked some of the obvious flaws of the student leaders, 
including their willingness to assume an overtly confrontational stance that was highly 
                                                          
92 Xu，Xu jiayun xianggang huiyilu, p. 382.  
93 Xu，Xu jiayun xianggang huiyilu, p. 387. 
94 Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, eds, Hong Kong Remembers (Hong Kong ; New York : Oxford University 
Press 1996), p. 214; Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 185 
95 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven : 
Yale University Press 1976),  p. 170. 
187 
 
provocative to the hardliners within the CCP government.96 What was even  more dangerous 
for Hong Kong, according to Steve Tsang, was that local supporters of the student movement 
in Beijing was overlooking the reciprocal principle that was fundamental to the endurance of 
the One Country, Two Systems formula: If Beijing would leave Hong Kong alone, then 
residents of the city should not interfere in the internal politics of the PRC.97 Indeed, ‘self-
interest should have encouraged the people of Hong Kong to insulate themselves from volatile 
PRC politics to avoid provoking the wrath of big brother’.98 After the summer of 1989, ‘the 
people of Hong Kong were far too emotionally involved’ to conduct politics in a manner that 
could have calmed the fears of the party-state.99 
Protest Politics in Hong Kong During the Sunset Period of Colonial Rule  
It is not difficult to apply Lefebvre’s theories concerning space to the political 
circumstances of Hong Kong during the sunset period of colonial rule. After all, the PRC’s 
determination to inherit the British colonial state could be seen as a demonstration of the 
Beijing leadership’s explicit goal of transforming Hong Kong into a city made up almost 
entirely of abstract space, meaning that the sole purpose of the post-1997 HKSAR would be to 
generate wealth for Beijing. If Beijing was keen on using Hong Kong as one of the engines for 
the PRC’s economic modernisation, its leaders were equally adamant that Chinese in the city 
lacked a distinct identity. According to Chris Patten, Beijing ‘furiously contested the notion 
that there was a polity entity called Hong Kong that could be represented in’ Sino-British 
negotiations.100 A geopolitical entity lacking an identity was necessarily one that was also 
missing a past. In this way, the PRC was not only subscribing to the (untrue) conventional 
wisdom that Hong Kong was merely a ‘borrowed place’ on ‘borrowed time’, but also Chinese 
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leaders were actively promoting the absence of a distinctive Hong Kong identity or history to 
legitimise its promotion of the city as an exclusively economic entity that was not suited for 
liberal political reforms.   
 Beijing’s Hong Kong policies centred on inheriting in totality the city’s colonial 
political structure, a plan that would have succeeded had it not been the popular mobilisations 
that erupted in Hong Kong during the final period of colonial rule. The transformation of Hong 
Kong into an apolitical economic city was dependent upon the absence of local constitutional 
reforms, a political reality the overturning of which became the principal focus of protestors 
that became highly active during and after 1989. The plan of the CCP to essentially inherit the 
classic colonial state that was created by the British was torn asunder in 1989, as a new group 
of political activists emerged to challenge not just Beijing, but Britain as well. It was generally 
believed that Hong Kong needed a strong defence mechanism against possible violation of the 
One Country, Two Systems principle that was promised by Beijing. According to Legislative 
Councillor Poon Chi-fai, given that the British government had already refused to grant the 
right of abode to its subjects in Hong Kong, thereby not giving them ‘an escape hatch’, then  
‘in order to pacify the discontent of the Hong Kong people’, the British Government had to 
‘vigorously’ push for political reforms in Hong Kong as ‘a substitute for the right of abode in 
the United Kingdom’.101 Selina Chow, the legislative councillor who mocked Martin Lee for 
being too emotional when he was pleading for political reforms, was by 1989, broadcasting her 
‘fear of the loss of freedom to our children, fear of the breakdown of the value systems that we 
have taken for granted’.102 The establishment of a Legislative Council in which all members 
would be elected by residents of the city was seen as the best method to defend Hong Kong’s 
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interests after 1997.103 The fact that Beijing was against constitutional reforms was largely 
ignored by local activists. If the CCP was seen as untrustworthy and the British were unwilling 
and unable to be the city’s protector after 1997, then building upon the unwritten moral code 
that concentrated on the perseveration of the collective interests of the Hong Kong population, 
many Hong Kong Chinese were convinced that they had to support constitutional reforms to 
protect the welfare of their home after 1997.104  
Protests became a primary tool with which the Hong Kong population attempted to 
extract concessions from Britain and the PRC. In this effort, speechifying in the Legislative 
Council was complemented by large scale popular mobilisations the likes of which had never 
been seen before in the history of Hong Kong. On June 4th, 1989, when reports reached the city 
that troops had moved into Tiananmen Square, an estimated crowd of 200,000 gathered at the 
Happy Valley Race Course to protest this course of action.105 On June 5th, 1989, 1 million Hong 
Kong Chinese participated in a protest to demonstrate their support for liberal reforms within 
the PRC, an astonishing number, given that the total population of Hong Kong at the time was 
5.7 million.106  Protests before, during, and after the summer of 1989 that often took place in 
some of Hong Kong’s busiest intersections became increasingly focused on the attainment of 
local constitutional reforms. As protests became increasingly confrontational, as it was clear 
that their participants were highly dissatisfied with the proposed post-1997 political 
arrangement, especially if there appeared to be insufficient protection for the stability and 
prosperity of the city. As noted by Steve Tsang, there were even voices advocating for the 
abolition or revision of the Joint Declaration, as the Sino-British agreement lacked a 
sufficiently strong guarantee promising the eventual establishment of a liberal political 
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structure.107 To utilise the Lefebvrian analytical framework, by engaging in popular protests 
the scale of which was unprecedented in the history of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Chinese were 
recontextualising how they viewed and utilised space. The urban designs of Hong Kong might 
have been devised by technocrats whose representations of space focused primarily on profit 
maximisation; by 1989, Hong Kong’s spaces of representation and spatial practices were 
altered, as protestors in Hong Kong were transforming space, and their occupation of it, into 
powerful political tools the chief utility of which was to voice the local population’s discontent 
and exert pressure on the city’s current and future sovereign powers. Marches that occupied 
Hong Kong’s busiest streets almost became routine, and in stark contrast to previous 
mobilisation efforts, protests during the final years of colonial rule were participated by a 
record number of Hong Kong Chinese, a turn of events that gave birth to the colony’s ‘culture 
of protest’.108 
That the PRC was almost able to succeed in its efforts to inherit a largely unreformed 
colonial state was not only due to Britain’s grudging acquiescence, but also due to the inability 
of local political activists to garner the necessary public support to force the hands of Beijing 
and London. This, of course, all changed in 1989, and protests that took place in the summer 
of that year were remarkably bipartisan, as forces at opposite sides of the political spectrum 
found themselves literally matching side by side. Still somewhat surprised all these years later, 
Martin Lee recounted with a degree of astonishment that at one point, he was marching with 
Jasper Tsang, Tam Yiu-chung and Gary Cheng Kai-nam, all prominent PRC supporters who 
would emerge as Lee’s electoral opponents in the upcoming Legislative Council elections.109 
Past political mobilisations, such as the Baodiao Campaign and the Anti-Corruption Campaign, 
were driven by either Chinese nationalism or a determination to uphold the city’s unwritten 
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moral code; protests that erupted during and after the summer of 1989, however, prominently 
featured both of these two pillars necessary for sustained popular efforts, a key characteristic 
that ensured marches that took place in the final years of colonial rule would be participated by 
a record number of local Chinese. By taking side in a highly contentious conflict within the 
PRC, residents within the city who became politically engaged from 1989 onward were 
demonstrating their commitment to liberal reforms within China, as constitutional changes 
were seen as beneficial to both mainland and Hong Kong Chinese. Indeed, Martin Lee was 
convinced that reforms in Hong Kong would lead to political liberalisation within the PRC, or 
vice versa.110 The fusion of a determination to uphold the city’s unwritten moral code and 
Chinese nationalism was the foundation of popular mobilisations in Hong Kong during the 
final era of colonial rule.  
Protests and marches in Hong Kong in turn consolidated a local identity; in this sense, 
Craig Calhoun was certainly correct to assume that participation in popular mobilisations could 
facilitate the identity formation process of a population.111 As stated by Alvin So, the protest 
movement that emerged in 1989 ‘led to an explosion in Hong Kong’s civil society’, as a large 
segment of the local population became interested in using mobilisations to defend what was 
perceived as the interests of the city.112 The very act of participating in protest marches on 
behalf of Hong Kong helped cemented a local identity, as many Hong Kong Chinese were 
reminded that while ‘they were ethnically Chinese, they did not identify’ politically with the 
PRC due to divergent values held by the CCP leadership and the city’s majority.113 While 
Chinese nationalism and the city’s unwritten moral code served as engines of mobilisations, 
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the interests of Hong Kong increasingly became the prominent political consideration for the 
city’s activists and average residents who participated in protests.   
The Rise of Electoral and Partisan Politics in Hong Kong  
The massive protests that erupted during and after the summer of 1989 allowed the 
British to convinced even the CCP leadership that dramatic gestures to shore up public 
confidence in Hong Kong was necessary. In 1990, the right of abode in the United Kingdom 
was given to 50, 000 Hong Kong families.114 A bill of right was introduced in Hong Kong as 
yet another confidence-boosting measure. 115  More importantly, after rounds of secret 
negotiations, the PRC government agreed to the addition of eighteen directly elected seats to 
the Legislative Council in 1991.116 Percy Craddock, the diplomat who was sent to Beijing to 
negotiate with the PRC, thus secured a major concession from the CCP, as the original draft of 
the Basic Law stated that the Legislative Council in 1997 would only have fifteen directly 
elected seats.117 The post-1997 administration in Hong Kong likely would have to confront 
legislative councillors with a high degree of legitimacy.  
Political parties that were supportive of constitutional reforms won 58.22% of the 
popular vote and fifteen out of the eighteen directly elected seats in the 1991 Legislative 
Council election. 118  All ten candidates from the pro-PRC camp were defeated. 119  The 
conventional wisdom has always been that the electoral results of 1991 confirmed that after 
1989, the CCP and their supporters were seen as untrustworthy by significant segments of the 
local population. As stated by Steve Tsang, the 1991 electoral results ‘dissipated any hope of 
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the Hong Kong people putting the [events of 1989] behind them’.120  While there is no question 
that the electorate ‘had voted against the restoration of the status quo ante’, upon closer 
examination of the results of the 1991 Legislative Council elections, one could discover that 
the Hong Kong public, through still distrustful of the CCP, possessed a pragmatic streak.121 
Years later, when discussing the electoral results of 1991, Jasper Tsang was convinced that 
while pro-PRC candidates were shut out, they were actually able to obtain a fairly high number 
of votes.122 The popular consensus that a pro-Beijing stance was a electoral ‘kiss of death’ 
actually did not capture fully the political reality of Hong Kong in 1991.123  Chan Yuen-han, a 
prominent pro-PRC trade unionist won 44, 894 votes  (22.4% of the popular vote) at the 
Kowloon Central constituency; eventual winner Lau Chin-shek won 68, 484 votes (34.2% of 
the popular vote). 124  Similar electoral results were repeated in other geographical 
constituencies, demonstrating that while there were indeed a tidal wave of anti-Beijing 
legislators coming to the Legislative Council, there also existed voters who were more 
pragmatic, who recognised that a sustained confrontational stance against the CCP was 
detrimental to the future of Hong Kong.125 
If the Hong Kong’s unwritten moral code was established upon the preservation of 
Hong Kong residents’ collective interests, then after the initial anger against the CCP 
dissipated, it would be perfectly reasonable to assume that repeated confrontations against 
China’s ruling party would eventually be harmful to the city. The total dominance of the 
Legislative Council by political parties that were explicitly anti-CCP could not be conductive 
to the successful implementation of the One Country, Two System formula. There was also a 
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resentment among members of the pro-PRC faction against the moral righteousness of 
emerging politicians like Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, who by then were leaders of the United 
Democrats, an explicitly pro-reform party. After all, while Lee was an undergraduate feuding 
with his English professors, Jasper Tsang was publishing anti-British materials. Compared to 
Tsang, Lee was an upstart.126  There had to be resentment concerning the United Democrats’ 
monopolisation of the moral high ground. All these factors led pro-Beijing grandees to plan for 
the formation of a new political party that would present itself as pro-reform and pro-Beijing.127  
There is no doubt that NCNA played a major role in the formation of the Democratic 
Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), the pro-Beijing political party that emerged 
in 1992. There were even strong indication that the CCP's local party organisation, the Hong 
Kong-Macau Work Committee, was strongly involved in the formation of the DAB.128 This 
new political party always appears to be a sort of  Frankenstein monster, as it was an unwieldy 
combination of traditional pro-Beijing unions and white collar middle class elites. 129 
Nevertheless, a sense of loyalty to Beijing, and a conviction that Hong Kong had to be 
pragmatic about its relations with its new sovereign power in 1997,  served to be unifying 
principles of this new party. In the feverish political atmosphere after 1989, the future leaders 
of DAB had to rely on pragmatism and loyalty to Beijing as the lodestars for their actions. 
While Tsang’s capacity to quickly control his emotions after the events of 1989 and work with 
the CCP to construct a new party was dismissed by Martin Lee, his erstwhile rival, as actions 
of a loyal party supporter, an alternative reading could be that it was in the interests of Hong 
Kong to work with, rather than against, Beijing.130 At a time when Beijing’s distrust towards 
Hong Kong and Britain was at an all-time high, there were opened talked about the CCP setting 
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up an alternative administration before 1997.131 Deng even told Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
that ‘if serious trouble arose in Hong Kong during the transitional period, the Chinese 
government would have to reconsider the time and way of recovering Hong Kong’.132 In this 
way, the potential shown by DAB as being a countervailing force against the pro-reform parties 
most likely calmed the nerve of Beijing, and thereby prevented its leaders from taking rash 
actions; for that, men such as Tsang played a key role in preserving the city’s stability.133  
The formation of the DAB would not have been possible in the absence of the pro-PRC 
subsociety (or habitus) that was consolidated during the 1967 riots. Besides Tsang, who was a 
principal of a well-respected pro-PRC school, there were founding members who were 
imprisoned by the British during the 1967 riots, such as Chen Shi Yuan (陳仕源).134 While many 
PRC supporters were no doubt disappointed with Beijing, many did support the founding of 
this new party.135 One of the chief objectives of the DAB was to present a vision of pro-Beijing 
Chinese nationalism that was compatible with the city’s unwritten moral code. Essentially, 
politicians like Jasper Tsang had to convince the electorate that an amicable relationship 
between Hong Kong and Beijing was the best guarantee of the city’s long-term prosperity, 
thereby making it necessary for members of the Hong Kong population to at least acquiesce to 
the geopolitical reality that the CCP was the ruling party of China for the foreseeable future. 
The DAB did not begin, and would not end up, as a doomed political project. While there were 
inevitably setbacks, the party did find eventual success, and it is now the preeminent pro-
Beijing party in Hong Kong, processing significant representations in both the functional and 
geographical constituencies, as well as the district councils.136       
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The proliferation of political parties in Hong Kong, and the backlash against the 
Tiananmen incident, no doubt created a climate of political polarisation that still plagues the 
city to this day. At the same time, the very fact that there were passionate partisans from 
different political camps engaging in often vicious arguments concerning the proper direction 
of the city further demonstrated that Hong Kong was a distinct entity with its own social, 
cultural, economic, and political characteristics that were worth fighting over. As stated by 
Craig Calhoun, strong identity often manifested itself in collective action, and its intensity is 
reinforced when a group was mobilised for the achievement of a particular objective.137 A 
conviction that Hong Kong’s interests had to be defended through popular mobilisation led to 
protests, and while Hong Kong Chinese were marching to defend their collective welfare, it 
further became apparent to them that their city was a distinct entity, as it was the only 
subnational unit in China containing a population a significant segment of which was willing 
and able to engage in mass political actions. Unlike previous struggles within the university 
student movement concerning whether activists should focus more on local affairs or on 
propagation of pro-PRC nationalism, the partisan political conflicts after 1989 were centred on 
to what degree could (or should) Hong Kong defy the PRC, and what kind of distance (if at all) 
should the city keep from Beijing. Instead of a left-right divide, the principal cleavage of 
politics in Hong Kong was centred on what kind of relationship with Beijing would most 
benefit Hong Kong.  In this way, homelandisation had triumphed over mainlandisation, as even 
partisans supportive of Beijing had to calibrate their pro-Beijing message so that closer 
alignment with mainland China was presented as advantageous to the city.  
Concluding Remarks 
 Beijing was determined to inherit an apolitical city containing inhabitants more 
interested in moneymaking than in politicking. Of course, the Beijing leadership did not 
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understand Hong Kong and grossly misread local conditions. The residents of Hong Kong had 
never been politically apathic, and as demonstrated by the various protest marches in the 1970s, 
they were more than willing to actively challenge colonial authorities. There was a period of 
societal peace because the colonial government, through the providence of social welfare, was 
able to significantly defuse social tensions. The misguided belief that the residents of Hong 
Kong had always been political apathetic, and that their protests were only against the CCP, 
but never against the British, could be seen as one source of tensions between the city and 
Beijing. A factor that further undermined relations between Hong Kong and the PRC was that, 
between the city and Beijing, there existed two prominent forms of Chinese nationalisms. For 
Beijing, nationalism meant loyalty to the CCP; for the majority of Hong Kong Chinese, their 
Chinese nationalism was centred around cultural values and their appreciation of Chinese 
civilizational achievements. For many Hong Kong Chinese, their Chineseness was embedded 
in their daily and everyday life, making it beyond partisan affiliations. Perhaps irrationally, 
many Hong Kong Chinese viewed the implementation of liberal political reforms as a 
transparently beneficial measure to all Chinese that should be the goal of any ruling Chinese 
regime.  Support for reforms became a way for many Hong Kong Chinese to demonstrate their 
love of China.  
Of course, another factor that made Hong Kong such a unique, and in the eye of the 
CCP leadership, unnervingly independent, Chinese city, was the fact that by the final period of 
British colony rule, the citizens of Hong Kong had acquired a local identity that repeatedly 
expressed itself through popular mobilisations. By the end of the 1980s, the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong had become a focus of political mobilisations. Even the DAB had to 
argue for acquiescence, if not loyalty, to the CCP, by stating that such a course of action would 
benefit Hong Kong. By the end of 1989, it became obvious that the post-1997 Hong Kong 
would not be an apolitical financial centre that would simply further accelerate China’s 
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economic reforms. Hong Kong would once again become a part of China in 1997, but Beijing 
had to accept the good with the bad. For better or worse, by 1997, Hong Kong was a Chinese 
global city with a population containing men and women who were willing to protest on the 
street, a characteristic that has come to define the HKSAR.  
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Conclusion 
Continued Political Conflicts in Hong Kong, 1992-1997 
 By 1992, Hong Kong’s political culture, one that predicated on tensions, conflicts and 
mutual antagonism between pro-PRC and pro-Hong Kong activists, was firmly established. Of 
course, the saga of colonial Hong Kong would only end in 1997, and with five years remaining 
before the expiration of the lease on the New Territories and the emergence of an increasingly 
confrontational partisan culture, it stood to reason that Britain would send to the city an 
experienced politician as the Crown Colony’s ‘Last Governor’. Chris Patten, a former 
politician who unexpectedly lost his seat in John Major’s victorious campaign in 1992, arrived 
in Hong Kong as someone seemingly determined to break the mould.1  Wanting ‘to better his 
diplomatic predecessor and to leave his own mark’, Patten ‘intended to restore credibility to 
the governorship in the eyes of the local people’.2 Accordingly, Patten was more than willing 
to interact with local people as if he was a politician intending to win power through democratic 
means.3 While not necessarily hell-bent on creating a Sino-British confrontation, it is now clear 
that Patten was not against engendering a degree of discomfort for Beijing, especially if such 
a course of action would result in popular acclaim. As a political heavyweight appointed by the 
prime minister to the Hong Kong governorship as a reward for sacrificing victory in his own 
riding by campaigning on behalf of the Conservative Party as its campaign chairman, Patten 
possessed sufficient political weight to carry out his objectives.4  
  Patten’s inaugural policy address was one of the most important political speeches in 
the history of Hong Kong, as it laid out the governor’s constitutional reform proposal, which 
represented the commencement of an epic Sino-British clash merely five years before the 
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transfer of sovereignty. Concentrating primarily on reforming the Legislative Council in 
preparation for the 1995 election, Patten lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen 
and eliminated multimember geographical constituencies of the Legislative Council to ensure 
that in future elections, lawmakers would be elected on a ‘single seat, single vote’ basis.5 More 
importantly, Patten wanted to significantly expand the franchises of the existing functional 
constituencies so that an additional 2.7 million members of the workforce would be eligible to 
vote in nine additional functional constituency seats. 6  In this way, workers, instead of 
corporations, would be able to vote in functional constituencies.7 There was also a plan to add 
two seats in which members would be directly elected. 8   Directly elected district board 
members would be responsible for appointing ten lawmakers.9 
 Under closer scrutiny, the Patten reform package was never as radical as the governor 
presented it to be. A critical element of the package was the establishment of a ‘Government-
LegCo Committee’ that would facilitate ‘an effective working relationship between’ the 
executive and the legislative branches, an essential task as Patten abruptly terminated the 
practice of appointing members of the Legislative Council to the Executive Council.10 In the 
1970s and the 1980s, members of the Legislative Council who were appointed to the Executive 
Council were gradually accumulating greater and greater power. As demonstrated by  the 
establishment of the Office of Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Council 
(UMELOO) in 1963 and its transformation into the Office of Members of Executive and 
Legislative Council (OMELCO) in 1985, there was a political tradition in Hong Kong that 
enabled members of the Legislative and Executive Councils to act as liaison between the 
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government and the population at large, a role that elected politicians like Martin Lee could 
utilise to gain a greater level of political prominence.11 At one stroke, Patten significantly 
undermined the power of elected politicians like Martin Lee, who had a very good claim to be 
appointed to the Executive Council. Patten’s reform package, which could be seen as a 
compromise between Beijing’s stated policy to create an executive-led government in which 
legislators were no longer allowed to serve in the executive branch and local desire for political 
reforms, likely spooked the PRC, the leaders of which did not totally understood Hong Kong’s 
political system to begin with.12 Falling to understand the fact that even if Patten’s reform 
package was implemented in its totality, only one-third of the members of the Legislative 
Council would have been directly elected, Beijing become determined to derail Patten’s 
governorship.13 
 After months of political campaign aimed at the destruction of Patten’s credibility in 
Hong Kong, the height of which saw the governor labelled as ‘the criminal of all time’, ‘a 
whore of the east’, ‘a serpent’ and, somewhat oddly, ‘a tango dancer’, Beijing, upon realising 
that London would not send a replacement, very grudgingly agreed to the commencement of 
another round of Sino-British negotiations.14 After months of fruitless talks, Patten, acting with 
London’s permission, and likely annoyed with Beijing’s highly hostile stance, began debates 
on this reform package in November 1993 on the floor of the Legislative Council.15  In the 
summer of 1994, significant portions of the Patten reform package were passed, setting the 
stage for the 1995 election that would be contested on the parameters defined by the governor.16  
The team led by Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, which had by then reconfigured itself into the 
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Democratic Party, once again outperformed the DAB.17 The pro-reform camp won sixteen out 
of twenty geographical constituency seats and 61% of the popular vote.18 With two years left 
before retrocession, the results of the 1995 quickly became irreverent. In November 1996, a 
selection committee was established to select the first chief executive of the post-1997 SAR 
and member of the provisional Legislative Council.19 By December 1996, all members of the 
provisional Legislative Council were appointed, and opposition figures with popular mandates 
like Martin Lee were excluded, while ten pro-PRC political figures who were defeated in the 
1995 election were appointed. In the same month, Tung Chee-hwa, a shipping tycoon whose 
company was financially beholden to the PRC, was selected as the inaugural chief executive.20 
By the end of 1996, there was nothing for Patten to do but to wait for his term to expire in 1997. 
Looking at the Rear-view Mirror: The Emergence of a Hong Kong Identity in the 
Postwar Era and Political Mobilisation in the Colony 
 Political controversies concerning Chris Patten’s governorship were largely the by-
product of Hong Kong identity’s consolidation in 1992, as by the end of this year, the city 
possessed two political camps the adherents of which engaged in political combats over what 
type of relations the city should have with Beijing. Even the most radical of pro-PRC partisans 
had to present loyalty to the CCP as a policy that would benefit Hong Kong, thereby revealing 
that the prosperity of the city represented the primary focus of activists in the colony. If pro-
PRC partisans were determined to eradicate the British status of Hong Kong in 1967 and 
transform it into a city under the control of the CCP, by 1992, their political descendants had 
to explain why closer ties with the PRC would benefit Hong Kong. By the end of the colonial 
era, even the common people of Hong Kong possessed a Hong Kong-centric world view that 
made them ready participants of large-scale political mobilisations.  
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 The emergence of a Hong Kong identity was not a sudden event; instead, it was a 
gradual historical process that largely began in 1949, after the establishment of the PRC. As it 
was demonstrated by Ming. K. Chan, even after becoming a British colony, the absence of 
borders between Hong Kong and nearby southern Chinese cities meant a remarkably high 
degree of interactions between populations at both sides of the Sino-Hong Kong divide, so 
much so that striking workers could easily found shelter, provisions, and even political 
protection from their compatriots in Guangdong. 21  Indeed, in 1921, this ‘intra-delta mobility’ 
enabled a significant portion of Chinese residents in Hong Kong to travel to their cities or 
villages of origin during the Ching Ming festival, thereby distorting the census results to such 
a degree that the population of the colony was shown to have decreased by about 5.3% from 
only a year prior.22 The establishment of the PRC ensured that instead of Hong Kong and 
nearby Chinese cities having two-way traffic that enabled Chinese in the region to travel to 
whatever destinations they desired, by 1949, there would be refugees coming into Hong Kong, 
while Chinese in the colony would largely refrain from extended stays in the PRC. Influxes of 
refugees and the subsequent decision to impose border control not only meant that the colony’s 
population experienced exponential growth, but also that by the 1960s, Hong Kong possessed 
a population the majority of which was locally born.  
 Although members of Hong Kong’s Chinese population shared a profound cultural 
affinity with their neighbours in the Guangdong province, a local identity began to emerge in 
the 1960s. Prolonged separation from their counterparts in China and the existence of a Sino-
Hong Kong border ensured the emergence of a sentiment of distinctiveness that was further 
intensified over the course of the 1967 riots, during which pro-PRC partisans engaged in a 
campaign to eradicate the British status of Hong Kong. While the pro-PRC faction failed in its 
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efforts to cripple British rule, its members in the 1970s, mostly leaders in the student movement 
who were sympathetic to the CCP, were able to rehabilitate the image of Beijing. When the 
Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, it was with reluctant acceptance, mixed with a sense of 
relief that was the by-product of finally knowing their collective fate, that Hong Kong Chinese 
greeted the announcement that their city would once again become part of China in 1997. Of 
course, everything changed in 1989, as events in the PRC essentially gave birth to Hong Kong’s 
culture of protest. The protests in 1989 also significantly enhanced the public profiles of pro-
reform activists who previously were warily received by the general public, and this dramatic 
shift in reputations allowed them to emerge as leaders and to enter the Legislative Council as 
highly regarded lawmakers. It was in response to the anti-Beijing stances of popular public 
figures like Martin Lee that veterans of the pro-PRC camp decided to create a countervailing 
political organisation, the DAB. Hong Kong’s protest culture gave birth to the city’s partisan 
politics.   
Reflections on the Postwar History of Hong Kong 
 This examination of Hong Kong’s immediate past could be seen as a case study on how 
a society that was in constant state of political instability could lead to the emergence of a 
strong identity among its residents. Hong Kong had not only historically been a major site of 
confrontations between colonialism and China, but also a political theatre that witnessed 
clashes between conflicting allegiances to duelling Chinese states. The 1956 riots represented 
a major crisis sparked by the CCP-KMT rivalry in Hong Kong. The conclusion of the Chinese 
Civil War thus made Hong Kong more, not less, politically charged. Therefore, Hong Kong 
was never politically apathetic, and to understand the city, one must understand conflicts that 
had occurred within it. It is for this reason that this dissertation paid significant attention to 
political mobilisations that took post in postwar Hong Kong. Political conflicts within a society 
led to a consolidation of an identity, as duelling conceptions of what ought to be the future 
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direction of the polity reinforced the fact that it had in it passionate men and women who were 
determined to uphold its interests. Failure of pro-PRC partisans to cripple the colonial state in 
1967 led to the strengthening of a local identity, a turn of events that represented a tectonic 
shift in the history of Hong Kong, as it was an indication that Hong Kong Chinese were not 
politically loyal to the PRC, even if they were often contemptuous of their colonisers and were 
well aware of the flaws of British policymakers. It was the realisation of societal ills in Hong 
Kong that led young activists like Albert Ho to participate in social movements such as the 
Anti-Corruption Campaign that ultimately led to the creation of the ICAC. It could even be 
said that the diminishment of the pro-PRC faction after the 1967 riots gave young activists like 
Albert Ho more space to operate in Hong Kong politics, as it became important for supporters 
of Beijing to win the battle of ideas after being defeated in a physical struggle, the former being 
a form of confrontation highly suited for young intellectuals active in the 1970s. In these ways, 
political conflicts in Hong Kong had a transformative effect on local society that is still being 
felt by the people of the city today.  
 Of course, it is important to remember that not everyone in Hong Kong was 
overwhelmingly preoccupied by important political issues of the day, or that partisan political 
struggles represented the most important aspects of the lives of all Hong Kong Chinese. In this 
regard, Brubaker and his colleagues were certainly correct to assert that more often than not, 
'heated nationalist rhetoric evoked only muted popular response’.23 Even accepting that it 
would be naïve to simply take ‘political entrepreneurs’ at their words and accept that nationalist 
and political passions would easily lead to eruption of crises, it would be equally irresponsible 
to conduct research as if tensions never erupted in any given society.24 Epoch- defining events 
did occur in postwar Hong Kong. One of the central concerns of this dissertation is how to 
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reconcile the imperative to examine historical events with the need to focus on more banal 
aspects of daily living. This dissertation therefore examined monumental political events 
without ignoring everyday life and perspectives of common people.  
As it was demonstrated by the history of Hong Kong during the sunset period of British 
rule, the act of marching together in a protest, a shared determination to fulfil a common 
objective, and a commitment to define a way of life were finishing touches to an identity 
formation process that was decades in the making. The actions of Hong Kong protestors 
therefore illustrate to researchers that ‘risky and unusual collective action places one’s identity 
on the line in an especially powerful way’.25 A collective desire to preserve Hong Kong’s status 
as a distinct Chinese city even after 1997 was a motivator for collective actions that resulted in 
the consolidation of a Hong Kong identity. The prosperity of Hong Kong then became the axis 
around which even pro-PRC partisans had to operate, as the semi-liberal electoral system that 
emerged in 1991 made it necessary for them to appeal to an electorate that was convinced that 
the primary responsibility of lawmakers was to promote the city’s welfare. By then, the 
existence of a Hong Kong identity could no longer be questioned, as the city’s distinctiveness 
had been accepted as fact by both the political class and the general public.  
The Significance of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Studies 
 This dissertation has devoted pages after pages on the study of a city that is smaller in 
size than even Westchester Country, New York.26 So is Hong Kong deserving of scholarly 
attention? After all, with the relentless rise of China, other cities in the PRC seemed determined 
to eclipse and ultimately replace Hong Kong as mainland China’s gateway to the outside world. 
With the exception of periods during which riots or protests erupted in Hong Kong, it also 
appears that the city is becoming less deserving of global media coverage. So what is so special 
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about Hong Kong? What are the elements in its past that make it deserving of examinations by 
scholars?   
 With the exception of Taiwan, the former Japanese colony that has yet to come under 
the sovereignty of the PRC, Hong Kong is the only Chinese territory in which mass protests 
and elections for lawmakers are allowed. These political features of Hong Kong are protected 
by the city’s free press and strong rule of law. While there are indications that these 
characteristics of the Hong Kong SAR are atrophying, they are foundations that have made the 
city so vital in China’s modernisation efforts that were begun by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Hong 
Kong would not have become an international financial centre that was absolutely essential in 
the financing of Deng’s reform efforts had it not been the city’s universally respected legal 
system. In the future, should the CCP leadership decide to liberalise the political structure of 
the PRC, its leaders would find a ready blueprint to emulate in the past constitutional 
development of Hong Kong. 
 By providing a historical account of how a Hong Kong identity came to be, this 
dissertation demonstrates the intimate, multi-layered, and indeed, inseparable relations 
between China and Hong Kong. A sense of solidarity that was fundamental to popular 
mobilisations would not have been possible in the absence of a shared Chinese (Cantonese) 
culture. It is important to note that Martin Lee and his cohorts saw themselves as Chinese 
patriots. Indeed, Martin Lee most likely saw Hong Kong as a model for the PRC to emulate, 
noting that the city’s rule of law and liberal values were essential if the PRC is truly to emerge 
as a great global power.27 In this sense, local activists were convinced that what was good for 
Hong Kong would ultimately benefit the PRC as well. While pro-Beijing veterans like Jasper 
Tsang were highly sceptical of Hong Kong’s capacity to influence events in China, pro-reform 
                                                          
27 Oral Interview with Martin Lee, p. 13.  
208 
 
 
activists were convinced that they were doing just that by preserving Hong Kong’s liberal 
political culture and rule of law.28   
 At a time when it appears that China’s relentless economic growth will continue for the 
foreseeable future, talks concerning the Hong Kong SAR serving as a role model for other 
cities in China likely seem as unrealistic as dreams of independence advocated by the most 
radical of the city’s political activists. Indeed, what is there for Hong Kong to teach China when 
the city’s former pupil, Shenzhen, finally surpassed the former British colony in total GDP 
output in 2017?29 While casual observers are now rushing to dismiss the importance of Hong 
Kong, this approach is not repeated by the highest level of state power within the PRC. The 
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area Initiative, the economic integration plan that 
aims to create a powerful economic bloc in the Pearl River Delta, is slated to be led by Han 
Zheng, the PRC’s vice premier.30 If Hong Kong’s economic prosperity is no longer essential 
for the PRC’s survival, the SAR is still very much China’s sole international financial centre 
and an engine for Guangdong province’s growth. In other words, Hong Kong is still absolutely 
essential for Guangdong’s continued economic success as the province becomes the engine for 
national prosperity. Hong Kong’s participation in the Greater Bay Area Initiative is the clearest 
indication of the continued importance of Hong Kong. The future political liberalisation of 
China and continued Chinese prosperity depended considerably on Hong Kong. Ultimately, 
Hong Kong studies is China studies, and as long as China remains a major geopolitical player, 
there will always be audience for monographs focusing on the past, present, and future of the 
PRC’s leading world city.      
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